MQsTTang is a new Mustang Panda backdoor that uses MQTT for C2 and operates as a single-stage, minimally obfuscated tool. The campaign targets government and diplomatic entities, employs spearphishing distribution with decoy filenames, and includes anti-analysis and persistence mechanisms. #MQsTTang #MustangPanda #Korplug #PlugX #QMQTT #EMQX #YanNaingOo0072022 #Taiwan #Bulgaria #Australia #Germany #Japan #Proofpoint #Avast
Keypoints
- MQsTTang is a backdoor attributed to Mustang Panda, using MQTT for C2 and designed as a single-stage, non-obfuscated tool.
- Victimology centers on governmental/diplomatic targets, with Taiwan as a focus and decoy filenames suggesting broader Europe/Asia targeting.
- MQsTTang communicates via a public MQTT broker (3.228.54.173) using the QMQTT library built on Qt, concealing direct C2 links behind the broker.
- Distribution occurs through RAR archives with spearphishing links and diplomacy/passport-themed filenames.
- Anti-analysis routines detect common debuggers/tools and window classes; execution flow is controlled by a growing argument passed to a self-launching process.
- Persistence is achieved by a Run key in the registry, with copies placed in C:UsersPublic and named to blend with legitimate software.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1583.003] Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server – Some servers used in the campaign are on shared hosting. ‘Some servers used in the campaign are on shared hosting.’
- [T1583.004] Acquire Infrastructure: Server – Some servers used in the campaign seem to be exclusive to Mustang Panda. ‘Some servers used in the campaign seem to be exclusive to Mustang Panda.’
- [T1587.001] Develop Capabilities: Malware – MQsTTang is a custom backdoor, probably developed by Mustang Panda. ‘MQsTTang is a custom backdoor, probably developed by Mustang Panda.’
- [T1588.002] Obtain Capabilities: Tool – Multiple legitimate and open- source tools, including psexec, ps, curl, and plink, were found on the staging server. ‘Multiple legitimate and open- source tools, including psexec, ps, curl, and plink, were found on the staging server.’
- [T1608.001] Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware – MQsTTang was uploaded to the web server for distribution. ‘MQsTTang was uploaded to the web server for distribution.’
- [T1608.002] Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool – Multiple tools were uploaded to an FTP server. ‘Multiple tools were uploaded to an FTP server.’
- [T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – MQsTTang is distributed via spearphishing links to a malicious file on an attacker-controlled web server. ‘MQsTTang is distributed via spearphishing links to a malicious file on an attacker-controlled web server.’
- [T1106] Native API – MQsTTang uses the QProcess class from the Qt framework to execute commands. ‘MQsTTang uses the QProcess class from the Qt framework to execute commands.’
- [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – MQsTTang relies on the user to execute the downloaded malicious file. ‘MQsTTang relies on the user to execute the downloaded malicious file.’
- [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – MQsTTang persists by creating a registry Run key. ‘persistence by creating a registry Run key.’
- [T1036.004] Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service – In most samples, the registry key is created with the name qvlc. This matches the name of a legitimate executable used by VLC. ‘the registry key is created with the name qvlc. This matches the name of a legitimate executable used by VLC.’
- [T1036.005] Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location – When creating copies, MQsTTang uses filenames of legitimate programs. ‘When creating copies, MQsTTang uses filenames of legitimate programs.’
- [T1480] Execution Guardrails – MQsTTang checks the paths it is executed from to determine which tasks to execute. ‘MQsTTang checks the paths it is executed from to determine which tasks to execute.’
- [T1622] Debugger Evasion – MQsTTang detects running debuggers and alters its behavior if any are found to be present. ‘MQsTTang detects running debuggers and alters its behavior if any are found to be present.’
- [T1071] Application Layer Protocol – MQsTTang communicates with its C&C server using the MQTT protocol. ‘MQsTTang communicates with its C&C server using the MQTT protocol.’
- [T1102.002] Web Service: Bidirectional Communication – MQsTTang uses a legitimate public MQTT broker. ‘MQsTTang uses a legitimate public MQTT broker.’
- [T1132.001] Data Encoding: Standard Encoding – The content of the messages between the malware and server is base64 encoded. ‘The content of the messages between the malware and server is base64 encoded.’
- [T1573.001] Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography – The content of the messages between the malware and server is encrypted using a repeating XOR key. ‘encrypted using a repeating XOR key.’
- [T1041] Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – The output of executed commands is sent back to the server using the same protocol. ‘The output of executed commands is sent back to the server using the same protocol.’
Indicators of Compromise
- [SHA-1] File hashes – A1C660D31518C8AFAA6973714DE30F3D576B68FC, 430C2EF474C7710345B410F49DF853BDEAFBDD78, and 2 more hashes
- [Filename] File names – CVs Amb Officer PASPORT Ministry Of Foreign Affairs.exe, Documents members of delegation diplomatic from Germany.Exe, and 2 more filenames
- [IP] Network – 3.228.54.173, 80.85.156[.]151, and 185.144.31[.]86
- [Domain] broker.emqx.io
- [URL] GitHub raw links – https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/YanNaingOo0072022/14/main/Documents.rar, https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/YanNaingOo0072022/ee/main/CVs Amb.rar