MacSync Stealer is a macOS information-stealing MaaS operation that uses ClickFix lures, malvertising, and multi-stage native Mach-O loaders to evade Apple defenses. It exfiltrates credentials, Keychain data, cookies, SSH keys, and crypto wallets through HTTPS C2 infrastructure and cleans up traces with self-deleting temporary files. #MacSync #ClickFix #drivinguber.com #newsinweb.com #com.utils.Launcher
Keypoints
- MacSync Stealer is a commercial macOS information stealer and remote-access stager sold as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS).
- The malware is delivered mainly through ClickFix social engineering and search engine malvertising rather than software exploits.
- Its native 64-bit Mach-O stagers detach from the terminal, hide output, and load AppleScript payloads directly into memory.
- MacSync uses XOR string obfuscation, custom headers, and runtime endpoint construction to evade static analysis and detection.
- Stolen data includes browser vaults, macOS Keychain data, session cookies, SSH keys, Telegram sessions, and cryptocurrency wallet databases.
- Exfiltration is performed in 10 MB chunks over HTTP PUT with retry logic, then temporary files are deleted to reduce forensic traces.
- Telemetry shows broad international targeting, with strong focus on software engineering, crypto/Web3, remote work, government, and fintech sectors.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1204.002 ] User Execution â Victims are tricked into running a Terminal command through ClickFix prompts (âusers are tricked into copying and running commands in Terminal under the guise of software installers, CAPTCHA checks, download errors, or troubleshooting promptsâ).
- [T1059.002 ] AppleScript â The stager pipes remote content directly into osascript to execute an in-memory AppleScript payload (âpipes the response directly into /usr/bin/osascript via stdinâ).
- [T1059.004 ] Unix Shell â The infection chain uses shell commands such as curl and zsh to launch stages (âcurl -s ⌠| zshâ).
- [T1543.001 ] Launch Agent â Persistence is established by placing a malicious plist in LaunchAgents (âpersists using the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ directoryâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â Strings, URLs, headers, and paths are hidden with single-byte XOR obfuscation (âhide functional strings ⌠using ⌠ObfuscatedStringâ).
- [T1564.001 ] Hidden Files and Directories â Temporary artifacts are stored with dot-prefixed names (â/tmp/.httpcodeâ).
- [T1070.004 ] File Deletion â The malware removes staging and status files after successful upload (âdeletes /tmp/osalogging.zip and /tmp/.httpcodeâ).
- [T1036.005 ] Masquerading â The signed binary uses a spoofed utility-style identifier to blend in (âSigning Identifier com.utils.Launcherâ).
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses â It suppresses terminal output by redirecting standard streams to /dev/null (âredirects stdin, stdout, and stderr to /dev/nullâ).
- [T1555.001 ] Credentials from Password Stores â The AppleScript steals Keychain data and stored credentials (âsteals all keychains dataâ).
- [T1539 ] Steal Web Session Cookie â The payload dumps browser session cookies for reuse (âsession cookiesâ).
- [T1552.004 ] Private Keys â The stealer targets SSH keys and other private credentials (âSSH keysâ).
- [T1082 ] System Information Discovery â The malware collects host details such as macOS version and hardware UUID (âcollects macOS version, hardware UUID, and CPU architectureâ).
- [T1560.001 ] Archive Collected Data â Stolen data is bundled into a ZIP archive before exfiltration (âarchives stolen data into /tmp/osalogging.zipâ).
- [T1071.001 ] Web Protocols â C2 communication uses HTTPS with custom headers (âconnects to C2 servers over HTTPSâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The remote AppleScript payload is fetched from the server and executed (âDownloads second-stage AppleScript modulesâ).
- [T1030 ] Data Transfer Size Limits â Large archives are split into 10 MB chunks for upload (âsplits files into 10 MB chunksâ).
- [T1048.003 ] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol â Data is uploaded with HTTP PUT requests (âuploads them sequentially via HTTP PUT requestsâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [SHA-256 Hash ] Native Mach-O stager sample â 9ff32f7c0108e9d27a3b491edf04827b6ca025f44db68aeadc44eeb97c9aab11, and other 2 items (MD5 9678f71ea4cccbc3d511dc8d7f24b113, SHA-1 59508d071661ea70fa5fcbe6f9e2fb72506e57df)
- [Code Signing ID ] Spoofed ad-hoc signing identifier â com.utils.Launcher
- [File Path ] Staging and cleanup artifacts â /tmp/osalogging.zip, /tmp/.httpcode
- [Domain ] Primary and fallback C2 infrastructure â drivinguber.com, newsinweb.com
- [Subdomain ] Region-specific fallback endpoints â asia.newsinweb.com, usa.newsinweb.com
- [URI ] Dynamic payload and upload gates â /dynamic?txd=c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522ad572a4014275cf979013a0, /gate?buildtxd=c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522ad572a4014275cf979013a0
- [HTTP Header ] Campaign authentication header â api-key: de62a2f47d1c7dec2997f931a050a615
- [User-Agent ] Spoofed client string â Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) CFNetwork/Darwin 26.0.0 AppleWebKit/537.36
- [Campaign Token ] Shared transaction token used in URLs â c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522ad572a4014275cf979013a0
Read more: https://www.seqrite.com/blog/macsync-the-evasive-macos-stealer-exploiting-clickfix-lures/