Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities

ESET researchers exposed Operation LiberalFace, a MirrorFace spearphishing campaign aimed at Japanese political entities around the 2022 House of Councillors election. The operation leveraged the LODEINFO backdoor, introduced a new credential stealer MirrorStealer, and involved manual/semi-manual post‑compromise actions to exfiltrate data. #MirrorFace #LODEINFO #MirrorStealer #OperationLiberalFace #HouseOfCouncillors #Ichitaro

Keypoints

  • MirrorFace launched Operation LiberalFace in late June 2022 targeting Japanese political entities, with a focus on members of a specific party.
  • Spearphishing emails delivered the group’s backdoor backdoor LODEINFO via self-extracting WinRAR attachments.
  • LODEINFO was used to deliver additional malware, exfiltrate credentials, and steal documents and emails from victims.
  • A previously undocumented credential stealer, MirrorStealer, was deployed during the operation.
  • Post‑compromise activity appears to be manual or semi‑manual, including C2 commands and data exfiltration steps.
  • Details of the campaign were shared at AVAR 2022, with analysis suggesting MirrorFace targets in Japan and possible connections to broader Japanese‑facing espionage activity.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – A malicious WinRAR SFX archive is attached to a spearphishing email. “Spearphishing email messages containing the group’s flagship backdoor LODEINFO were sent to the targets.”
  • [T1106] Native API – LODEINFO can execute files using the CreateProcessA API. “LODEINFO can execute files using the CreateProcessA API.”
  • [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – Victim opening a malicious attachment sent via email. “victim opening a malicious attachment sent via email.”
  • [T1559.001] Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model – LODEINFO can execute commands via Component Object Model. “LODEINFO can execute commands via Component Object Model.”
  • [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – LODEINFO adds an entry to the HKCU Run key to ensure persistence. “LODEINFO adds an entry to the HKCU Run key to ensure persistence.”
  • [T1112] Modify Registry – LODEINFO can store its configuration in the registry. “LODEINFO can store its configuration in the registry.”
  • [T1055] Process Injection – LODEINFO can inject shellcode into cmd.exe. “LODEINFO can inject shellcode into cmd.exe.”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – LODEINFO loader decrypts a payload using a single-byte XOR or RC4. “LODEINFO loader decrypts a payload using a single-byte XOR or RC4.”
  • [T1574.002] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading – MirrorFace side-loads LODEINFO by dropping a malicious library and a legitimate executable (e.g., K7SysMon.exe). “MirrorFace side-loads LODEINFO by dropping a malicious library and a legitimate executable (e.g., K7SysMon.exe).”
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – LODEINFO fingerprints the compromised machine. “LODEINFO fingerprints the compromised machine.”
  • [T1083] File and Directory Discovery – LODEINFO can obtain file and directory listings. “LODEINFO can obtain file and directory listings.”
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – LODEINFO can list running processes. “LODEINFO can list running processes.”
  • [T1033] System Owner/User Discovery – LODEINFO can obtain the victim’s username. “LODEINFO can obtain the victim’s username.”
  • [T1614.001] System Language Discovery – LODEINFO checks the system language to verify that it is not running on a machine set to use the English language. “LODEINFO checks the system language to verify that it is not running on a machine set to use the English language.”
  • [T1560.001] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility – Operators archive collected data using the RAR archiver. “archiving collected data using the RAR archiver.”
  • [T1114.001] Email Collection: Local Email Collection – Operators collecting stored email messages. “collecting stored email messages.”
  • [T1056.001] Input Capture: Keylogging – LODEINFO performs keylogging. “LODEINFO performs keylogging.”
  • [T1113] Screen Capture – LODEINFO can obtain a screenshot. “LODEINFO can obtain a screenshot.”
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – Operators collecting and exfiltrating data of interest. “collecting and exfiltrating data of interest.”
  • [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – LODEINFO uses the HTTP protocol to communicate with its C2 server. “LODEINFO uses the HTTP protocol to communicate with its C2 server.”
  • [T1132.001] Data Encoding: Standard Encoding – LODEINFO uses URL-safe base64 to encode its C2 traffic. “URL-safe base64 to encode its C2 traffic.”
  • [T1573.001] Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography – LODEINFO uses AES-256-CBC to encrypt C2 traffic. “LODEINFO uses AES-256-CBC to encrypt C2 traffic.”
  • [T1001.001] Data Obfuscation: Junk Data – Second-stage LODEINFO C2 prepends junk to sent data. “prepends junk to sent data.”
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – LODEINFO can exfiltrate files to the C2 server. “exfiltrate files to the C2 server.”
  • [T1071.002] Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols – MirrorFace used SCP (pscp.exe) to exfiltrate data. “Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to exfiltrate collected data.”
  • [T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact – LODEINFO can encrypt files on the victim’s machine. “Data Encrypted for Impact.”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File] K7SysMn1.dll – LODEINFO loader. F4691FF3B3ACD15653684F372285CAC36C8D0AEF.
  • [File] K7SysMon.Exe.db – Encrypted LODEINFO. DB81C8719DDAAE40C8D9B9CA103BBE77BE4FCE6C.
  • [File] JsSchHlp.exe – Signed by JUSTSYSTEMS CORPORATION, with appended second-stage LODEINFO data. A8D2BE15085061B753FDEBBDB08D301A034CE1D5.
  • [File] JSESPR.dll – Second-stage LODEINFO loader. 0AB7BB3FF583E50FBF28B288E71D3BB57F9D1395.
  • [File] 31558_n.dll – MirrorStealer credential stealer. E888A552B00D810B5521002304D4F11BC249D8ED.
  • [IP] 5.8.95.174 – LODEINFO C2 server (G-Core Labs). First seen 2022-06-13.
  • [IP] 45.32.13.180 – Server for data exfiltration (AS-CHOOPA). First seen 2022-06-29.
  • [IP] 103.175.16.39 – LODEINFO C2 server (Gigabit Hosting). First seen 2022-06-13.
  • [IP] 167.179.116.56 – Second-stage LODEINFO C2 server (AS-CHOOPA). First seen 2021-10-20.
  • [IP] 172.105.217.233 – Second-stage LODEINFO C2 server (Linode, LLC). First seen 2021-11-14.
  • [Domain] www.ninesmn.com – Second-stage LODEINFO C2 server (associated with 167.179.116.56).
  • [Domain] www.aesorunwe.com – Second-stage LODEINFO C2 server (associated with 172.105.217.233).

Read more: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/12/14/unmasking-mirrorface-operation-liberalface-targeting-japanese-political-entities/