How BRATA is monitoring your bank account | Cleafy Labs

BRATA continues to evolve with new targets and features, including factory reset, GPS tracking, multi-channel C2 (HTTP and WebSocket), and ongoing monitoring via VNC and keylogging to facilitate unauthorized wire transfers. The report details BRATA variants A, B, and C, a downloader to evade AV, and expansion to the UK, Poland, Italy, and LATAM targets. #BRATA #BRATA.A #BRATA.B #BRATA.C #VNC #WebSocket #GPS

Keypoints

  • BRATA has added capabilities such as device factory reset, GPS tracking, multi-channel C2 (HTTP and TCP), and continuous monitoring via VNC and keylogging.
  • A new BRATA variant started circulating last December and is distributed through a downloader to evade antivirus detection. ‘The target list now contains further banks and financial institutions in the UK (new), Poland (new), Italy, and LATAM.’
  • BRATA.A is the most used variant, with BRATA.B introducing overlay pages to steal PINs and partial code obfuscation; BRATA.C uses a downloader/dropper architecture. ‘BRATA.B has almost the same capabilities… the main differences found are the partial obfuscation of the code and the use of tailored overlay pages used to steal the security number (or PIN) of the targeted banking application.’ ‘BRATA.C is composed of an initial dropper used to download and execute the “real” malicious app later.’
  • BRATA monitors bank apps via Accessibility Service and can capture the screen and keystrokes; ‘BRATA starts to take screenshots of the victim’s device’ and ‘BRATA.B monitors all users’ keystrokes when visiting the targeted bank application.’
  • GPS permission appears in the manifest, but the feature may be under development or unused; ‘no evidence in the code is actually used’ for GPS in BRATA.
  • The malware switches communication channels from HTTP to WebSockets to minimize latency and data loads, aiding stealthy C2 communication. ‘the first communications are made by the application towards the C2 through the HTTP protocol, and then, if the server is online, it is forced to switch the connection towards the WebSocket protocol.’
  • BRATA implements anti-analysis and defense evasion, including removing antivirus apps and using a downloader to avoid detection. ‘BRATA… removes antivirus apps installed on the infected device’ and ‘downloader to avoid being detected by antivirus solutions.’

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1485] Data Destruction – BRATA uses a factory reset to erase traces after a fraudulent transfer. Quote: ‘Capability to perform the device factory reset: it appears that TAs are leveraging this feature to erase any trace, right after an unauthorized wire transfer attempt.’
  • [T1113] Screen Capture – BRATA starts to take screenshots and send them to the C2. Quote: ‘As soon as TAs send the command “get_screen” from the C2 server, BRATA starts to take screenshots of the victim’s device and send it back to the C2 server through the HTTP channel.’
  • [T1056.001] Keylogging – BRATA.B monitors keystrokes in the banking app. Quote: ‘keylogging’ and ‘BRATA.B monitors all users’ keystrokes when visiting the targeted bank application.’
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – BRATA.C is an initial dropper used to download and execute the real malicious app later. Quote: ‘BRATA.C is composed of an initial dropper used to download and execute the “real” malicious app later.’
  • [T1562.001] Impair Defenses – BRATA removes antivirus apps on the infected device. Quote: ‘list of antivirus app that BRATA is able to remove’ and ‘BRATA… removes antivirus apps installed on the infected device.’
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – BRATA uses HTTP and then WebSocket for C2. Quote: ‘the first communications are made by the application towards the C2 through the HTTP protocol, and then, if the server is online, it is forced to switch the connection towards the WebSocket protocol.’
  • [T1222] Permissions Modification – BRATA requests device admin permission during installation to enable higher privileges. Quote: ‘device admin’ permission requested by BRATA.’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File hash] BRATA variants – 220ec1e3effb6f4a4a3acb6b3b3d2e90 (BRATA.A), e664bd7951d45d0a33529913cfbcbac0 (BRATA.B), 2dfdce36a367b89b0de1a2ffc1052e24 (BRATA.C) – variant samples observed in campaigns targeting banking apps.
  • [IP address] C2 server – 5[.]39[.]217[.]241 – used as the command and control host for BRATA operations.

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