Examining Water Sigbin’s Infection Routine Leading to an XMRig Cryptominer

Water Sigbin uses a multi-stage loading chain to deliver the PureCrypter loader and XMRIG miner by exploiting Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities CVE-2017-3506 and CVE-2023-21839 via a PowerShell script. The operation relies on in-memory, fileless techniques (reflective DLL loading and process injection) with code obfuscation and persistence mechanisms to evade detection. #WaterSigbin #8220Gang #XMRig #PureCrypter #CVE-2017-3506 #CVE-2023-21839 #OracleWebLogic

Keypoints

  • Water Sigbin exploits CVE-2017-3506 and CVE-2023-21839 to deploy cryptocurrency miners via a PowerShell script.
  • The threat actor uses fileless techniques, including DLL reflective loading and process injection, to run in memory and avoid disk-based detection.
  • A multi-stage loading chain delivers the PureCrypter loader and XMRIG miner, with staged components and in-memory payloads.
  • Obfuscation and anti-debugging measures are employed (e.g., .Net Reactor) to hinder reverse engineering and analysis.
  • Persistence and defense-evasion tactics include creating scheduled tasks, mutexes, and exclusions in Windows Defender.
  • The campaign establishes C2 communications, encrypts and stores configuration in the registry, and propagates victim-specific IDs for management and exfiltration.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application – The attacker exploited Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-3506 and CVE-2023-21839) to deploy cryptocurrency miners via PowerShell scripts. ‘Water Sigbin continues to exploit CVE-2017-3506 and CVE-2023-21839 to deploy cryptocurrency miners via a PowerShell script.’
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – The PowerShell script decodes and executes the first-stage payload after exploitation. ‘Upon successful exploitation of CVE-2017-3506, Water Sigbin deploys a PowerShell script on the compromised machine.’
  • [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – The malware collects system information using WMI queries. ‘collects system information, which includes usernames, installed antivirus software, and CPU information, using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries.’
  • [T1036.005] Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location – The malware impersonates the WireGuard VPN application to appear legitimate. ‘The malware impersonates the legitimate VPN application WireGuard to deceive users and AV engines.’
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Obfuscation and protection hinder reverse engineering of payloads. ‘This protection obfuscates the code, making it difficult for defenders to understand and replicate.’
  • [T1112] Modify Registry – The malware stores configuration data in registry keys for persistence and configuration. ‘The malware stores the decrypted response in a registry key under the subkey path HKEY_CURRENT_USERSOFTWARE.’
  • [T1562.001] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – It adds malware-related files/processes to Windows Defender exclusions. ‘Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath … -Force; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess …’
  • [T1620] Reflective Code Loading – In-memory loading via reflective DLL injection to avoid touching disk. ‘Reflective DLL injection for in-memory execution.’
  • [T1055.012] Process Injection: Process Hollowing – The loader injects payload into memory and starts a new process. ‘process injection to load the next stage payload into memory and start the new process.’
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – The malware creates a high-privilege scheduled task for persistence. ‘The malware can create a scheduled task with the highest privilege that runs 15 seconds after creation and then runs at random intervals…’
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – It creates and uses new processes to host payloads (e.g., cvtres.exe). ‘The loader creates a new process named cvtres.exe in the path …’
  • [T1012] Query Registry – The malware reads/writes registry keys as part of its configuration and persistence. ‘registry key under the subkey path HKEY_CURRENT_USERSOFTWARE<Victim ID>’
  • [T1518.001] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery – It retrieves installed antivirus software to tailor defenses. ‘retrieves installed AV using WMI query’
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – It collects hardware and system information to generate a victim ID. ‘collects hardware information… [and] a format … [Processor ID]-…’
  • [T1071] Application Layer Protocol – C2 communications occur over standard application-layer protocols with an encrypted channel. ‘C&C server at 89.185.85.102:9091’ and ‘encrypted response’ to fetch XMRig configuration.’
  • [T1001] Data Obfuscation – Data is encrypted/decrypted and compressed to evade detection. ‘AES encryption and gzip decompression’ and ‘TripleDES symmetric-key encryption’
  • [T1571] Non-Standard Port – C2 and mining communications use non-standard port 9091. ‘C&C server at 89.185.85.102:9091’
  • [T1095] Non-Application Layer Protocol – Communications may use non-application-layer protocols for C2/ops. ‘Non-Application Layer Protocol’ (as listed in the technique mapping).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP] C2 and mining endpoints – 89.185.85.102:9091, 217.182.205.238:8080
  • [Domain] C2 domain – god.sck-dns.cc
  • [Hash] First-stage and second-stage loaders – f4d11b36a844a68bf9718cf720984468583efa6664fc99966115a44b9a20aa33, 0bf87b0e65713bf35c8cf54c9fa0015fa629624fd590cb4ba941cd7cdeda8050, b380b771c7f5c2c26750e281101873772e10c8c1a0d2a2ff0aff1912b569ab93, 2e32c5cea00f8e4c808eae806b14585e8672385df7449d2f6575927537ce8884
  • [File name] Observed loader/payload names – wireguard2-3.exe, Zxpus.dll, cvtres.exe, Tixrgtluffu.dll, AddinProcess.exe, IsSynchronized.exe, plugin3.dll
  • [Registry Key] Persistence/config – HKEY_CURRENT_USERSOFTWARE<Victim ID>
  • [Wallet] Crypto wallet address – ZEPHYR2xf9vMHptpxP6VY4hHwTe94b2L5SGyp9Czg57U8DwRT3RQvDd37eyKxoFJUYJvP5ivBbiFCAMyaKWUe9aPZzuNoDXYTtj2Z.c4k

Read more: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/f/water-sigbin-xmrig.html