Argamal is a new malware family distributed through trojanized hentai games and torrents that installs a malicious implant, then later downloads a RAT for full system compromise. It uses COM hijacking, scheduled tasks, and changing C2 infrastructure to persist, evade detection, and control infected machines while targeting victims worldwide. #Argamal #AniRena #PixelDrain #Kaspersky #freeddns #kozow #ignorelist
Keypoints
- Argamal was discovered in April 2026 and had variants present since at least 2024.
- The campaign targets players of hentai games distributed via websites and torrent trackers such as AniRena.
- Infected game archives contain legitimate game files plus a malicious FFmpeg DLL and a loader DLL named natives2_blob.bin.
- The malware uses PowerShell stages, environment variables, scheduled tasks, and COM hijacking for persistence and delayed payload delivery.
- The final payload is a RAT capable of full remote control, screenshots, file operations, system reboot/shutdown, and command execution.
- C2 infrastructure includes domains such as asper1[.]freeddns[.]org and Winst0[.]kozow[.]com, both resolving to 186[.]158.223.35.
- Kaspersky says hundreds of victims were affected, mainly in Russia, Brazil, Germany, and Vietnam.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1546.015 ] COM Hijacking â The malware persists by replacing the InprocServer32 entry for a Windows Color System calibration COM object, triggering on user logon (âreplacing the InprocServer32 entryâ / âallowing the malware to run at startupâ).
- [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task â It creates tasks to launch Stage2 three days later and also abuses the WindowsColorSystem calibration loader task to run on each logon (âcreates a scheduled task that will execute three days laterâ / âruns every time a user logs inâ).
- [T1059.001 ] PowerShell â Stage1 and Stage2 are PowerShell scripts used to check the environment, set persistence data, and download/decrypt payloads (âexecutes a Base64-encoded PowerShell scriptâ / âpayload downloader scriptâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â The campaign uses Base64, string substitution, AES-CBC, and encrypted payloads to hide content (âBase64-encoded PowerShell scriptâ / âencrypted payloadâ).
- [T1027.003 ] Steganography / Packed or Encoded Files and Information â The malware stores and decrypts payload data from disguised files such as zaesdl.dat and settings.dat (âdownloads an encrypted payload called zaesdl.datâ / âsaved in the settings.dat fileâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The downloader retrieves payloads from GitHub using bitsadmin.exe (âdownloads an encrypted payload called zaesdl.dat from GitHubâ).
- [T1021 ] Remote Services â The RAT communicates with remote C2 servers over UDP and TCP for command-and-control (âcommunicates with the C2 server using the 3747/tcp portâ / âsends UDP heartbeatsâ).
- [T1056.001 ] Keylogging â The article describes keyboard input control commands such as SKEY and cursor/mouse control, but not full keylogging; no clear keylogging is stated. (âpresses specified keyâ).
- [T1113 ] Screen Capture â The RAT can take screenshots and send them to C2 (âSCREEN / SCREEN9: makes a screenshotâ).
- [T1057 ] Process Discovery â It checks for security tools via tasklist and sends process-related data to C2 (âchecks for the presence of the following security solutions using the output of the tasklist commandâ / âprocess listâ).
- [T1012 ] Query Registry â It reads and writes registry keys for persistence and cleanup (âsets the InprocServer32 registry keyâ / âremoves the changes made under the HKCUSOFTWAREClassesCLSID⌠registry keyâ).
- [T1547.001 ] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder â The malware leverages registry-based startup behavior through COM registration under HKCU, causing execution at logon (âallowing the malware to run during every user sessionâ).
- [T1106 ] Native API â The payload uses Windows native execution functions and shell mechanisms such as ShellExecuteW, WinExec, and CreateProcessW (âExecute command from the response using ShellExecuteWâ).
- [T1569.002 ] System Services: Service Execution â No explicit service execution is described; commands are executed via task, shell, and WinExec instead. (âRUNTASKâ / âRUNDOSâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [SHA1 hash] Malicious DLL and loader components used in the game archive â 42add9475e67a1ccc6a6af94b5475d3defc01b85, edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858d
- [SHA256 hash] RAT payloads identified in the campaign â 76253fb55aed707440e808ea78e7101318436b1c1405a3c5e0aeb08012484134, e16cdec4ab29b4a4535f4337f261b6da20a3c614eb13270bed2d533ad2cb0d7a9
- [Domain] C2 and infrastructure domains used by the RAT â asper1[.]freeddns[.]org, Winst0[.]kozow[.]com
- [Domain] locale-based fallback domain and redirection â country1[.]ignorelist[.]com, github[.]com/gmz159/u
- [IP address] C2 server and related infrastructure â 186[.]158.223.35, 127[.]0.0.1
- [File names] Loader and payload artifacts inside infected archives â natives2_blob.bin, zaesdl.dat
- [URL/Repository] Delivery and hosting sources referenced in the campaign â hxxps://github[.]com/DnyP/files, hxxps://github[.]com/mgzv/p
Read more: https://securelist.com/argamal-rat-distributed-with-hentai-games/119999/