Argamal: Malware hidden in hentai games

Argamal: Malware hidden in hentai games
Argamal is a new malware family distributed through trojanized hentai games and torrents that installs a malicious implant, then later downloads a RAT for full system compromise. It uses COM hijacking, scheduled tasks, and changing C2 infrastructure to persist, evade detection, and control infected machines while targeting victims worldwide. #Argamal #AniRena #PixelDrain #Kaspersky #freeddns #kozow #ignorelist

Keypoints

  • Argamal was discovered in April 2026 and had variants present since at least 2024.
  • The campaign targets players of hentai games distributed via websites and torrent trackers such as AniRena.
  • Infected game archives contain legitimate game files plus a malicious FFmpeg DLL and a loader DLL named natives2_blob.bin.
  • The malware uses PowerShell stages, environment variables, scheduled tasks, and COM hijacking for persistence and delayed payload delivery.
  • The final payload is a RAT capable of full remote control, screenshots, file operations, system reboot/shutdown, and command execution.
  • C2 infrastructure includes domains such as asper1[.]freeddns[.]org and Winst0[.]kozow[.]com, both resolving to 186[.]158.223.35.
  • Kaspersky says hundreds of victims were affected, mainly in Russia, Brazil, Germany, and Vietnam.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1546.015 ] COM Hijacking – The malware persists by replacing the InprocServer32 entry for a Windows Color System calibration COM object, triggering on user logon (‘replacing the InprocServer32 entry’ / ‘allowing the malware to run at startup’).
  • [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – It creates tasks to launch Stage2 three days later and also abuses the WindowsColorSystem calibration loader task to run on each logon (‘creates a scheduled task that will execute three days later’ / ‘runs every time a user logs in’).
  • [T1059.001 ] PowerShell – Stage1 and Stage2 are PowerShell scripts used to check the environment, set persistence data, and download/decrypt payloads (‘executes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script’ / ‘payload downloader script’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – The campaign uses Base64, string substitution, AES-CBC, and encrypted payloads to hide content (‘Base64-encoded PowerShell script’ / ‘encrypted payload’).
  • [T1027.003 ] Steganography / Packed or Encoded Files and Information – The malware stores and decrypts payload data from disguised files such as zaesdl.dat and settings.dat (‘downloads an encrypted payload called zaesdl.dat’ / ‘saved in the settings.dat file’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – The downloader retrieves payloads from GitHub using bitsadmin.exe (‘downloads an encrypted payload called zaesdl.dat from GitHub’).
  • [T1021 ] Remote Services – The RAT communicates with remote C2 servers over UDP and TCP for command-and-control (‘communicates with the C2 server using the 3747/tcp port’ / ‘sends UDP heartbeats’).
  • [T1056.001 ] Keylogging – The article describes keyboard input control commands such as SKEY and cursor/mouse control, but not full keylogging; no clear keylogging is stated. (‘presses specified key’).
  • [T1113 ] Screen Capture – The RAT can take screenshots and send them to C2 (‘SCREEN / SCREEN9: makes a screenshot’).
  • [T1057 ] Process Discovery – It checks for security tools via tasklist and sends process-related data to C2 (‘checks for the presence of the following security solutions using the output of the tasklist command’ / ‘process list’).
  • [T1012 ] Query Registry – It reads and writes registry keys for persistence and cleanup (‘sets the InprocServer32 registry key’ / ‘removes the changes made under the HKCUSOFTWAREClassesCLSID… registry key’).
  • [T1547.001 ] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – The malware leverages registry-based startup behavior through COM registration under HKCU, causing execution at logon (‘allowing the malware to run during every user session’).
  • [T1106 ] Native API – The payload uses Windows native execution functions and shell mechanisms such as ShellExecuteW, WinExec, and CreateProcessW (‘Execute command from the response using ShellExecuteW’).
  • [T1569.002 ] System Services: Service Execution – No explicit service execution is described; commands are executed via task, shell, and WinExec instead. (‘RUNTASK’ / ‘RUNDOS’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA1 hash] Malicious DLL and loader components used in the game archive – 42add9475e67a1ccc6a6af94b5475d3defc01b85, edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858d
  • [SHA256 hash] RAT payloads identified in the campaign – 76253fb55aed707440e808ea78e7101318436b1c1405a3c5e0aeb08012484134, e16cdec4ab29b4a4535f4337f261b6da20a3c614eb13270bed2d533ad2cb0d7a9
  • [Domain] C2 and infrastructure domains used by the RAT – asper1[.]freeddns[.]org, Winst0[.]kozow[.]com
  • [Domain] locale-based fallback domain and redirection – country1[.]ignorelist[.]com, github[.]com/gmz159/u
  • [IP address] C2 server and related infrastructure – 186[.]158.223.35, 127[.]0.0.1
  • [File names] Loader and payload artifacts inside infected archives – natives2_blob.bin, zaesdl.dat
  • [URL/Repository] Delivery and hosting sources referenced in the campaign – hxxps://github[.]com/DnyP/files, hxxps://github[.]com/mgzv/p


Read more: https://securelist.com/argamal-rat-distributed-with-hentai-games/119999/