EdskManager RAT: Multi-Stage Malware with HVNC and Evasion Capabilities

EdskManager RAT: Multi-Stage Malware with HVNC and Evasion Capabilities

EdskManager RAT is a sophisticated remote access trojan that employs multi-stage infection, encrypted configuration files, and HVNC for stealthy remote control. It uses cloud-hosted malware components, dynamic C2 infrastructure, and advanced anti-analysis techniques to maintain persistence and evade detection. #EdskManagerRAT #HVNC #AmazonS3 #u_arpuu_com #kimhate_com

Keypoints

  • EdskManager RAT uses a multi-stage infection process starting with a downloader disguised as legitimate software.
  • The malware stores critical configuration data in an encrypted .edskv file decrypted in memory during execution.
  • It communicates with its command-and-control servers using zlib-compressed messages over socket API and supports dynamic fallback domains.
  • Utilizes Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC) to enable stealthy remote control without visible signs on the victim’s screen.
  • Persistence is established through scheduled tasks, autorun registry entries, and startup shortcuts.
  • The malware performs system reconnaissance including browser extension enumeration and collects detailed host information.
  • Implements multiple anti-analysis techniques such as memory obfuscation, API hooking, and debugger evasion.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566] Phishing – Implied as initial access vector through deceptive downloader disguised as legitimate software.
  • [T1189] Drive-by Compromise – Suggested as a method for delivering the initial downloader.
  • [T1204] User Execution – The downloader relies on user interaction to execute the initial payload.
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – Persistence via autorun registry entries for malware execution at startup.
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – Persistence ensured by creating scheduled tasks that execute malware components.
  • [T1622] Debugger Evasion – Use of anti-debugging techniques to avoid analysis (“…anti-analysis… memory-to-memory operations…”).
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Decrypts encrypted .edskv file contents in memory to obtain configurations.
  • [T1564.003] Hidden Window – Creates multiple hidden windows to support stealth and remote control (HVNC functionality).
  • [T1027.013] Encrypted/Encoded File – Uses encrypted .edskv files for storing configuration and critical data.
  • [T1497] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion – Uses memory obfuscation and runtime tactics to hinder sandbox detection.
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – Gathers detailed information about the host environment and installed software.
  • [T1087.001] Local Account Discovery – Collects user and group information from the infected system.
  • [T1010] Application Window Discovery – Detects and enumerates browser extensions and application windows.
  • [T1217] Browser Information Discovery – Enumerates installed browser extensions on Chrome, Brave, and Edge.
  • [T1007] System Service Discovery – Collects data related to system services to assist reconnaissance.
  • [T1124] System Time Discovery – Likely used to maintain timing and avoid detection during execution.
  • [T1673] Virtual Machine Discovery – Attempts to detect virtual environments for evasion.
  • [T1115] Clipboard Data – Capability to monitor and capture clipboard contents.
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – Collects local system data for exfiltration.
  • [T1056] Input Capture – Includes keylogging functionality to capture user inputs silently.
  • [T1113] Screen Capture – Ability to capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop.
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Data exfiltration is done via encrypted communication with C2 servers.
  • [T1001] Data Obfuscation – Uses compression and encryption to obscure communication content sent to C2.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File] Initial downloader and malware components – WindowsFormsApp.exe (SHA-256: 85bae6fe73a9e2bf0819a6f60adfc458392a7a56de23f10d3bdddb8e3a97a8ec), commonbase.dll, LogManager.dll, VideoManagerEntry.edskv.
  • [Domain] Command and control servers – u[.]arpuu[.]com (previously resolved to 56[.]155[.]36[.]99), kimhate[.]com:1516 (potential C2, no observed communication).
  • [URL] Malware hosting location – videomanagerentry[.]s3[.]ap-northeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]com (Amazon S3 storage for downloading payload files).
  • [Registry Key] Persistence mechanism – ComputerHKEY_CURRENT_USERSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunVideoManagerEntry.
  • [Scheduled Task] Persistence mechanism – Task named “VideoManagerEntry” created to maintain persistence.


Read more: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/edskmanager-rat-multi-stage-malware-with-hvnc-and-evasion-capabilities/