SpyNote Malware Part 2

Deceptive websites cloned from the Google Play Store are delivering AndroidOS SpyNote RAT via APK droppers that use dynamic payload decryption, DEX element injection, and added anti-analysis techniques to evade detection. The actor re-used infrastructure with minor IP rotations and continues to target consumers with spoofed popular apps like Chrome, CamSoda, and iHappy. #SpyNote #Chrome #CamSoda

Keypoints

  • Actors deploy fake Google Play Store web pages to trick users into downloading malicious .apk files directly via JavaScript-triggered downloads.
  • Initial droppers decrypt and join encrypted assets (files “000” and “001”) using an AES key derived from the manifest to produce the SpyNote APK.
  • Dropper employs DEX element injection and reflection to insert malicious code into the ClassLoader, forcing execution of malicious code over legitimate app code.
  • SpyNote capabilities include camera/microphone control, keylogging, accessibility abuse to steal 2FA codes, overlay attacks, and remote device control including wipe/lock.
  • Recent samples use control flow and identifier obfuscation (variations of o, O, 0) in C2 logic and added anti-analysis measures in the APK dropper.
  • Infrastructure is relatively static and confined to a few IPs/domains (e.g., 154.90.58[.]26 and 199.247.6[.]61) though IP resolutions are occasionally rotated.
  • Actor targets a broad consumer audience with lures mimicking social, gaming, and utility apps (examples: Chrome, CamSoda, iHappy) suggesting financially motivated operations.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1636.004 ] Collect SMS Messages – SpyNote can steal SMS messages as part of its data exfiltration capabilities (“Stealing SMS messages”).
  • [T1636.003 ] Contact List – SpyNote accesses and exfiltrates the device contact list (“Accessing and exfiltrating contact list”).
  • [T1636.002 ] Call Log – SpyNote reads call logs to gather caller information and history (“Reading call logs”).
  • [T1430 ] Location Tracking – SpyNote tracks GPS location to monitor victim movements (“Tracking GPS location”).
  • [T1533 ] Data from Local System – SpyNote accesses files and photos from local storage (“Accessing and potentially stealing files from external storage”, “Stealing photos”).
  • [T1640 ] Device Information Discovery – SpyNote extracts device identifiers and system specs (IMEI, etc.) (“Extracting device information (IMEI, system specs)”).
  • [T1657 ] Network Traffic Monitoring – SpyNote can monitor network traffic on the device (“Monitoring network traffic”).
  • [T1428 ] Camera Capture – SpyNote can activate the device camera to capture photos or video (“Activating the device’s camera to capture photos or videos”).
  • [T1429 ] Audio Capture – SpyNote records audio from the device microphone (“Recording audio from the device’s microphone”).
  • [T1646 ] Make Phone Call – SpyNote can initiate phone calls from the device (“Making phone calls”).
  • [T1645 ] Call Recording – SpyNote can intercept and record incoming phone calls (“Intercepting incoming phone calls and recording them”).
  • [T1132 ] External Remote Services – SpyNote provides remote command execution via a shell or similar remote services (“Providing a shell terminal for remote command execution”).
  • [T1478 ] Input Capture – SpyNote implements keylogging to capture keystrokes (“Keylogging (recording keystrokes)”).
  • [T1555.004 ] Credentials in Files – SpyNote targets application credentials and can extract 2FA codes and other credentials (“Targeting credentials for various applications (banking, social media)”, “Extracting two-factor authentication (2FA) codes”).
  • [T1641 ] Overlay Windows – SpyNote displays overlays for clickjacking and credential theft (“Displaying content over other applications (clickjacking)”).
  • [T1485 ] Data Destruction – SpyNote can remotely wipe device data if granted privileges (“Remotely wiping data”).
  • [T1486 ] Device Lockout – SpyNote can remotely lock the device (“Remotely locking the device”).
  • [T1535 ] Reset Device Password – SpyNote can reset device passwords remotely (“Remotely resetting the device password”).
  • [T1534 ] Install Other Software – SpyNote can download and install additional apps without user consent (“Downloading and installing new applications without user consent”).
  • [T1539 ] Update Software – SpyNote supports self-updating capabilities (“Self-updating”).
  • [T1574 ] File Deletion – SpyNote can delete collected data from storage (“Deleting collected data from the SD card”).
  • [T1518 ] Installed Application List – SpyNote detects other installed apps to tailor targeting (“Detecting other installed applications”).
  • [T1656 ] Screen Capture – SpyNote can capture screen content (“Capturing screen content”).
  • [T1556 ] Webview Injection – SpyNote can inject links into webviews within apps (“Injecting web links into web view modules within applications”).
  • [T1668 ] Hide Icons – SpyNote hides its app icon to avoid discovery (“Hiding its application icon from the app launcher”).
  • [T1624.001 ] Event Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers – SpyNote automatically restarts services after reboot (“Automatically starting malicious services after device reboot”).
  • [T1520 ] Persistence via System Application – SpyNote implements resilient “diehard services” to resist termination (“Implementing “diehard services” that are difficult to shut down”).
  • [T1546.003 ] Disable or Modify System Configuration: Disable Battery Optimization – SpyNote excludes itself from battery optimization to stay active (“Excluding itself from battery optimization settings”).
  • [T1529 ] Abuse of OS Features: Notifications – SpyNote uses silent persistent notifications to maintain presence (“Displaying continuous silent notifications to maintain a persistent presence”).
  • [T1547 ] Prevent Application Uninstall – SpyNote monitors for uninstall attempts and blocks removal (“Monitoring system settings for attempts to remove the application and blocking them”).
  • [T1550 ] Abuse of Accessibility Features – SpyNote hijacks Accessibility Services to simulate inputs and steal 2FA codes (“Hijacking accessibility services to simulate user inputs to prevent uninstallation”).
  • [T1701 ] Application Manipulation – SpyNote automatically navigates or manipulates UI to interfere with user attempts to remove it (“Automatically navigating back to the device’s home screen when a user tries to access app settings”).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP Address ] delivery and C2 infrastructure – 154.90.58[.]26 (delivery hosting many malicious APKs), 199.247.6[.]61 (C2 hosting domains)
  • [Domain ] malicious delivery and C2 domains – bcgrt[.]top (example delivery URL https://bcgrt[.]top/Beauty.apk), mskisdakw[.]top (C2 example); many other .top domains used for APK hosting.
  • [File Name ] spoofed APK filenames used as lures – Chrome.apk, CamSoda.apk, iHappy.apk (examples from delivery URLs)
  • [File Hash ] dropper and payload hashes – Chrome.apk (dropper) SHA-256: 48aa5f908fa6…66e8, Classes.dex (SpyNote) SHA-256: 86e8d3716318…b9e8 (and additional combined decrypted SpyNote asset hash b81febd19a45…d0d6)
  • [JavaScript/HTML Artifacts ] page and iframe indicators – embedded strings and resources like “sBw2N8uateIzRr93vmFze5MF_35vMk5F1wG04L5JcJE” and “PJKdyVFC5jlu_l8Wo_hirJkhs1cmitmn44fgpOc3zFc” found in fake Play Store pages.


Read more: https://dti.domaintools.com/spynote-malware-part-2/