Research Briefing: MCP Security

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is emerging as the new standard for integrating large language model (LLM) applications with external data sources and tools. While it offers significant capabilities, including natural language querying and contextual remediation, it also presents various security challenges that need to be managed through careful implementation and governance. Affected: LLM applications, software development, security protocols

Keypoints :

  • MCP connects LLM applications to external systems, enhancing functionality.
  • Broad support for MCP comes from major tech players like OpenAI, Microsoft, and Google.
  • MCP remains a work in progress, with evolving specifications and security considerations.
  • Security concerns include managing trusted sources and auto-running tools in client applications.
  • Advisories emphasize human oversight, tool validation, and secure API key management.
  • Local servers present higher risks, running arbitrary code on machines, while remote servers pose threats like data leakage and unauthorized access.
  • Auto-installation of MCP servers without inspection increases supply chain risks.
  • Current trust signals in MCP registries are weak or inconsistent, requiring better oversight.
  • Establishing an official MCP registry and improved signing protocols is in progress.
  • Future developments should focus on tool namespacing, better isolation, and granular permission management to mitigate risks.

MITRE Techniques :

  • T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol – Utilization of HTTP for communication between LLM applications and MCP servers.
  • T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution – Risk of remote code execution through vulnerable MCP client interactions.
  • T1202: Data Encrypted – Risks associated with the handling and transmission of sensitive information through MCP servers.
  • T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application – Exposure to attacks via improperly secured MCP server interfaces.
  • T1059.003: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell – Potential command execution vulnerabilities within MCP implementations.

Indicator of Compromise :

  • [Domain] glama.ai
  • [IoC Type] Link to MCP Registry where trust signals are attempted to be established
  • [Hash Type] SHA-256 placeholder for potential malicious code versioning
  • [IP Address] Placeholder for remote MCP server access, specific values not mentioned
  • [Email Address] Placeholder for potential developer communication, specific values not mentioned

Full Story: https://www.wiz.io/blog/mcp-security-research-briefing