Fake Microsoft Teams download sites were used to distribute a trojanized ZIP archive that installs a multistage loader chain ending in ValleyRAT. The campaign abuses GameBox.exe for DLL sideloading, evades Windows Defender, steals clipboard and log data, and communicates with a C2 server at 103.215.77.17. #ValleyRAT #GameBox.exe #SilverFoxAPT #MicrosoftTeams
Keypoints
- Fake Microsoft Teams distribution sites were shared on X in mid-April and closely mimicked the legitimate Teams download page.
- Users were tricked into downloading a ZIP archive that launched a malicious NSIS installer instead of a normal Teams installer.
- The attack used DLL sideloading through the legitimate Tencent executable GameBox.exe to load a malicious DLL named utility.dll.
- The malware weakened Windows Defender by adding exclusion paths and exclusion processes through PowerShell commands.
- The infection chain used in-memory decryption, shellcode injection, API hashing, and reflective loading to reduce disk-based detection.
- The final payload was identified as a ValleyRAT variant, with behavior and registry patterns suggesting a link to SilverFox APT activity.
- The malware captured clipboard contents, wrote local logs, and maintained outbound communication with a command-and-control server.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1189 ] Drive-by Compromise â Users were directed to malicious Teams-lookalike sites that prompted a harmful download (âusers are prompted to download a compressed archiveâ).
- [T1566.002 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Link â The campaign used convincing fake Microsoft Teams themed websites to lure victims into clicking and downloading (âclosely mimic the official Microsoft Teams download pageâ).
- [T1036 ] Masquerading â The sites and downloaded files were designed to appear legitimate, including a fake Teams installer and shortcut (âhelping avoid suspicion by presenting an expected behaviorâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The malicious archive and staged payloads were downloaded from attacker-controlled infrastructure (âprompted to download a compressed archiveâ).
- [T1218 ] System Binary Proxy Execution â A legitimate Tencent executable GameBox.exe was abused to execute malicious code via sideloading (âlegitimate executable (GameBox.exe) being abusedâ).
- [T1574.002 ] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading â The attack loaded utility.dll through a legitimate executable to execute the payload (âside-load a malicious dll named utility.dllâ).
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools â Windows Defender was weakened using PowerShell exclusions (âAdd-MpPreference -ExclusionPathâ and âAdd-MpPreference -ExclusionProcessâ).
- [T1036.002 ] Masquerading: Prepend/Append Legitimate Name or Location â Malware was copied into ProgramData and hidden to blend in (âcopied to the ProgramData folderâ).
- [T1112 ] Modify Registry â The malware used registry keys for configuration and persistence-related data (âconfiguration data⌠were likely written to HKCUSOFTWAREIpDates_infoâ).
- [T1543.003 ] Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service â Persistence was established by creating an auto-start service named _CCGDAT (âcreating a service named _CCGDATâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â Payloads were stored encrypted and later decrypted in memory using AES and XOR (âstored in an encrypted format in memoryâ).
- [T1055 ] Process Injection â Shellcode was allocated in memory and executed in the current process (âallocates memory within the current process and writes the decrypted shellcode into itâ).
- [T1106 ] Native API â The malware used Windows APIs such as CreateThread, GetClipboardData, SetFileAttributes, and BcryptDecrypt to perform actions (âExecution is then transferred using CreateThreadâ).
- [T1027.007 ] Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution â API hashing was used to resolve Windows APIs at runtime (âcomputes hashes and dynamically matches themâ).
- [T1620 ] Reflective Code Loading â The final payload used reflective loading to map the PE into memory (âuses Reflective Loading techniques to map the PE into memoryâ).
- [T1056.001 ] Input Capture: Keylogging â Local logs stored captured keystrokes, indicating keylogging activity (âstores operational data such as captured keystrokesâ).
- [T1115 ] Clipboard Data â The malware accessed clipboard contents to steal sensitive information (âaccessing clipboard contents through the GetClipboardData APIâ).
- [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols â The malware communicated with a remote C2 server and exchanged data (âmaintaining communication with the remote serverâ).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Collected logs and data were sent back to the command-and-control server (âsends collected data back to the serverâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domains ] fake Microsoft Teams lure sites â teams-securecall[.]com, teamszs[.]com
- [URL/Archive Name ] trojanized download archive names â 98653.2.87.teamsx.zip, teamsxb.zip
- [File Names ] dropped malicious and staged files â utility.dll, user.dat
- [File Names ] installer-related component â GameBox.exe, legitimate Microsoft Teams installer
- [File Hashes ] detected IOC hashes associated with the files â 709604CE58E3F8255587AC9253DB6994, 18F3E85D7237E3CAC0AD13BDCF513F0F and 1 more hash
- [IP Address ] command-and-control server â 103.215.77.17