Armored Likho (Eagle Werewolf) ran a new cyber-espionage campaign in Russia using a fake donation app to deliver the Rust-based Still Toolkit, which includes Still Sync for Telegram data theft and Still Audio for covert voice surveillance. The campaign overlaps with earlier Armored Likho activity and uses infrastructure such as orderapiserver[.]info, tg4service[.]com, and srwinservice[.]com. #ArmoredLikho #EagleWerewolf #StillToolkit #StillSync #StillAudio
Keypoints
- Armored Likho targeted private individuals and organizations in Russia across corporate, government, IT, and education sectors.
- The initial infection used a fake donation-service app built in Rust with the Tauri framework as a dropper.
- The new Still Toolkit contains two Rust implants: Still Sync and Still Audio.
- Still Sync steals Telegram session data and can use the Telegram API to exfiltrate chats, media, and account information.
- Still Audio performs covert audio surveillance by detecting speech and recording conversations when voice activity is present.
- The campaign shares code, encryption logic, and infrastructure patterns with earlier Armored Likho and AquilaRAT-related activity.
- Kaspersky detects the threat as Trojan.Win64.Agent.* and HEUR:Backdoor.Win32.Generic.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1204 ] User Execution â The fake donation app relies on the victim entering a password and interacting with the lure to continue the infection (âthe app mimics a service for donationsâ and âAfter the user enters a valid passwordâ).
- [T1219 ] Remote Access Software â The toolkit enables continued access to Telegram accounts by stealing session data and using the Telegram API to access the victimâs account (âsteals Telegram session data to gain ongoing access to the victimâs accountâ).
- [T1056.001 ] Keylogging â Not used directly as a classic keylogger, but the implant captures user-authored Telegram communications and credentials-like session material through account access (âsteals Telegram session dataâ and âpull chat logsâ).
- [T1119 ] Automated Collection â Still Sync automatically pulls chat logs, media files, and other information from Telegram once it has access (âautomatically pull chat logs, media files, and other information from the accountâ).
- [T1005 ] Data from Local System â The malware searches local directories for Telegram tdata and collects files from disk (âsearches for the tdata folderâ and âpulls a list of files from the tdata folderâ).
- [T1074.001 ] Local Data Staging â The implant prepares collected Telegram files and snapshots for server-side deduplication before exfiltration (âThis lets the C2 server avoid re-receiving files it already hasâ).
- [T1021.005 ] Remote Services: Telegram â The malware authenticates to Telegram and uses its API to access messages and media (âauthenticate to the chat app using the previously obtained tdataâ).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Collected Telegram data and audio recordings are sent to command-and-control servers (âsends it in a POST requestâ and âsends the recordings to a command-and-control serverâ).
- [T1123 ] Audio Capture â Still Audio records microphone audio when speech is detected (âcovert audio surveillanceâ and âstart recording voice when certain conditions are metâ).
- [T1057 ] Process Discovery â The audio implant lists available input devices and selects one for recording (âretrieves ⌠a list of available audio input devicesâ and âactive_deviceâ).
- [T1078 ] Valid Accounts â The attackers use stolen Telegram session data to log in as the victim (âSync can log in to the victimâs accountâ).
- [T1497.001 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks â The campaign collects detailed machine identifiers and system properties for registration and tracking (âMotherboard serial numberâ, âCPU IDâ, âSystem UUIDâ).
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses â The malware uses backup and shadow-copy methods to access protected files when standard access fails (âabuse the SeBackupPrivilege privilegeâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â The GitHub-based C2 address is Base64-encoded and Blowfish-encrypted (âthe server URL Base64-encoded and encrypted with the Blowfish algorithmâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The implant retrieves C2 configuration from GitHub when its server is unreachable (âtries to pull the current C2 URL from a GitHub repositoryâ).
- [T1584.001 ] Compromise Infrastructure: Domains â The operators register and use multiple lookalike domains for infrastructure (âtheir domain names follow similar naming patterns that mimic Windows system servicesâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP addresses] C2 and infrastructure hosting â 187.127.153[.]38, 159.198.37[.]74, and other 6 IPs
- [Domains] command-and-control, dropper, and fallback infrastructure â orderapiserver[.]info, tg4service[.]com, and other 6 domains
- [File hashes] identified sample hashes â C1D1EE16B92E6A138FFA048855F75D7D17674B250D8B422A50A86C9FF207186D62801F6223E860A7CCA271522E303B2D, 68F0365D2FA8C828D012D8859E52A7734BD7C352AE277B0E38D07BEEDD4DD507D4BC09FB10EA2A5DC0BCBEEDA5E5AFDD, and 2 more hashes
- [File names] malicious components and logs â IntAudio.exe, logfile.log, and bin
- [URLs] C2 fallback and configuration source â hxxps://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/mmarln/pi-mono/refs/heads/main/packages/pods/src/array12.json, https://tg4service[.]com:443
- [Windows paths] Telegram data locations searched by the malware â C:UsersAppDataRoamingTelegram Desktop, C:UsersAppDataLocalPackagesLocalCacheRoaming
Read more: https://securelist.com/armored-likho-still-toolkit/121033/