AhnLab ASEC reports that the Larva-25012 threat actor is distributing Proxyware via malicious installers masquerading as Notepad++ and cracked-software download pages, using both MSI and ZIP vectors that deploy DPLoader and multiple Proxyware families such as Infatica and DigitalPulse. The attacker persists via scheduled tasks, DLL side‑loading and process injection, and evades detection by disabling Defender and using obfuscated JavaScript/Python loaders; remediation includes avoiding untrusted downloads and running updated security tools. #Larva-25012 #DPLoader
Keypoints
- Larva-25012 distributes Proxyware by luring victims to malicious advertisement pages and fake download portals for cracked or pirated software.
- Recent campaigns use both Setup.msi (C++ DLL) and Setup.zip (legitimate Setup.exe with TextShaping.dll) delivery methods, enabling DLL side-loading and in-memory payload execution.
- Installers deploy a downloader named DPLoader (JavaScript and Python variants) that registers scheduled tasks (e.g., Notepad Update Scheduler, UNBScheduler, UNPScheduler) for persistence and retrieves commands from C2 servers.
- DPLoader installs multiple Proxyware families (Infatica, DigitalPulse, Honeygain, etc.), sometimes injecting proxy modules into explorer.exe or other processes to activate proxy‑sharing functionality.
- The attack chain uses PowerShell to install NodeJS/Python, create obfuscated payload files, and modify Defender settings (add exclusions, disable notifications, prevent sample submission) to evade detection.
- Payloads and scripts are hosted on public services (e.g., GitHub, CloudFront), with several MD5 hashes, URLs, and domains identified as IOCs in AhnLab’s report.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1053 ] Scheduled Task/Job – Used to achieve persistence by registering tasks such as “Notepad Update Scheduler”, “UNBScheduler”, and “UNPScheduler” (‘registers itself in the Windows Task Scheduler under the name “Notepad Update Scheduler”‘).
- [T1055.001 ] Dynamic-link Library Injection – Malware injects shellcode and droppers into processes like AggregatorHost.exe and explorer.exe to execute payloads in target processes (‘injects shellcode into the AggregatorHost.exe process’).
- [T1574.001 ] DLL Side-Loading – The ZIP variant executes malicious code via a loader DLL placed alongside a legitimate Setup.exe, enabling side-loading (‘When the user launches Setup.exe, the malware is executed through DLL side-loading’).
- [T1218.011 ] Rundll32 – Rundll32.exe is used to execute exported functions in malicious DLLs and run injected components (‘launched via Rundll32.exe’).
- [T1059.001 ] PowerShell – Attackers generate and run PowerShell scripts to install runtimes, create obfuscated JavaScript files, modify Defender policy, and download/install Proxyware (‘The PowerShell script performs actions consistent with prior attacks. It installs NodeJS… and registers them in the Task Scheduler’).
- [T1059.006 ] Python – The dropper installs Python and deploys a Python-based DPLoader variant; Python is also used as an execution environment for launchers (‘retrieves the official Python installer from the Python website and installs Python, then deploys a Python-based variant of DPLoader’).
- [T1204.001 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Victims are tricked into executing supplied installers (MSI/EXE/ZIP) via fake download pages and advertisements (‘files delivered through these malicious ad pages are ultimately hosted on GitHub’ and users launch Setup.exe).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Payloads and tool components are hosted and retrieved from public repositories and CDN services such as GitHub and CloudFront (‘files delivered through these malicious ad pages are ultimately hosted on GitHub’).
- [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – DPLoader communicates with C2 via HTTP(S) endpoints (e.g., ‘/d’ and ‘/e’) to send system info and retrieve commands (‘communicates via the “/d” URL endpoint, while the “/e” endpoint is used exclusively for error reporting’).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – The attackers use obfuscated JavaScript and an obfuscated Go-built DigitalPulse binary and perform runtime decryption of shellcode and droppers (‘an obfuscated version of DigitalPulse Proxyware’ and ‘encrypted shellcode is stored and decrypted at runtime’).
- [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – Malware collects and transmits host system information (os_type, os_name, machine_id, agent_version, etc.) to C2 for profiling and command targeting (‘The obfuscated JavaScript malware communicates with the C&C server by transmitting the following system information’).
- [T1562 ] Impair Defenses – The PowerShell installer modifies Windows Defender policies by adding exclusions, disabling notifications, and preventing sample submissions to evade detection (‘the script also modifies Windows Defender policies by adding exclusion paths, disabling security notifications, and preventing malware sample submissions’).
- [T1036 ] Masquerading – Installers and scheduled tasks impersonate legitimate applications and system tools (e.g., Notepad++, Microsoft Anti-Malware Tool) to hide malicious activity (‘impersonating legitimate applications such as AutoClicker, FastCleanPlus, WinMemoryCleaner, and SteamCleaner’).
Indicators of Compromise
- [MD5 ] malicious sample hashes – 01f6153a34ab6974314cf96cced9939f, 05e27d1d0d1e24a93fc72c8cf88924f8, and 3 more hashes
- [URL ] payload and script hosting – https[:]//armortra[.]xyz/8101[.]py, https[:]//d37k0r4olv9brc[.]cloudfront[.]net/93845[.]ps1, and other hosted payload URLs
- [FQDN ] infrastructure domains – armortra[.]xyz, easy-horizon[.]com, and furtheret[.]com (additional domains include trustv[.]xyz)
- [File Name ] notable filenames used by installers/loaders – Setup.msi, Setup.zip, TextShaping.dll, MicrosoftAntiMalwareTool.exe, and other DLL/EXE names such as infatica_agent.dll
- [File Path ] observed installation locations – %LOCALAPPDATA%NotepadNotepad[GUID] (Python DPLoader path) and %LOCALAPPDATA%MicrosoftMicrosoft Windows Pluton[GUID]MicrosoftWindowsPlutonTaskScheduler.dll (DigitalPulse install path)
Read more: https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/92183/