AsyncRAT is being distributed through Windows CHM (CHM) files, with a multi-stage chain that downloads and executes payloads via mshta, VBScript, and HTA. The campaign culminates in a fileless AsyncRAT deployment featuring anti-VM, keylogging, and screenshot capabilities, with C2 communications to a public server and persistence via startup LNKs.
#AsyncRAT #Mshta #VBScript #PowerShell #HTA #StartupFolder #C2 #2023foco #AhnLabASEC
#AsyncRAT #Mshta #VBScript #PowerShell #HTA #StartupFolder #C2 #2023foco #AhnLabASEC
Keypoints
- CHM-based distribution of AsyncRAT has been confirmed as a rising method for malware delivery.
- A malicious script uses mshta to run a command pointing to hxxps://2023foco.com[.]br/plmckv.hta.
- The VBScript fragment obfuscates strings to evade detection and invokes PowerShell to download and run additional payloads.
- The loader downloads data from remote URLs, loads a .NET DLL in memory, and executes via RegAsm.exe.
- v.hta can download more data and create startup artifacts (LNK) to maintain persistence.
- AsyncRATβs C2 channel operates at 51.79.116[.]37:8848, with anti-VM, keylogging, and screenshot exfiltration features.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1218] Mshta β This script uses mshta to execute a malicious command that exists in the address βhxxps://2023foco.com[.]br/plmckv.htaβ.
- [T1059.001] PowerShell β The PowerShell command can be seen once it is unobfuscated and is used to load and execute payloads.
- [T1059.005] VBScript β The malicious VBScript has fragmented strings to evade detection, and is responsible for executing PowerShell commands.
- [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer β Powershell downloads and executes vbs/hta from remote URLs as part of the dropper chain.
- [T1055] Process Injection β The loaded DLL receives data from a URL and is executed within the RegAsm.exe process in memory.
- [T1547.001] Startup Items β v.hta creates startup programs to achieve persistence via startup LNK entries.
- [T1023] Shortcut Modification β An LNK file is created in the Startup folder to launch the v.vbs file and mimic a legitimate icon.
- [T1071] Application Layer Protocol β C2 communications are established to the server at 51.79.116[.]37:8848 for command and control.
- [T1567.002] Exfiltration to Email β Screenshots are captured and sent to the threat actor via SMTP as part of data exfiltration.
- [T1497] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion β Anti-VM checks are employed to avoid execution in virtualized environments.
- [T1056] Input Capture β Keylogging is implemented to harvest user input for credentials or sensitive data.
Indicators of Compromise
- [Hash] ea64cc5749f48f610074636426fdfb4c, b810d06b6ead297da6d145fca80c80b2, ac64e8e7eb01755cc363167dd7653d53, 824584841251baa953b21feb5f516bed, 407b0b88187916dc2e38c8d796c10804, d5dcb2348a9c414dbd980d7e3df63fe8, c45f6c4e3222c4308c80c945fb3ac4dc β sample file hashes associated with the CHM-based dropper and components.
- [URL] https://2023foco.com[.]br/plmckv.hta, http://2023foco.com[.]br/vvvvv.txt, https://2023foco.com[.]br/serverhta.hta, https://2023foco.com[.]br/dcreverso.txt, https://2023foco.com[.]br/2.txt, https://2023foco.com[.]br/printa.txt, https://2023foco.com[.]br/runpe.jpg β payloads and loaders downloaded during the chain.
- [IP] 51.79.116[.]37:8848 β C2 server address used by AsyncRAT.
- [Domain] 2023foco.com.br β domain hosting the dropper and loader resources.
Read more: https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/47525/