Socket identified a malicious Firefox extension, [email protected], that stays clean until after installation and then downloads a remote payload to automate Google account takeover. The campaign targets Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking users by hijacking Google sessions, stealing oauth_token cookies, and, when needed, forcing password resets through attacker-controlled infrastructure. #[email protected] #pdf.gusercontent.com #accounts.google.com
Keypoints
- The Firefox extension [email protected] was published on September 3, 2026, and its malicious functionality appeared in version 1.4 on September 11, 2026.
- The add-on ships without hardcoded malicious logic, target URLs, or exfiltration endpoints, making static review appear benign.
- After installation, it fetches configuration and payloads from attacker-controlled pdf.gusercontent.com infrastructure.
- The extension uses a message bridge and webRequest monitoring to activate only after it is armed at runtime.
- It injects code into real accounts.google.com pages to automate Google account takeover and capture session cookies.
- If Google forces a password reset, the script sets a new attacker-known password, providing durable account access.
- Socket assessed the campaignâs current scale as low, but highlighted its strong detection-evasion design and Portuguese/Spanish targeting.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1195 ] Supply Chain Compromise â The extension is delivered through the Firefox Add-ons store and only becomes malicious after installation, abusing trusted software distribution (âpublished to the Firefox Add-ons storeâ and âthe extension fetches its malicious configuration and payload from attacker infrastructure only after installationâ).
- [T1056 ] Input Capture â The script intercepts and manipulates authentication-related inputs, including password-reset handling and session-related data (âcapturing both the victimâs Google session cookie and, when Google prompts for one, a password reset valueâ).
- [T1110 ] Brute Force â The takeover flow repeatedly retries and drives Google authentication steps, including password-reset and passkey challenge handling (âforcing the passkey/security-key challengeâ and âdetecting and retrying around Googleâs own bot-detection block pageâ).
- [T1552.001 ] Credentials in Files â The extension stores attacker-controlled configuration and victim identifiers in browser storage for later use (âbrowser.storage.local.setâ and âstores {leadId, email} into the config objectâ).
- [T1204.002 ] Malicious File Execution â The operator injects and executes attacker-supplied JavaScript inside a legitimate Google page (âbrowser.tabs.executeScriptâ and âinjects the fetched load-addon.js directly into that real Google pageâ).
- [T1059.007 ] JavaScript â The payload is executed as JavaScript in the browser context to automate account takeover (âload-addon.jsâ and âscript that will later be injected into accounts.google.com tabsâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â The extension avoids detection by shipping generic dispatcher logic and receiving malicious behavior only as data (âcontains no hardcoded malicious logicâ and âThe malicious behavior ⌠is data, not codeâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The extension downloads a remote payload and configuration after installation (âfetches its malicious configuration and payload from attacker infrastructureâ).
- [T1539 ] Steal Web Session Cookie â The webRequest listener captures Google session cookies from responses and exfiltrates them (âwatches all https://*.google.com/* responses for a Set-Cookie header containing oauth_tokenâ).
- [T1185 ] Browser Session Hijacking â The campaign captures the victimâs authenticated Google session and uses it to gain account access (âstolen, valid oauth_token session cookieâ and âturns the victimâs own authenticated browser session into a remote-controlled account-takeover botâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [Extension identifier ] malicious Firefox add-on â [email protected]
- [Domain / URL ] attacker infrastructure and landing pages â pdf.gusercontent.com, pdf.gusercontent.com/oninstalled
- [Domain / URL ] payload and collection endpoints â pdf.gusercontent.com/loginSdk/load-addon.js, pdf.gusercontent.com/api/accounts/collect/?leadId=&email=&data=
- [Domain / URL ] telemetry and redirect endpoints â pdf.gusercontent.com/api/extlog, pdf.gusercontent.com/reload
- [File names / scripts ] malicious loader and takeover script â index-BhOgWOaO.js, load-addon.js
- [File hashes ] malicious payload hashes â f1b8329075b1cbd1ae0a5dc947bd00f94642cb166a86c2455a1d0b10aee9f2b1, 16447c70f8e3c99de95b92846460214a661915c89f5c10965bf18da4c279880a, and 1 more hash
- [Targeted system / domain ] account takeover target â accounts.google.com
Read more: https://socket.dev/blog/firefox-google-account-takeover