In October 2025, CRIL discovered a multi-stage backdoor campaign using a weaponized ZIP masquerading as a Belarusian military PDF that used nested archives, LNK-triggered PowerShell, scheduled tasks, and a Tor hidden-service with obfs4 to provide anonymous SSH/RDP/SFTP/SMB access. The TTPs and infrastructure show similarities to the December 2024 Army+ campaign attributed to Sandworm (UAC-0125/APT44), including pre-generated RSA keys and OpenSSH for Windows deployment. #Sandworm #obfs4
Keypoints
- Attack delivered via a weaponized ZIP named “ТЛГ на убытие на переподготовку.pdf” that used double extensions and nested archives to masquerade as a legitimate military document.
- LNK file execution triggered embedded PowerShell which extracted a hidden ZIP and executed a second-stage script after anti-analysis environment checks.
- Persistence achieved using scheduled tasks that deploy OpenSSH for Windows (disguised as githubdesktop.exe) and a customized Tor client (pinterest.exe) to create an obfs4-enabled hidden service.
- The hidden service forwarded SSH, RDP, SFTP, and SMB over .onion addresses, enabling anonymous multi-protocol remote access authenticated with pre-generated RSA keys.
- The campaign used obfs4 pluggable transport with bridge relays (77.20.116.133:8080, 156.67.24.239:33333) to hide Tor traffic and impede network detection.
- CRIL linked the sample with moderate confidence to the December 2024 Army+ campaign and Sandworm (UAC-0125/APT44) based on overlapping TTPs and infrastructure evolution.
- No secondary payloads or post-exploitation activity were observed during CRIL’s controlled connectivity tests, suggesting reconnaissance-focused operations.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566] Phishing – Malicious ZIP archive disguised as a PDF military document (“Malicious ZIP archive disguised as a PDF military document”).
- [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – Victim opens LNK believing it to be a PDF, which triggers execution (“The victim opens the LNK file, believing it to be a legitimate PDF document”).
- [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – LNK executes embedded PowerShell to extract and run the payload (“LNK file executes embedded PowerShell commands to extract and execute a malicious payload”).
- [T1053.005] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – Creates scheduled tasks that run on logon and daily at 10:21 AM UTC for persistence (“Creates scheduled tasks triggering on logon and daily at 10:21 AM UTC to maintain persistence”).
- [T1036.005] Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location – Uses legitimate-sounding filenames (githubdesktop.exe, pinterest.exe) to disguise malicious binaries (“Uses legitimate software names (githubdesktop.exe, pinterest.exe) to disguise malicious binaries”).
- [T1497] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion – Checks for >=10 LNK files and >=50 processes to detect and evade sandbox environments (“Checks for a minimum of 10 LNK files and 50 processes to detect sandbox environments”).
- [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – Uses nested archives, randomized filenames, and obfuscated PowerShell to evade detection (“Uses nested archives, randomized filenames, and obfuscated PowerShell to evade detection”).
- [T1070.004] Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion – Executes from %AppData% with hidden folders to minimize forensic footprint (“Executes from %AppData% with hidden folders to minimize forensic footprint”).
- [T1552.004] Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys – Deploys pre-generated RSA private keys embedded in the archive for SSH authentication (“Deploys pre-generated RSA private keys for SSH authentication embedded in malware archive”).
- [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – Uses curl over Tor to register victim with attacker C2 (“Uses HTTPS via curl to register the victim with the attacker’s C2 infrastructure”).
- [T1573.002] Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography – Establishes SSH connections using RSA key-based authentication for secure C2 (“Establishes SSH connections using RSA key-based authentication for secure C2”).
- [T1090.003] Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy – Routes C2 traffic through the Tor network via a local SOCKS5 proxy for anonymization (“Routes all C2 traffic through the Tor network using a SOCKS5 proxy for anonymization”).
- [T1572] Protocol Tunneling – Tunnels SSH, RDP, SMB, and SFTP through Tor hidden service .onion addresses (“Tunnels SSH, RDP, SMB, and SFTP through Tor hidden service .onion addresses”).
- [T1095] Non-Application Layer Protocol – Uses obfs4 pluggable transport to disguise Tor traffic (“Uses obfs4 pluggable transport to disguise Tor traffic as benign communications”).
- [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Exfiltrates data via SFTP subsystem routed through the Tor hidden service (“Exfiltrates data via SFTP subsystem routed through Tor hidden service”).
- [T1048.002] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol – Uses SSH/SFTP for encrypted data exfiltration separate from primary C2 channel (“Uses SSH/SFTP for encrypted data exfiltration, separate from the primary C2 channel”).
- [T1021.002] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Exposes SMB (port 445) through Tor for network share access and lateral movement (“Exposes SMB port 445 through Tor for network share access and lateral movement”).
- [T1021.001] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol – Provides RDP access via Tor forwarding to local RDP for interactive control (“Provides RDP access on port 3389 through Tor for interactive system control”).
Indicators of Compromise
- [File Hash – SHA-256] Malicious archive and payload examples – 30a5df544f4a838f9c7ce34377ed2668e0ba22cc39d1e26b303781153808a2c4 (ZIP archive), 99ec6437f74eec19e33c1a0b4ac8826bcc44848f87cd1a1c2b379fae9df62de9 (LNK file).
- [File Hash – SHA-256] Scripts and decoys – 7269b4bc6b3036e5a2f8c2a7908a439202cee9c8b9e50b67c786c39f2500df8f (PowerShell script), 5d3a6340691840d1a87bfab543faec77b4a9d457991dd938834de820a99685f7 (decoy PDF file name listed).
- [File Hash – SHA-256] Binaries (signed/legitimate-named) – 08db5bb9812f49f9394fd724b9196c7dc2f61b5ba1644da65db95ab6e430c92b (obfs4proxy/confluence.exe), 710e8c96875d6a3c1b4f08f4b2094c800658551065b20ef3fd450b210dcc7b9a (SFTP/ebay.exe), 7946a2275c1c232eebed6ead95ea4723285950175586db1f95354b910b0a3cce (pinterest.exe – Tor client).
- [Network/Bridge IPs] obfs4 bridge relays used as Tor entry points – 77.20.116.133:8080, 156.67.24.239:33333 (bridge relays for obfs4 transport).
- [Domain / Onion] Tor hidden service hostname – taibdsgqlwvnizgipp4sn7xee72qys3pufih3rjzhx3e5b5t245kafid.onion (example compromised-host .onion address).
Read more: https://cyble.com/blog/weaponized-military-documents-deliver-backdoor/