GuLoader: Evolving Tactics in Latest Campaign Targeting European Industry

GuLoader: Evolving Tactics in Latest Campaign Targeting European Industry

Researchers from Cado Security Labs documented a campaign abusing GuLoader to deliver Remote Access Trojans to European industrial and engineering companies. The campaign uses spearphishing emails with archive attachments and multi-stage PowerShell obfuscation to evade detection and deploy RATs such as Remcos, NetWire, and AgentTesla. #GuLoader #Remcos #NetWire #AgentTesla #Romania #Poland #Germany #Kazakhstan #EuropeanIndustry

Keypoints

  • Spearphishing emails with archive attachments are used to gain initial access to European industrial targets.
  • Obfuscated PowerShell and multi-stage deobfuscation routines hinder static and dynamic analysis.
  • The downloader performs process injection and uses memory procedures to run shellcode in legitimate processes.
  • Registry-based persistence and 32/64-bit PowerShell handling demonstrate deliberate evasion and resilience.
  • Final payloads are RATs delivered through compromised processes, highlighting a targeted industry campaign.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing: Malicious Attachment – Used via spearphishing emails with archive attachments to gain initial access. ‘The emails typically include order inquiries and contain an archive file attachment (iso, 7z, gzip, rar).’
  • [T1055] Process Injection – The second shellcode is injected into the legitimate ‘msiexec.exe’ process to execute payloads. ‘The second shellcode is injected into the legitimate msiexec.exe process and appears to be reaching out to a domain to retrieve an additional payload.’
  • [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – The first stage is a batch file compressed in the archive from the email attachment. ‘The first stage of GuLoader is a batch file that is compressed in the archive from the email attachment.’
  • [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – The second shellcode adds the original PowerShell script as a Registry Key ‘Mannas’ in HKCU/Software/Procentagiveless for persistence, with the path to PowerShell 32 bit executable stored as ‘Frenetic’ in HKCU\Environment. ‘the second shellcode adds the original PowerShell script as a Registry Key “Mannas” in HKCU/Software/Procentagiveless for persistence, with the path to PowerShell 32 bit executable stored as “Frenetic” in HKCU\Environment;’
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Obfuscated PowerShell strings are deobfuscated through functions like Boendes to reveal later stages. ‘The obfuscated script contains strings that are deobfuscated through a function “Boendes”… After deobfuscating, the functionality of the script is clearer.’
  • [T1622] Debugger Evasion – The malware employs anti-debugging techniques to hinder analysis. ‘The first shellcode includes multiple anti-debugging techniques that make static and dynamic analysis difficult.’
  • [T1001.001] Junk Code – Obfuscation includes junk code to impede analysis. ‘Junk Code’
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The second stage reaches out to a domain to retrieve an additional payload. ‘the second shellcode is injected into… and appears to be reaching out to a domain to retrieve an additional payload’
  • [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Powershell – The campaign uses PowerShell scripts for the loader and additional payloads. ‘This Powershell script contains the function “Aromastofs” that is used to invoke the provided expressions.’
  • [T1497.003] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion – The campaign employs time-based evasion tactics to evade analysis. ‘Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion’
  • [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – The loader communicates over web protocols to fetch the final payload. ‘Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP Address] Context – 91.109.20.161, 137.184.191.215
  • [IP Address] Context – 185.248.196.6
  • [Domain] Context – filedn.com, careerfinder.ro
  • [URL] Context – https://filedn.com/lK8iuOs2ybqy4Dz6sat9kSz/Frihandelsaftalen40.fla, https://careerfinder.ro/vn/Traurigheder.sea
  • [File] Context – ZW_PCCE-010023024001.bat, ORDER_1ST.bat
  • [Hash] Context – 36a9a24404963678edab15248ca95a4065bdc6a84e32fcb7a2387c3198641374, 26500af5772702324f07c58b04ff703958e7e0b57493276ba91c8fa87b7794ff

Read more: https://darktrace.com/blog/guloader-evolving-tactics-in-latest-campaign-targeting-european-industry