Batten Down Your Packages: Mitigation Guidance for Supply Chain Compromise

Batten Down Your Packages: Mitigation Guidance for Supply Chain Compromise
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) reports a sharp rise in open source software supply chain compromise in 2025 and early 2026, including major campaigns tied to UNC6780, MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, and UNC4899. The article also outlines detailed mitigation guidance for protecting ecosystems such as PyPI, npm, Docker Hub, GitHub Actions, and developer pipelines from package poisoning, credential theft, and workflow abuse. #UNC6780 #MIDNIGHTNEPTUNE #UNC4899 #axios #PyPI #npm #DockerHub #GitHubActions

Keypoints

  • GTIG says open source software supply chain compromise grew significantly in 2025 and early 2026, with increasing volume and impact.
  • Most major incidents involved compromise of code repositories, dependencies, and developer tools rather than classic source-code update channels.
  • UNC6780 (TeamPCP) targeted PyPI, npm, and Docker Hub, used pull_request_target abuse, and deployed credential stealers such as SANDCLOCK.
  • A malicious dependency in axios was attributed to MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, with the release weaponized to deploy the WAVESHAPER.V2 backdoor before removal from npm.
  • GTIG warns that AI-assisted development may accelerate supply chain attacks, including malicious packages being inserted into MCP and AI coding workflows.
  • Traditional supply chain compromise remains rarer, but notable cases included UNC4899’s exploitation of a web3 organization and UNC6863’s DAEMON Tools campaign.
  • The article recommends layered defenses such as SBOMs, short-lived tokens, workflow restrictions, runner isolation, package cooldowns, and stronger vendor governance.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1195.001 ] Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools – Used to compromise code repositories, software dependencies, and developer tools in open source supply chain attacks (‘compromise of code repositories, software dependencies and developer tools’).
  • [T1195.002 ] Compromise Software Supply Chain – Describes manipulation of source code or update/distribution mechanisms in traditional supply chain compromise (‘manipulation of source code or update/distribution mechanisms’).
  • [T1195.001 ] Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools – UNC6780 abused the pull_request_target GitHub Actions trigger to access secrets and write permissions (‘abuse of the pull_request_target GitHub Actions trigger to obtain base repository secrets and write permissions’).
  • [T1566.002 ] Spearphishing Link – The axios maintainer account was compromised through social engineering, leading to malicious package publication (‘the maintainer account was compromised via social engineering’).
  • [T1021 ] Remote Services – UNC4899 used social engineering to gain access to a developer machine and then operated within the victim environment to inject malicious code (‘compromise a developer’s machine’).
  • [T1059.004 ] Unix Shell – The article advises on detecting shell-escape characters and command-substitution patterns in untrusted input, indicating shell-based abuse paths (‘shell-escape characters or command-substitution patterns’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Malicious packages and droppers such as the axios dependency and SLICKDEMON/BADFALL delivered payloads into victim environments (‘deploy the WAVESHAPER.V2 backdoor’, ‘deliver the shellcoded loader BADFALL’).
  • [T1218 ] System Binary Proxy Execution – The article discusses malicious install scripts and package execution abuse via npm/pnpm lifecycle behavior (‘disable the automatic running of package install scripts’).
  • [T1552 ] Unsecured Credentials – UNC6780 deployed credential stealers and the article focuses on token theft, static keys, and leaked credentials (‘deploy credential stealers’, ‘harvest credentials’).
  • [T1098 ] Account Manipulation – Package registry maintainer accounts were taken over and used to publish malicious code (‘the maintainer account was compromised and used to publish the updated versions’).
  • [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application – Consumer-facing websites were compromised to serve ClickFix lures and web skimmers (‘automotive dealership websites served ClickFix lures’, ‘eCommerce websites were infected with web skimmers’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Malware/Tool Names ] Malicious payloads and tools referenced in the campaigns – SANDCLOCK, WAVESHAPER.V2, SLICKDEMON, BADFALL, SHADOWLADDER
  • [Threat Actor Names ] Actors associated with the supply chain incidents – UNC6780, MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, UNC4899, UNC6688, UNC6863
  • [Package/Repostory Names ] Compromised or targeted open source ecosystems and packages – axios, PyPI, npm, Docker Hub
  • [Platform/Workflow Names ] Environments and triggers used or abused in the attacks – GitHub Actions, pull_request_target, Model Context Protocol (MCP)
  • [Organization/Platform Names ] Organizations and services referenced in mitigation and incident context – Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), Mandiant, OpenSSF, Linux Foundation, Notepad++
  • [Numeric/Exposure Context ] Scale of compromise and distribution impact – over 100 million weekly downloads, 15 industry verticals, 13 countries, 1.4B USD


Read more: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/mitigation-guidance-for-supply-chain-compromise/