Researchers analyzed a multi-stage infection that used Registry-stored PowerShell, DNS TXT records, PNG and WAV file payload containers, and in-memory .NET loading to hide its activity. The chain ultimately deployed an XMRig-based cryptocurrency miner while maintaining a separate C2 channel and weakening Microsoft Defender and PowerShell logging controls. #XMRig #WinRing0.sys #RealtekHDAudio.wav #sslvalidcert.com #httptls.org
Keypoints
- Initial PowerShell execution was launched with execution-policy bypass and loaded payload data from a Registry value under HKLM:Softwareuf42a9660377vstdfehzr.
- The malware used DNS TXT records from sslvalidcert.com and later txtcdn.net to retrieve encoded data that led to a PNG payload container.
- A PNG image from frames-1zm.pages.dev/frames.png concealed script data in pixel channels and was reconstructed and executed in memory.
- Later stages used ZIP archives and WAV files such as Atsg.wav, Tmav.wav, and Realtek HD Audio.wav to hide additional PowerShell scripts and .NET assemblies.
- The malware established persistence through Scheduled Tasks and a WMI permanent event subscription, while disabling or weakening PowerShell and Microsoft Defender controls.
- The final payload was an XMRig-family cryptocurrency miner that used a config.txt resource, a mining pool, TLS, and a dropped WinRing0.sys driver for optimization.
- A separate C2 channel remained active independently of mining activity, allowing continued remote control and potential delivery of additional payloads.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1059.001 ] PowerShell â Used to run multi-stage scripts and execute reconstructed payloads (âPowerShell.exe -NoProfile -executionPolicy BypassâŚâ; âthe payload extracted the PowerShell code and executed it asynchronouslyâ).
- [T1112 ] Modify Registry â Used the Registry to store and retrieve encrypted payload stages and host identifiers (âthe Registry was being used to store the next stage of the payloadâ; âstored in the Registryâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â Heavily concealed payloads with encoded data, decimal-to-ASCII conversion, nibble reconstruction, and hidden content in images/audio (âencoded PowerShell payloadâ; âreconstructed the embedded data by combining the lower four bitsâ).
- [T1071.004 ] DNS â Used DNS TXT queries to retrieve data and discover C2 information (âqueries DNS TXT recordsâ; âResolve-DnsName performs the TXT record queryâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â Downloaded payload containers and configuration files from remote URLs (âdownloaded a PNG imageâ; âdownloaded a copy from https[:]//publicwavlib[.]pages.dev/mav.wavâ).
- [T1564.001 ] Hidden Files and Directories â Created hidden Scheduled Tasks to maintain persistence (âHidden Scheduled Tasks were created to execute the encrypted payloadâ).
- [T1546.003 ] Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription â Set up a WMI permanent event subscription for persistence (âa WMI permanent event subscription was configuredâ).
- [T1562.001 ] Disable or Modify Tools â Tampered with security and telemetry settings, including Microsoft Defender exclusions and PowerShell history removal (âdisabled or weakened selected security-related featuresâ; âadd broad Microsoft Defender exclusionsâ).
- [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job â Used Scheduled Tasks to run the payload at logon and at regular intervals (âHidden Scheduled Tasks were created to execute the encrypted payload at logon and at regular intervalsâ).
- [T1106 ] Native API â Loaded .NET assemblies directly into memory with Assembly.Load rather than writing them to disk (â[Reflection.Assembly]::Load()â; âloaded it directly into the PowerShell processâ).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Sent host information and command results over the established C2 channel (âtransmitted âInfoâ and âpingoâ messagesâ; âreported to the C2 server using âOKâ or âERRâ responsesâ).
- [T1021.001 ] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol â Not mentioned.
Indicators of Compromise
- [URL ] Payload, configuration, and fallback downloads â https[:]//frames-1zm[.]pages.dev/frames.png, https[:]//publicwavlib[.]pages.dev/hdaudio.wav, and 4 more URLs.
- [Domain ] DNS/C2 discovery and TXT lookups â sslvalidcert.com, httptls.org, and other domains including txtcdn.net.
- [IP Address ] C2 server endpoint â 104[.]21[.]2[.]193:8443.
- [File Names ] Hidden stages and dropped components â Realtek HD Audio.wav, mav.wav, tmav.wav, atsg.wav, and 2 more files.
- [File Hashes ] Sample hashes tied to WAV, DLL, and EXE artifacts â ED276B2312F641B00F87FA18E85C48EB, BE860A15B7E5D44B0B3D67F598238FAD, and 4 more hashes.
- [Registry Path ] Payload storage and host tracking â HKLM:Softwareuf42a9660377vstdfehzr, plus the related uf42a9660377 key.
- [Windows File/Artifact ] Driver and auxiliary component â WinRing0.sys and fp.dll.