Stealth in Layers: Unmasking the Loader used in Targeted Email Campaigns

CRIL identified a commodity loader used by multiple threat actors in targeted email campaigns that primarily impacted Manufacturing and Government organizations in Italy, Finland, and Saudi Arabia. The multi-stage, fileless infection chain uses weaponized Office documents (CVE-2017-11882), steganographic PNGs hosted on Archive.org, trojanized TaskScheduler assemblies, reflective loading and process hollowing to deliver payloads such as PureLog Stealer to a C2 at 38.49.210[.]241. #PureLogStealer #TaskScheduler

Keypoints

  • CRIL tracked a commodity loader shared across multiple high-capability threat actors delivering RATs and infostealers to targeted sectors, especially Manufacturing and Government in Europe and the Middle East.
  • Initial infections used targeted phishing with RAR/ZIP attachments and weaponized Office documents exploiting CVE-2017-11882, as well as malicious SVG and LNK-based archives.
  • A unified four-stage, largely fileless execution chain includes obfuscated JavaScript, hidden PowerShell retrieval, steganographic PNG extraction, reflective .NET loading, trojanized TaskScheduler assembly, and process hollowing into RegAsm/AddInProcess32.
  • Steganography and trojanization of open-source libraries were used to evade detection: payloads were embedded in PNGs hosted on legitimate services (Archive.org, Pixeldrain) and malicious functions appended to trusted .NET libraries.
  • The final payload observed in analyzed samples was PureLog Stealer, which exfiltrates browser credentials, crypto wallet data, email and VPN credentials, and system telemetry to C2 38.49.210[.]241.
  • A novel UAC bypass was noted where the malware monitors process creation and opportunistically triggers UAC prompts to obtain elevated PowerShell execution through user approval.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – Targeted phishing emails with malicious attachments masquerading as Purchase Orders (‘masquerading as legitimate Purchase Order communications from business partners’).
  • [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application – Use of an exploit for CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Equation Editor to weaponize Office documents (‘exploiting CVE-2017-11882’).
  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Victims open JavaScript, VBScript, or LNK files delivered in archives (‘Extraction of the RAR archive reveals a first-stage malicious JavaScript payload, PO No 602450.js’).
  • [T1059.007 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript – Heavily obfuscated JavaScript reconstructs strings and spawns PowerShell to retrieve second-stage payloads (‘The de-obfuscated JavaScript creates a hidden PowerShell process’).
  • [T1059.001 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – Hidden PowerShell instance retrieves steganographic payloads and decodes assemblies for reflective loading (‘The decoded PowerShell script functions as a second-stage loader, retrieving a malicious PNG file’).
  • [T1047 ] Windows Management Instrumentation – WMI objects used to spawn hidden PowerShell processes (‘creates a hidden PowerShell process using WMI objects (winmgmts:rootcimv2)’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Multi-layer obfuscation including base64 and string manipulation used throughout the chain (‘Multi-layer obfuscation using base64 encoding and string manipulation’).
  • [T1027.003 ] Steganography – Payloads steganographically embedded in PNG images hosted on Archive.org and other services (‘malicious payload hidden within PNG image files’).
  • [T1620 ] Reflective Code Loading – .NET assembly loaded reflectively in memory to avoid disk writes (‘reflected in memory via Reflection.Assembly::Load’).
  • [T1055.012 ] Process Injection: Process Hollowing – Loader creates a suspended RegAsm.exe and injects the decoded payload into its memory (‘creates a new suspended RegAsm.exe process and injects the decoded payload into its memory space’).
  • [T1036.005 ] Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location – Execution through legitimate Windows utilities and trojanized libraries to blend with normal activity (‘weaponizing the legitimate open-source TaskScheduler library’ and use of RegAsm/AddInProcess32).
  • [T1548.002 ] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control – UAC bypass that monitors process creation and triggers prompts to gain elevated PowerShell execution (‘monitors process creation events and opportunistically triggered UAC prompts’).
  • [T1497.003 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time-Based Evasion – Use of a 5-second sleep delay to evade automated sandbox analysis (‘with a 5-second sleep delay’).
  • [T1552.001 ] Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files – Extraction of credentials from stored files and browser databases (‘Extraction of credentials from browser databases and configuration files’).
  • [T1555.003 ] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers – Harvesting saved passwords, cookies, and tokens from multiple browser types (‘Data harvested from a wide range of Chromium-based browsers… Firefox-based browsers’).
  • [T1555 ] Credentials from Password Stores – Extraction from password manager applications and browser-based password stores (‘Extraction of credentials from password manager applications’).
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – Collection of hardware, OS, and network information for fingerprinting (‘Collection of hardware, OS, and network information’).
  • [T1518.001 ] Security Software Discovery – Enumeration of installed antivirus and security products (‘Enumeration of installed antivirus products’).
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – Collection of cryptocurrency wallets, VPN configs, and email data (‘Collection of cryptocurrency wallets, VPN configs, and email data’).
  • [T1114 ] Email Collection – Harvesting email credentials and configurations from desktop email clients (‘Harvesting email credentials and configurations from email clients’).
  • [T1102 ] Web Service – Abuse of Archive.org and other web services to host steganographic payloads (‘retrieving a malicious PNG file from Archive.org’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Exfiltration of stolen data to C2 infrastructure at 38.49.210[.]241 (‘Data exfiltration to C2 server at 38.49.210.241’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA-256 ] Sample and payload hashes – c1322b21eb3f300a7ab0f435d6bcf6941fd0fbd58b02f7af797af464c920040a, 5c0e3209559f83788275b73ac3bcc61867ece6922afabe3ac672240c1c46b1d3, and 4 more hashes.
  • [URLs ] Malicious hosting and payload retrieval – hxxp://192[.]3.101[.]161/zeus/ConvertedFile[.]txt, hxxps://pixeldrain[.]com/api/file/7B3Gowyz, and 2 more Archive.org PNG URLs.
  • [IP Address ] Command-and-control server – 38.49.210[.]241 (PureLog Stealer C2).
  • [File names ] Malicious attachments and loader artifacts – PO No 602450.rar, PO No 602450.js, and Microsoft.Win32.TaskScheduler.dll (trojanized library).
  • [Binary/process names ] Living-off-the-land binaries abused for execution – RegAsm.exe, AddInProcess32 (used for process hollowing and payload execution).
  • [File types ] Steganographic payload carriers – PNG files hosted on Archive.org (e.g., MSI_PRO_with_b64[.]png) used to hide base64-encoded .NET assemblies.


Read more: https://cyble.com/blog/stealth-in-layers-unmasking-loader-in-targeted-email-campaigns/