Lockbit 2.0 Ransomware: TTPs Used in Emerging Ransomware Campaigns

Keypoints

  • LockBit 2.0 is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operator, previously known as the ABCD ransomware group, with affiliates and developers rising in the last six months.
  • The ransomware encrypts victim files and appends the .lockbit extension, and it changes the wallpaper and drops a ransom note named Restore-My-Files.txt upon completion.
  • LockBit 2.0 encodes its executable to evade detection and decodes required modules/strings as needed.
  • The malware performs language checks and avoids attacking systems with specific languages (e.g., Russian, Belarusian, Tajik, Armenian, and others).
  • It damages built-in recovery and logging mechanisms by deleting shadow copies and disabling recovery, then ignoring boot failures.
  • LockBit 2.0 deletes itself and related logs to hinder post-incident investigations.
  • The article provides IOCs (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 hashes) to aid identification of samples and IOCs.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – The LockBit executable is encoded and decodes modules/strings as needed. Quote: “The LockBit executable is encoded. Ransomware decodes required modules and strings as needed.”
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts – Initial access via valid accounts. Quote: “T1078 Valid Accounts”
  • [T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application – Exploitation of exposed applications. Quote: “T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application”
  • [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – Use of WMI in operations. Quote: “T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation”
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – Command-line execution. Quote: “T1059.003 Windows Command Shell”
  • [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – Autostart persistence. Quote: “T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder”
  • [T1055] Process Injection – Privilege/Process manipulation. Quote: “T1055 Process Injection”
  • [T1070.004] Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion – Cleaning traces by deleting files. Quote: “T1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion”
  • [T1112] Modify Registry – Registry modification for persistence/defense evasion. Quote: “T1112 Modify Registry”
  • [T1497] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion – Evading analysis environments. Quote: “T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion”
  • [T1056.004] Credential API Hooking – Credential access via API hooking. Quote: “T1056.004 Credential API Hooking”
  • [T1110] Brute Force – Credential access via brute force. Quote: “T1110 Brute Force”
  • [T1012] Query Registry – Discovery of registry information. Quote: “T1012 Query Registry”
  • [T1018] Remote System Discovery – Discovery of remote systems. Quote: “T1018 Remote System Discovery”
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – Detecting running processes. Quote: “T1057 Process Discovery”
  • [T1021] Remote Services – Lateral movement via remote services. Quote: “T1021 Remote Services”
  • [T1021.001] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol – RDP usage. Quote: “T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol”
  • [T1021.002] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral movement via SMB/Win Admin Shares. Quote: “T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares”
  • [T1090.003] Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy – C2/proxy techniques via multi-hop proxies. Quote: “T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy”
  • [T1567.002] Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage – Data exfiltration via cloud storage. Quote: “T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage”
  • [T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact – Data encryption for impact. Quote: “T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact”
  • [T1490] Inhibit System Recovery – Preventing recovery. Quote: “T1490 Inhibit System Recovery”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [MD5] context – af9ff037caca1f316e7d05db86dbd882, b7f1120bcff47ab77e74e387805feabe, and 2 more hashes
  • [SHA-1] context – 844e9b219aaecb26de4994a259f822500fb75ae1, a185904a46b0cb87d38057fc591a31e6063cdd95, and 2 more hashes
  • [SHA-256] context – f3e891a2a39dd948cd85e1c8335a83e640d0987dbd48c16001a02f6b7c1733ae, 4de287e0b05e138ab942d71d1d4d2ad5fb7d46a336a446f619091bdace4f2d0a, and 2 more hashes

Read more: https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/lockbit-2.0-ransomware-ttps-used-in-emerging-ransomware-campaigns