Sitecore CVE 2025 53690 Exploitation Campaign

Sitecore CVE 2025 53690 Exploitation Campaign

Mandiant investigated a ViewState deserialization attack exploiting an exposed ASP.NET machine key in Sitecore deployments (CVE-2025-53690) that enabled remote code execution and deployment of reconnaissance and tunneling tools. The actor used WEEPSTEEL, EARTHWORM, DWAGENT, SHARPHOUND, and attempted GoTokenTheft to escalate privileges, perform AD reconnaissance, and exfiltrate data. #WEEPSTEEL #EARTHWORM

Keypoints

  • Initial compromise exploited ViewState deserialization (CVE-2025-53690) on Sitecore instances using a publicly exposed sample ASP.NET machine key.
  • Mandiant decrypted the malicious ViewState payload (using the recovered machine key) and identified an embedded .NET assembly tracked as WEEPSTEEL used for internal reconnaissance.
  • Attacker archived the web root (including web.config) and staged tooling in public directories, deploying open-source tools like EARTHWORM (tunneler), DWAGENT (RAT), and SHARPHOUND (AD reconnaissance).
  • Privilege escalation involved creating local admin accounts (asp$, sawadmin), installing DWAGENT, and attempting token theft with GoToken.exe (GoTokenTheft) followed by SAM/SYSTEM hive dumps.
  • Persistence and lateral movement used RDP over EARTHWORM reverse SOCKS proxies to C2 servers (e.g., 130.33.156[.]194, 103.235.46[.]102) and compromised admin credentials for further access.
  • Active Directory enumeration and discovery included locating domain controllers, searching SYSVOL for cpassword in GPO XMLs, and collecting BloodHound data via SharpHound.
  • Mandiant worked with Sitecore; Sitecore released advisory SC2025-005 and updated deployments to generate unique machine keys; Mandiant provided detection rules and YARA signatures.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1170] External Remote Services – Actor used RDP for lateral movement and remote access, often routed through a reverse SOCKS proxy established by EARTHWORM (“traffic was routed through a reverse SOCKS proxy created by EARTHWORM to bypass security controls and obscure their activities”).
  • [T1505] Server Software Component – Exploitation of ViewState deserialization vulnerability in Sitecore’s blocked.aspx endpoint to achieve remote code execution (“Initial compromise was achieved by exploiting the ViewState Deserialization vulnerability CVE-2025-53690 … resulting in remote code execution”).
  • [T1204] User Execution – Malicious ViewState payloads were sent to an accessible __VIEWSTATE field and processed by the server due to a compromised machine key (“When machine keys … are compromised, the application effectively loses its ability to differentiate between legitimate and malicious ViewState payloads”).
  • [T1620] Reflective Code Loading – Embedded .NET assembly (Information.dll / WEEPSTEEL) was delivered via ViewState and executed for reconnaissance (“decrypted the threat actor’s ViewState payload … contained an embedded .NET assembly named Information.dll. This assembly … functions as an internal reconnaissance tool”).
  • [T1040] Network Sniffing – WEEPSTEEL and related reconnaissance collected network adapter and connection information to fingerprint the host (“NetworkAdapterInformation … active network connections” gathered by WEEPSTEEL for reconnaissance).
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – Attacker archived web root including web.config to exfiltrate sensitive configuration data (“archived the contents of inetpubsitecoreSitecoreCDWebsite … contained sensitive files, such as the web.config file”).
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – Staging and deployment of tools (7za.exe, EARTHWORM, DWAGENT, SharpHound, GoToken.exe) in public directories for later execution (“Files written into the Public directory include: 7za.exe … lfe.ico (EARTHWORM) … DWAgent installer … GoToken.exe”).
  • [T1068] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – Creation of local administrator accounts and use of tools to escalate from NETWORK SERVICE to SYSTEM/Administrator (“Following initial compromise, the threat actor elevated their access from NETWORK SERVICE privileges to the SYSTEM or ADMINISTRATOR level” and commands adding asp$ and sawadmin to administrators).
  • [T1003] OS Credential Dumping – Dumping SYSTEM and SAM hives to extract password hashes for local accounts (“reg save HKLMSYSTEM c:userspublicsystem.hive … reg save HKLMSAM c:userspublicsam.hive”).
  • [T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter – Use of VBScript and command execution to launch tools and execute attacker commands (“1.vbs … contained a simple VBS code to launch the EARTHWORM” and multiple command executions like net user, reg save, etc.).
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts – Use and later removal of created local admin accounts and use of compromised admin accounts for RDP and lateral movement (“asp$ … sawadmin … The compromised administrator accounts were used to RDP to other hosts”).
  • [T1531] Account Discovery – Discovery of privileged groups and domain admin enumeration via commands like net group domain admins and nltest (“net group domain admins … nltest /DCLIST:”).
  • [T1086] PowerShell (or scripting) – Use of scripted tooling and automated commands for discovery and persistence, e.g., execution of SharpHound and archival via 7-Zip (“sh.exe -c all … C:Program Files7-Zip7zFM.exe “C:UsersPublicMusic_BloodHound.zip””).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File hash] malware and tooling – WEEPSTEEL Information.dll: SHA-256 a566cceaf9a66332470a978a234a8a8e2bbdd4d6aa43c2c75c25a80b3b744307; SharpHound: SHA-256 61f897ed69646e0509f6802fb2d7c5e88c3e3b93c4ca86942e24d203aa878863.
  • [File path / file name] staged files and binaries – C:UsersPublicMusiclfe.ico (EARTHWORM, SHA-256 b3f83721f24f7ee5eb19f24747b7668ff96da7dfd9be947e6e24a688ecc0a52b), C:UsersPublicMusicGoToken.exe (MD5 62483e732553c8ba051b792949f3c6d0) .
  • [Domain / URL] download source – hxxp://130.33.156[.]194/main.exe used to retrieve main.exe (MD5 be7e2c6a9a4654b51a16f8b10a2be175) and other tooling.
  • [IP addresses] C2 and tunneling endpoints – 130.33.156[.]194 (ports 443, 8080) and 103.235.46[.]102:80 used by EARTHWORM reverse SOCKS connections.
  • [Account names] created or observed accounts – Local accounts asp$ and sawadmin created by the attacker; observed workstation h496883 as RDP source.


Read more: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/viewstate-deserialization-zero-day-vulnerability