Operation ForumTroll continues: Russian political scientists targeted using plagiarism reports

Operation ForumTroll continues: Russian political scientists targeted using plagiarism reports

Operation ForumTroll conducted targeted phishing against Russian academics in October 2025 using a spoofed e-library domain to deliver a PowerShell-based downloader and an OLLVM-obfuscated DLL loader. The final payload deployed the commercial Tuoni framework and used COM Hijacking for persistence, with C2 infrastructure on fastly.net. #ForumTroll #Tuoni

Keypoints

  • ForumTroll ran a targeted phishing campaign in Oct 2025 focused on political science, international relations, and global economics scholars in Russia, using spoofed eLibrary emails and personalized archive filenames.
  • Phishing emails originated from support@e-library[.]wiki and linked to https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/wiki.php?id= which delivered a personalized archive named __.zip.
  • The archive contained a victim-named .lnk shortcut that executed a PowerShell script to download a DLL payload and a decoy PDF saved and opened automatically to mask the infection.
  • The final DLL was an OLLVM-obfuscated loader that saved to %localappdata%MicrosoftWindowsExplorericoncache_.dll and established persistence via COM Hijacking (writing to HKCRCLSID{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}InProcServer32).
  • The deployed implant in the fall campaign was the Tuoni red-teaming framework (public portions on GitHub) with C2 traffic routed through fastly.net hostnames.
  • The attackers used long-registered malicious infrastructure and UI elements copied from the legitimate site to build credibility, plus one-time download restrictions and OS checks to hinder analysis.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059.001 ] PowerShell – Used to execute a downloader script launched by the shortcut to fetch and run the payload. (β€˜When the user clicked the shortcut, it ran a PowerShell script.’)
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – The PowerShell script retrieved the final DLL payload from a remote URL on the malicious site. (β€˜Contacted a URL in the format: https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/query.php?id=&key= to retrieve the final payload, a DLL file.’)
  • [T1546.011 ] COM Hijacking – Persistence was achieved by writing the DLL path into a CLSID InProcServer32 registry key to hijack COM component loading. (β€˜writing the path to the DLL file into the registry key HKCRCLSID{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}InProcServer32.’)
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – The final loader was OLLVM-obfuscated to impede analysis and detection. (β€˜The DLL file deployed to infected devices proved to be an OLLVM-obfuscated loader.’)
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 communications and payload hosting used HTTP/S and fastly.net hostnames for command-and-control. (β€˜As in the previous campaign, the attackers used fastly.net as C2 servers.’)
  • [T1204 ] User Execution – The attack relied on social engineering (clicking the link, downloading the archive, and opening the shortcut and decoy PDF) to execute the malicious payload. (β€˜The downloaded archive was named with the victim’s last name, first name, and patronymic.’ and β€˜This PDF was saved to the user’s Downloads folder … and then opened automatically.’)

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain ] phishing and payload hosting – e-library[.]wiki, perf-service-clients2.global.ssl.fastly[.]net, and 2 more fastly hostnames
  • [Email ] phishing sender – support@e-library[.]wiki
  • [IP address ] historical access to legitimate site – 193.65.18[.]14
  • [URLs ] download and payload retrieval endpoints – https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/wiki.php?id=, https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/query.php?id=&key=
  • [File names ] archive, shortcut, and decoy PDF naming patterns – __.zip, __.lnk, __.pdf
  • [File path ] installed payload location – %localappdata%MicrosoftWindowsExplorericoncache_.dll


Read more: https://securelist.com/operation-forumtroll-new-targeted-campaign/118492/