Cambodia-focused cluster uses multistage infection chain with localized lures

Cambodia-focused cluster uses multistage infection chain with localized lures
Acronis TRU uncovered a Cambodia-focused campaign that uses phishing-style archives, DLL sideloading, PNG-embedded payloads, BYOVD, and process injection to deploy SparkRAT while impairing multiple security products. The activity shows similarities to SilverFox tradecraft but lacks enough evidence for direct attribution, so it is tracked as an unattributed cluster with possible Chinese-language development or deployment links. #SparkRAT #SilverFox #CVE-2026-36425 #ardrv.sys #OPSWATAppRemover #HuorongInternetSecurity #TencentPCManager

Keypoints

  • The campaign targeted individuals and organizations in Cambodia using lure themes such as government notices, public health materials, dental records, and real estate documents.
  • The initial delivery used a compressed archive containing an Inno Setup executable named as a Cambodian COVID-19 notice.
  • The infection chain included DLL sideloading, anti-analysis checks, token manipulation, PNG-based shellcode decryption, process injection, and BYOVD.
  • The malware created persistence through a Windows service and a scheduled task named TaskHandler.
  • The campaign installed the vulnerable driver ardrv.sys, associated with OPSWAT AppRemover, and abused CVE-2026-36425 to terminate security processes.
  • Final payloads injected into legitimate processes included SparkRAT, which communicated with sx.nuihuw.com:443 and had a backup C2 at nuihuw.top:443.
  • Acronis assessed the activity as an unattributed cluster with low-confidence links to the broader SilverFox ecosystem.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566 ] Phishing – The campaign used archive filenames and lure documents to entice victims (‘targeted-phishing delivery scenario’ and ‘Cambodian Government Notice on COVID-19 Prevention and Control’).
  • [T1574.002 ] DLL Side-Loading – A signed Tencent binary loaded the malicious DLL (‘used to sideload the malicious DLL WfoY.qf’).
  • [T1620 ] Reflective Code Loading – The final payload was reflectively loaded into memory (‘reflectively loads SparkRAT into a legitimate Windows process’).
  • [T1055 ] Process Injection – The malware injected shellcode into vssvc.exe, ctfmon.exe, and svchost.exe (‘injects the decrypted shellcode into vssvc.exe’ and ‘injected into ctfmon.exe’).
  • [T1562.001 ] Disable or Modify Tools – The loader impaired defenses by patching AMSI/ETW, adding exclusions, and weakening security processes (‘attempts to patch AMSI and ETW’ and ‘adding exclusions’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Encrypted payloads were hidden in PNG files and decrypted at runtime (‘shellcode hidden in PNG files’ and ‘treats the concatenated IDAT data as the encrypted payload’).
  • [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – The campaign abused a vulnerable driver to gain privileged kernel capability (‘CVE-2026-36425’ and ‘permits local users to submit process-termination requests without adequate privilege validation’).
  • [T1543.003 ] Windows Service – The malware created and started a service for persistence (‘sc create TaskHandler’ and ‘create a Windows Service’).
  • [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – It also created an on-start scheduled task for persistence (‘schtasks /create /tn “TaskHandler”‘).
  • [T1112 ] Modify Registry – Microsoft Defender exclusions were added through registry entries (‘configures Microsoft Defender exclusions by adding registry entries’).
  • [T1134.001 ] Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft – The loader searched for winlogon.exe and impersonated its SYSTEM token (‘accesses winlogon.exe’s SYSTEM token for impersonation’).
  • [T1083 ] File and Directory Discovery – The malware enumerated files, directories, and PNG components during staging (‘retrieves the directory and appends the following filename’).
  • [T1518.001 ] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery – It checked for Huorong and 360 security products before taking action (‘processes related to Huorong Internet Security’ and ‘360 Security processes’).
  • [T1012 ] Query Registry – The payload added Defender exclusions and likely checked system configuration via registry-related actions (‘adding registry entries’).
  • [T1003 ] OS Credential Dumping – Not observed directly; the campaign instead abused tokens and SYSTEM context, so no direct credential dumping was described in the article.
  • [T1106 ] Native API – The malware used Windows APIs such as OpenProcessToken, NtCreateFile, NtReadFile, and TerminateProcess (‘OpenProcessToken’ and ‘TerminateProcess API’).
  • [T1497.001 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks – Timing-based anti-sandbox logic was used to detect analysis environments (‘timing-based anti-sandbox check’).
  • [T1610 ] Deploy Container – Not observed; no container deployment was described in the article.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File names / paths ] staged payloads and lure archive names – Cambodian Government Notice on COVID-19 Prevention and Control (July 7).docx.exe, 56360VK1ES8.yvap
  • [File names ] additional PNG-embedded payload containers – BssBfeFFoA3A.nz, d7zzQhzRglBv.es, cnV.rb
  • [File name / driver ] vulnerable kernel driver used in BYOVD – ardrv.sys
  • [Domains / C2 ] command-and-control infrastructure – sx.nuihuw.com:443, nuihuw.top:443
  • [File hashes ] analyzed samples and dropped artifacts – 0a050e1d5338b936037f0928039c26893a553c3170b16b82bf75a9113b34a52f, 7504887e1e195ad585cffa5b6a5034161a7cc49f351123d60def79302bdb8326, and other hashes listed for the archives and payloads
  • [Executable / loader ] signed sideloading binary – F7u00ex.exe, WfoY.qf


Read more: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/cambodia-focused-cluster-uses-multi-stage-infection-chain-with-localized-lures/