An April 2022 intrusion saw BumbleBee act as the initial access loader, enabling multi-stage payloads and outbound C2 communication within a Windows environment. The operation featured credential dumping, Kerberoasting, privilege escalation tooling, and Cobalt Strike-based command and control, with AnyDesk persistence and lateral movement that could have led to domain-wide ransomware if allowed to continue. #BumbleBee #EXOTICLILY #FIN12 #WIZARDSPIDER #DEV-0193 #CobaltStrike #AnyDesk #Kerberoasting
Keypoints
- Delivery of the initial payload via a password-protected ISO with a document.lnk that executes namr.dll, the BumbleBee loader.
- Cobalt Strike beacon wab.exe dropped on the beachhead and then injected into explorer.exe and rundll32.exe for further actions.
- Remote access and persistence achieved through AnyDesk, with RDP used to move laterally to a server using a local Administrator account.
- Active Directory and Windows discovery performed using AdFind, VulnRecon, and Seatbelt, with multiple credential and host discovery steps.
- Credential dumping of LSASS using Procdump and comsvcs.dll MiniDump, followed by deletion of tools from hosts.
- Kerberoasting via Invoke-Kerberoast to extract Kerberos tickets, including offline password cracking against service accounts.
- Lateral movement and data collection via SMB/Windows Admin Shares, CreateServiceA remote service, and Cobalt Strike PsExec/jump, with two C2 servers observed.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566.001] Phishing: Attachment β The intrusion likely arrived via an email with a link to download a password-protected ISO: ββ¦ likely arrived via an email which included a link to download said zip file.β
- [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell β Execution via command line: βC:WindowsSystem32cmd.exe /c start rundll32 namr.dll,IternalJobβ
- [T1218.011] Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 β Loader executed via rundll32: ββ¦ rundll32 namr.dll,IternalJob β¦β
- [T1055] Process Injection β wab.exe injected into explorer.exe and rundll32.exe, enabling post-exploitation tasks.
- [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol β Lateral movement to a server using the local Administrator account: ββ¦ used RDP to access a server using the local Administrator account.β
- [T1219] Remote Access Software β AnyDesk used for persistence: βAnyDesk, which was the only observed persistence mechanism used during the intrusion.β
- [T1082] System Information Discovery β Discovery commands executed by the beacon (whoami, ipconfig /all, systeminfo, etc.).
- [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation β WMI-based enumeration and execution: ββ¦ executed by WMIβ
- [T1018] Remote System Discovery / System Network Configuration Discovery β Network/system discovery via commands and AdFind to identify targets.
- [T1069.002] Domain Groups / Account Discovery β AdFind and group enumeration of Domain/Enterprise admins.
- [T1558.003] Kerberos Kerberoasting β Invoke-Kerberoast to obtain Kerberos tickets for password cracking.
- [T1003.001] Credential Dumping: LSASS β Procdump/ MiniDump used to dump LSASS memory.
- [T1056] β (Privilege Escalation) GetSystem β βGetSystemβ usage to elevate to SYSTEM.
- [T1021.002] SMB/Windows Admin Shares β Remote services over RPC for lateral movement (e.g., CreateServiceA).
- [T1570] Lateral Tool Transfer β Transfer of tools like AnyDesk and Procdump between hosts.
- [T1059.001] PowerShell β PowerShell beacon download/execution in memory: βC:Windowsβ¦ powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c β¦β
- [T1543.003] Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service β Remote service creation on a server/DC via RPC.
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP] Network indicators β 142.91.3[.]109, 45.140.146[.]30 (Cobalt/BumbleBee beacons).
- [IP] C2/HTTP traffic hosting β 104.243.33[.]50 (CS C2 hosting).
- [Domain] Command and Control β fuvataren[.]com, dofixifa[.]co (CS C2s).
- [Domain] Additional C2/domain references β dofixifa.com, fuvataren.com (CS config).
- [File] document.lnk β LNK document used to trigger the loader.
- [File] namr.dll β BumbleBee loader loaded from the hidden DLL.
- [File] wab.exe β Cobalt Strike beacon dropped on the beachhead.
- [File] procdump64.exe β LSASS dumping tool transferred and used remotely.
- [File] VulnRecon.exe/.dll β Custom tool for privilege escalation enumeration.
- [File] BC_invoice_Report_CORP_46.iso β Initial ISO payload.
- [Hash] f856d7e7d485a2fc5b38faddd8c6ee5c β namr.dll (loader).
- [Hash] c68e4d5eaae99d6f0a51eec48ace79a4fede3c09 β namr.dll (loader).
- [Hash] c68437cc9ed6645726119c12fdcb33e7 β wab.exe (Cobalt Strike beacon).
- [Hash] 5839b4013cf6e25568f13d3fc4120795 β VulnRecon.exe (privilege enumeration).
- [Hash] 5226b7138f4dd1dbb9f6953bd75a320b β BC_invoice_Report_CORP_46.iso (initial payload).
Read more: https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/