An in-depth look at APT-C-36 campaigns shows ties to Hagga/Aggah and documents a five-stage infection chain that ends with NjRAT/LimeRAT, including memory-resident techniques and evolving C2 infrastructure. The analysis highlights spearphishing with OLE-triggered delivery, layered VBScript/Powershell execution, in-memory DLL injections, and a Process Hollowing-based final payload load with persistent C2 communication.
#NjRAT #LimeRAT #AsyncRAT #Fsociety #Fiber.dll #Hagga #Aggah #APT-C-36
#NjRAT #LimeRAT #AsyncRAT #Fsociety #Fiber.dll #Hagga #Aggah #APT-C-36
Keypoints
- APT-C-36 campaigns show strong similarities to Hagga/Aggah in TTPs and artefacts.
- Campaigns deploy NjRAT, AsyncRAT, and LimeRAT in a linked progression, with LimeRAT acting as an evolution of NjRAT.
- The infection chain is described in five stages, beginning with a phishing document and ending with NjRAT execution in memory.
- Stage 1 uses an OLE object in a malicious Word doc to trigger infection via a WSF file.
- Stages 2–4 rely on memory-resident, obfuscated components (VBScript/VBS, Fiber.dll, Fsociety.dll) to load final payloads without touching disk.
- Stage 5 injects NjRAT into a suspended RegAsm.exe process using Process Hollowing, then establishes C2 with periodic network traffic.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566.001] Spearphishing Attachment – The attack uses a spearphishing document with an embedded trigger; “The document is revised to see which is the trigger of the infection, finding a suspicious OLE object … which in turn will lead to a WSF file.”
- [T1036] Masquerading – The VBS component “shows the appearance of a legitimate Microsoft WinRM file.”
- [T1059.001] PowerShell – The infection chain uses PowerShell to download and execute scripts (e.g., “through powershell, will download a VBS file from the domain … and then launch it via Explorer”).
- [T1059.005] Visual Basic – The VBScript (VBS) component is used for downloading and executing payloads.
- [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The stage involves downloading a VBS file and later the RAT payload from remote sources.
- [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – Code is obfuscated and later deobfuscated to reveal the original payloads.
- [T1055.001] Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) Injection – The first DLL (DLL.PPAM / Fiber.dll) is injected into the PowerShell process.
- [T1055.012] Process Hollowing – NjRAT is injected into a suspended RegAsm.exe process via process hollowing.
- [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart: Startup Folder – Persistence is achieved by creating a startup link disguised as Notepad.
- [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – A scheduled task is created to ensure persistence of the actor’s payload.
- [T1132] Data Encoding – The final payloads are encoded (e.g., Base64), then decoded in memory before execution.
- [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol – C2 communications occur over web-based endpoints and public hosting (e.g., duckdns, HTTP(S)).
Indicators of Compromise
- [File Hash] 3e1682855ad4035134f6ebd68d56824535b4ca03 – Campaign February 23, 2023 (LimeRAT) – DOCUMENTO (FGE).vbs
- [File Hash] 59170d9b05fa7f3e33d0deaa940798a0bdf4f831 – Campaign February 23, 2023 (LimeRAT) – KZUTPv.dll
- [File Hash] a2a209d0c24c6218ae4b0d445a47b3f5ec04918e – Campaign February 23, 2023 (LimeRAT) – AGWNqj.dll
- [File Hash] f043812a9f333d57967d132f31ce43eb33e0e78d – Campaign February 23, 2023 (LimeRAT) – LimeRAT.exe
- [URL] hxxps://firebasestorage.googleapis[.]com/v0/b/lengua-y-literatura-1422e.appspot.com/o/dll.txt?alt=media&token=1c5d4ddd-8eda-411b-9af8-dcb5ccb40c0f
- [URL] hxxps://firebasestorage.googleapis[.]com/v0/b/proyecto-x-7373e.appspot.com/o/tridimensional.txt?alt=media&token=3ee335b7-99d6-47c9-b7f5-80030d225cc9
- [URL] hxxps://firebasestorage.googleapis[.]com/v0/b/lengua-y-literatura-1422e.appspot.com/o/Pe.txt?alt=media&token=f89c2bab-01ee-4522-a904-b1664f32d06f
- [Domain] fortuna777.duckdns[.]org:1994
- [Domain] asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543
- [URL] hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1066009888083431506/1070342535702130759/Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf[.]uue
- [IP] 192.0.2.123 (simulated) – Note: The IP is simulated and does not correspond to real C2.
Read more: https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/