From emerging threat to top-tier ransomware-as-a-service: The evolution of INC ransomware

From emerging threat to top-tier ransomware-as-a-service: The evolution of INC ransomware
INC ransomware evolved into one of the most active RaaS operations by 2026, surpassing 800 victims since 2023 and expanding after LockBit’s disruption and BlackCat’s shutdown. The group uses Rust-compiled Windows and Linux/ESXi encryptors, updated Veeam credential-dumping tooling, and an affiliate ecosystem that helped spawn related families like Lynx and Sinobi. #INC #LockBit #BlackCat #Veeam #Lynx #Sinobi

Keypoints

  • INC has grown from a mid-2023 RaaS operation into one of the most active ransomware groups in 2026, with more than 800 victims since 2023.
  • The group benefited from the disruption of LockBit and BlackCat, as affiliates reportedly migrated to INC.
  • Both Windows and Linux/ESXi payloads were rewritten in Rust, increasing portability and making analysis harder.
  • INC updated its tooling with a modified Veeam credential dumper that supports newer salted DPAPI credential encryption.
  • The 2024 sale of INC source code helped inspire related ransomware families, including Lynx and Sinobi, which share code overlap.
  • Victims are heavily concentrated in the United States, with legal services, manufacturing, construction, technology, and health care among the top targets.
  • INC uses double extortion, exfiltration to cloud storage via rclone, remote access tools, and printer-based ransom note delivery to pressure victims.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566 ] Phishing – Initial access via spear phishing used by affiliates to enter victim environments (‘spear phishing’).
  • [T1078 ] Valid Accounts – Actors used stolen or compromised credentials from Initial Access Brokers and reused valid logins (‘valid account credentials from Initial Access Brokers (IAB)’).
  • [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application – Initial access through exploitation of exposed systems such as Citrix, Fortinet EMS, and SimpleHelp (‘exploitation of vulnerabilities in public-facing applications’).
  • [T1016 ] System Network Configuration Discovery – Discovery of networked systems and volumes by iterating drives and checking connectivity (‘GetDriveTypeW’, ‘ping and net commands’).
  • [T1047 ] Windows Management Instrumentation / Command and Scripting Interpreter – Command execution and discovery were performed through cmd.exe and PowerShell (‘deploy a base64 encoded script through cmd.exe’).
  • [T1003 ] OS Credential Dumping – A modified Veeam credential dumper was used to extract stored credentials (‘The decoded script is found to be a Veeam credential dumper’).
  • [T1021.001 ] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol – Lateral movement used RDP to access other systems (‘including remote desktop protocol (RDP)’).
  • [T1021.002 ] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral movement included PsExec-based remote execution (‘PsExec’).
  • [T1489 ] Service Stop – Used tools such as PsKill and custom terminators to kill EDRs and processes (‘used different tools to kill EDRs’).
  • [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Dropped vulnerable drivers and terminated security tooling to weaken defenses (‘drops vulnerable drivers … and installs them as a service’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Payloads were packed with VMProtect and encoded notes/scripts were embedded in Base64 (‘heavily packed and protected by VMProtect’, ‘Base64-encoded string’).
  • [T1219 ] Remote Access Software – Commercial tools were used for C2 and remote control (‘Cobalt Strike, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and TeamViewer’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Staged data was compressed and uploaded to attacker-controlled cloud storage using rclone (‘upload the archives to attacker-controlled cloud storage using rclone’).
  • [T1486 ] Data Encrypted for Impact – Files were encrypted across the environment with configurable partial encryption (‘run the encryptor across the environment’).
  • [T1490 ] Inhibit System Recovery – Shadow copies were deleted to hinder recovery (‘Successfully deleted shadow copies’).
  • [T1046 ] Network Service Scanning – The malware scanned for active printers and other network assets (‘scans the compromised network for active printers’).
  • [T1565.001 ] Stored Data Manipulation: Data Encrypted – The malware appended .INC to files and used file footers to mark encrypted data (‘appends ‘.INC’ extension to all encrypted files’).
  • [T1070.004 ] File Deletion – The payload removed or overwrote artifacts such as shadow copies and notes during execution (‘while deleting shadow copies’).
  • [T1091 ] Replication Through Removable Media – Not directly confirmed; no direct use beyond removable media discovery, so omit if strict matching is required.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File hashes ] Windows sample and Linux sample hashes – 31800380c359143ae82c4f9011eee653dd22443d03d6a499148203bbfc275502, 589d9480fbfec2d8e61638eb0b537183d0f9977411fd1d2c0f8eb611feebe8807
  • [Domains ] Public leak and payment infrastructure – incblog[.]su, incblog6qu4y4mm4zvw5nrmue6qbwtgjsxpw6b7ixzssu36tsajldoad[.]onion
  • [Domains ] Payment site – incpaykabjqc2mtdxq6c23nqh4x6m5dkps5fr6vgdkgzp5njssx6qkid[.]onion
  • [File names ] Ransom note and family marker – INC-README.txt, .INC
  • [Executable names / paths ] Discovery and defense-impairment tools used in incidents – ipscan.exe, pskill.exe, netscan.exe
  • [IP addresses ] Internal discovery targets mentioned in incident context – 10.2.2.202
  • [Driver names ] Vulnerable drivers dropped by the custom terminator – filwfp.sys, filnk.sys, fildds.sys


Read more: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/from-emerging-threat-to-top-tier-ransomware-as-a-service-the-evolution-of-inc-ransomware/