Threat Spotlight: AsyncRAT campaigns feature new version of 3LOSH crypter

Researchers describe ongoing ISO-based campaigns that deliver AsyncRAT, LimeRAT, and other commodity malware via obfuscated VBScript in a multi-stage infection chain. The campaigns appear tied to a new version of the 3LOSH crypter, which embeds payloads with gzip and uses script-based components to enable persistence and C2 communications.
#AsyncRAT #LimeRAT #3LOSH #VBScript #PowerShell

Keypoints

  • Campaigns distribute malware using ISO disk images that contain malicious VBScript.
  • The infections rely on process injection to evade endpoint security.
  • A new version of the 3LOSH crypter is used to obfuscate and decompress payloads.
  • Stage 1 executes obfuscated VBScript that retrieves the next stage from an attacker-controlled server.
  • Stage 2 retrieves a PowerShell script (IEX) and creates multiple scripts (Office.bat, Office.vbs, Office.ps1, Microsofd.*) in a working directory.
  • Stage 3 operations include persistence via a scheduled task, WScript/Batch execution, and a final PowerShell payload that injects another payload via aspnet_compiler.exe.
  • The final payloads are primarily AsyncRAT and LimeRAT, using shared infrastructure for post-compromise C2 communications.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059.005] VBScript – The VBS contains junk data and uses string replacement to attempt to obfuscate the executed code. Quote: β€˜The VBS contains junk data and uses string replacement to attempt to obfuscate the executed code.’
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – Stage 2 retrieval uses a PowerShell script passed to the Invoke-Expression (IEX) cmdlet and executed to continue the infection process. Quote: β€˜the retrieved content is a PowerShell script passed to the Invoke-Expression (IEX) cmdlet and executed to continue the infection process.’
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – Stage 2 creates multiple scripts including Office.bat, Office.vbs, and Office.ps1 (as well as Microsofd.* variants). Quote: β€˜The following files are created in this manner: Office.bat Office.vbs Office.ps1 Microsofd.bat Microsofd.vbs Microsofd.ps1.’
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – The infection chain creates a new Scheduled Task named β€˜Office’ that runs immediately and then every two minutes for persistence. Quote: β€˜The next PowerShell script attempts to achieve persistence by creating a new Scheduled Task called β€œOffice” that is executed immediately and then repeated every two minutes.’
  • [T1055] Process Injection – The final payload is injected and executed via a process injection step using aspnet_compiler.exe. Quote: β€˜This is accomplished by invoking aspnet_compiler.exe, injecting the final payload, and executing it.’
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – The new 3LOSH crypter embeds binary payloads using GZIP compression rather than Base64, with a common decompression function. Quote: β€˜Binary payloads are now embedded using GZIP compression rather than simply Base64 encoded’.
  • [T1071] Application Layer Protocol – The campaigns use the same infrastructure for post-compromise C2 communications, indicating a shared command-and-control channel. Quote: β€˜the same infrastructure for post-compromise C2 communications.’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hash] Stage 1 ISOs – 4567abc4645a8f9414c6d642763d47a2678bf00fefe9e02677664b1c1b35c226, 64836303a8eb58b7c5660211e085e3e42b2f4a068aeee88ede30eaa1b9cc4898, c174daa66473073d55fca74107642b43938c832b6c57a2e35c5b6998b89becc8, ed22a3a0314aa108d3e2a5f89fc90eb4d32a07a83e4a16a0e778ec3dae8e3406
  • [Hash] Stage 1 VBS – 0e1d80e1868067b61194539818ac5cd517fb17ab6644492b8d9926f7c400efbb, 15ebbc7c74e36fdfb677c56fb94db874a29ed995548c226fc38bd2977f4462c6, and 2 more hashes
  • [File Name] Stage 1 Artifact Names – Office.bat, Office.vbs, Office.ps1, Microsofd.bat, Microsofd.vbs, Microsofd.ps1
  • [Domain] C2 Domains – 3laallah.myvnc.com, anderione.com, invoice-update.myiphost.com, mekhocairos.linkpc.net, n.myvnc.com, python.blogsyte.com
  • [IP Address] C2 IPs – 141.95.89.79, 94.130.207.164
  • [URL] Stage 2 Retrieval – hXXp[:]//ia801400[.]us[.]archive[.]org/26/items/auto_20220216/auto.txt, hXXps[:]//archive[.]org/download/auto_20220216/auto.txt, hXXps[:]//archive[.]org/download/my44_20220211/my44.txt, and 9 more URLs
  • [File Hash] Stage 3 Binaries – 0303634830257bc5c3dfcf18c143286e212bd9034b29976e6349b05b5389c8a5, 0e6a1e936ae9dac9856a86091c237537e72d2e8547596dab99e902ccd51be10f, and 50+ more

Read more: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/04/asyncrat-3losh-update.html