AllaSenha: AllaKore variant leverages Azure cloud C2 to steal banking details in Latin America

AllaSenha is a banking trojan variant of AllaKore that leverages Azure cloud as its C2 infrastructure to steal Brazilian banking credentials. The infection chain starts with a LNK file disguised as a PDF delivered via WebDAV, then downloads and executes a Python-based downloader (BPyCode) and a Delphi loader to deploy AllaSenha in memory. #AllaSenha #AllaKore #AzureCloud #BPyCode #ExecutorLoader #WebDAV #NotaFiscal.pdf.lnk #ItaúUnibanco #BancoDoBrasil #CaixaEconômicaFederal #Bradesco #Sicoob #BancoSafra

Keypoints

  • AllaSenha is a Latin America–focused AllaKore variant targeting Brazilian banks and credential theft (passwords, 2FA tokens, and QR codes).
  • The infection chain begins with a malicious LNK disguised as a PDF delivered via WebDAV, likely via phishing.
  • BPyCode launcher downloads Python, then runs a base64-encoded Python script to fetch and execute the final payload.
  • Stage 1 (BPyCode) deploys by using a domain-generation algorithm (DGA) to reach Azure-hosted staging servers; it downloads ExecutorLoader and an in-memory DLL payload.
  • Stage 2 (ExecutorLoader) injects AllaSenha into mshta.exe and uses a UPX-packed DLL to execute the final banking trojan in memory.
  • AllaSenha uses a daily rotating DGA and Azure C2, includes 2FA hijacking windows, and relies on ServerSocket for rudimentary remote-control capabilities.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – The infection chain started with a phishing link embedded in an email, leading to a malicious LNK delivered via WebDAV. “we believe with medium confidence that it is a phishing link (that would be embedded in an email)”
  • [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – The targeted user is expected to execute the malicious LNK named NotaFiscal.pdf.lnk. “The targeted user… is expected to execute the malicious LNK (NotaFiscal.pdf.lnk).”
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – A base64-encoded PowerShell script downloads and runs the BPyCode payload. “The resulting PowerShell script downloads the Python binary… and drops it to a created folder”
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – The LNK runs a Windows command shell to download and execute BPyCode launcher. “the LNK file in turn runs a Windows command shell, which creates and opens a fake invalid PDF file… then triggers the download and execution of BPyCode launcher (c.cmd)”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – ZIP archives are decrypted/extracted in memory and used to load components. “decrypts and extracts downloaded ZIP archives in memory”
  • [T1055] Process Injection – ExecutorLoader injects the payload into a (renamed) mshta.exe instance and runs it. “ExecutorLoader injects the payload into a (renamed) mshta.exe instance”
  • [T1218.005] Mshta – The final payload is executed within an mshta.exe process, including creating a thread inside this process to run AllaSenha. “a thread is then created inside the remote mshta.exe process, to run the final payload (AllaSenha).”
  • [T1483] Domain Generation Algorithms – BPyCode and AllaSenha use DGAs to generate C2 hostnames in the brazilsouth.azure.com domain. “uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to generate a list of 3 hostnames….brazilsouth.cloudapp.azure[.]com”
  • [T1095] Non-Application Layer Protocol – C2 communications use raw ASCII over TCP, with hosts and ports negotiated dynamically. “C2 communications between the malware and the server use raw ASCII text over a TCP socket.”
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files or Information – ZIP archives are encrypted with the same password to protect payloads. “encrypted (ZipCrypto) with the same password: Snh2301**Snh2301**”
  • [T1021] Remote Services – The malware includes ServerSocket functionality for keyboard/mouse control and remote desktop capabilities. “ServerSocket, allowing basic RAT functionalities such as keyboard and mouse control, as well remote desktop cababilities.”
  • [T1060] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – BPyCode persistence sets a Run key in the user registry. “registry run key at HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Hash] SHA-256 – 8424e76c9a4ee7a6d7498c2f6826fcde390616dc65032bebf6b2a6f8fbf4a535, 6149a3d1cff3afe3ebb9ac091844a3b7db7533aa69801c98d00b19cdb8b18c9e (Malicious LNK NotaFiscal.pdf.lnk; BPyCode launcher c.cmd)
  • [File name] NotaFiscal.pdf.lnk, c.cmd, dcc.cmd, filesa3.cmd
  • [IP address] 191.232.38.222@80Documentos, 191.235.87.229@80Documentos, 20.197.250.132@80Documentos
  • [Domain] nhefxgbdedndzhebcfedufbgkfecgbccfecgbcc.brazilsouth.cloudapp.azure[.]com
  • [URL] abrir-documento-adobe-reader-1.brazilsouth.cloudapp.azure[.]com@80Documentos, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/marinabarros320168/new/main/Execute_dll.exe
  • [Process/Library] mshta.exe, ExecutorLoader
  • [Registry] HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun

Read more: https://harfanglab.io/en/insidethelab/allasenha-allakore-variant-azure-c2-steal-banking-latin-america/