AeroBlade on the Hunt Targeting the U.S. Aerospace Industry

BlackBerry Threat Research uncovers AeroBlade, a previously unknown threat actor targeting a U.S. aerospace organization for commercial cyber espionage. The operation spans two campaigns (Sept 2022 and July 2023) and involves spear-phishing with weaponized Word documents, multi-stage payloads, and a stealthier final DLL reverse-shell with directory-listing capabilities. #AeroBlade #AerospaceIndustry

Keypoints

  • AeroBlade is a newly identified threat actor tracked by BlackBerry; activities focused on a U.S. aerospace company with commercial espionage goals.
    • The attack chain begins with spear-phishing using a weaponized Word document and remote template injection to fetch a second stage.
    • The final payload is a heavily obfuscated DLL that provides a reverse shell and can enumerate directories, with strong anti-analysis measures.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Spearphishing Attachment – Delivered via targeted email with a weaponized Word document containing an embedded remote template injection and malicious VBA macro code. “The actor used spear-phishing as a delivery mechanism: A weaponized document, sent as an email attachment, contains an embedded remote template injection technique and a malicious VBA macro code, to deliver the next stage to the final payload execution.”
  • [T1221] Remote Template Injection – The docx document employs remote template injection to download the second stage of the infection. “The docx document employs remote template injection, MITRE ATT&CK technique T1221, to download the second stage of the infection.”
  • [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – User opens the document and is prompted to enable content, triggering execution. “The document displays text in a deliberately scrambled font, along with a ‘lure’ message asking the potential victim to click it to enable the content in MS Office.”
  • [T1059.005] Visual Basic – The attack relies on a malicious macro; the second-stage macro runs a library included in the first-stage document. “The second-stage macro also copies the OLE document… to a hard-coded file name at a specific path.”
  • [T1106] Native API – The final payload uses API hashing and anti-analysis techniques to hide Windows API usage. “API hashing to hide its usage of Windows functions; The hash function used is Murmur.”
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – The reverse shell is created via cmd.exe with a pipe and CreateProcessW. “cmd.exe” and associated GetStdHandle/CreatePipe/CreateProcessW sequence are used to spawn the reverse shell.
  • [T1203] Exploitation for Client Execution – The final payload is a DLL that executes to enable persistence and remote control via C2. “The final payload is a DLL that acts as a reverse shell that connects to a hard-coded C2 server.”
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – C2 communications occur over port 443 to a fixed C2 host. “The C2 server IP address is the same… connects to the C2 server, transmitting all its collected information, and spawning a reverse shell, while also sending a list of directories.”
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The second stage is downloaded as part of the infection chain. “The next-stage information is saved in an XML… a… .dotm file downloads the second-stage document.”
  • [T1041] Exfiltration – Data is transmitted to the C2, including system information and directory lists. “transmitting all its collected information, and spawning a reverse shell, while also sending a list of directories found on the infected system.”
  • [T1083] File and Directory Discovery – The payload can list directories on the infected system. “lists all directories found on the now-infected system.”
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – The malware collects system information from the infected machine. “Collects system information from the infected machine.”
  • [T1033] Account Discovery – The sample captures username information via GetUserNameA() and computer name via GetComputerNameA(). “username using GetUserNameA()” and “computer name using GetComputerNameA()”
  • [T1016] System Network Configuration Discovery – The malware gathers IPs and MACs via GetAdaptersInfo(). “IPV4 addresses using GetAdaptersInfo()” and “MAC addresses using GetAdaptersInfo()”
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – Persistence via Windows Task Scheduler with a daily task named WinUpdate2. “Persistence is achieved via Windows Task Scheduler… WinUpdate2”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Static configuration is AES encrypted. “Static configuration is AES encrypted…”
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – The executable is heavily obfuscated to impede analysis. “heavily obfuscated executable which implements complex techniques… anti-disassembly”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IPv4 Address] context – C2-related IPs and infrastructure: [redacted].217, [redacted].195, and 2 more (if applicable)
  • [Domain] context – C2 domains: redacted.redacted.com and redacted.redacted.com
  • [File Hash] context – Second-stage payload hashes: 16bd34c3f00288e46d8e3fdb67916aa7c68d8a0622f2c76c57112dae36c76875, 885B04081BD89F5E23CBC59723052601, 6d515dafef42a5648754de3c0fa6adfcb8b57af1c1d69e629b0d840dab7f91ec, 62D3FF36EC8A721488E512E1C94B2744
  • [File Hash] context – Additional hashes related to the second stage: abc348d3cc40521afc165aa6dc2d66fd9e654d91e3d66461724ac9490030697f, A04D2C0AA0A798047161118B5D5816AA

Read more: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/11/aeroblade-on-the-hunt-targeting-us-aerospace-industry