SmallTiger Malware Targets South Korean Businesses: Kimsuky and Andariel Attacks

ASEC reports active use of the SmallTiger malware in attacks against South Korean businesses, with targets including defense contractors, auto parts manufacturers, and semiconductor makers. The operation linked to Kimsuky and Andariel, evolving from DurianBeacon to SmallTiger while leveraging updater software, DLL dropper activity, and downloader capabilities with C2 communication over TLS. #SmallTiger #DurianBeacon #Kimsuky #Andariel #WebBrowserPassView

Keypoints

  • The campaigns target South Korean defense contractors, automobile parts, and semiconductor manufacturers, with lateral movement via software updater exploitation.
  • DurianBeacon was used in the November 2023 wave and later superseded by SmallTiger in February 2024; the Go-based DurianBeacon communicates over SSL/TLS to its C2 server.
  • Initial access details are unclear, but the attacker propagated malware during internal movement, using techniques associated with the Andariel group in some stages.
  • SmallTiger Case #1 involved DLL-based downloaders, memory-resident payloads, credential dumping (Mimikatz/ProcDump), and browser credential stealer components (NirSoft WebBrowserPassView).
  • SmallTiger Case #2 employed mshta to fetch JavaScript from C2, created payloads in ADS (Alternate Data Stream) areas, and used rundll32 to execute them; GitHub hosted payloads in May 2024.
  • Overall indicators include multiple MD5s, domain/IPs, and download URLs tied to DurianBeacon and SmallTiger, plus C2 infrastructure across various KR domains and IPs.
  • Recommendations stress phishing avoidance, patching OS/browsers, and monitoring security tools to prevent future infections.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – “Execute PowerShell commands” used during operation.
    Quoted: ‘Execute PowerShell commands’
  • [T1218.005] Mshta – “The downloaded JavaScript creates a payload that is included internally at the … path—and runs it using rundll32”.
    Quoted: ‘download a malicious JavaScript from the C&C server using the mshta command and runs it.’
  • [T1218.011] Rundll32 – “runs it using rundll32” to execute payloads from ADS areas.
    Quoted: ‘…and runs it using rundll32.’
  • [T1055] Process Injection – “DurianBeacon loads a DLL created in the…dll path and calls the RyXmqIUMXViyw6Uvkf() function”.
    Quoted: ‘loads a DLL created in the ‘%SystemDirectory%OGPWm4uRZ0CAkHZ9oc0FcEpj86LSNmZ5.dll’ path and calls the RyXmqIUMXViyw6Uvkf() function.’
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – “decrypts three files that exist in the resource and installs them … decrypts the files to execute them inside the memory.”
    Quoted: ‘decrypts three files that exist in the resource and decrypts the files to execute them inside the memory.’
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – “The DurianBeacon … sends the infected system’s IP information, user name, desktop name, architecture, and file names”.
    Quoted: ‘sends the infected system’s IP information, user name, desktop name, architecture, and file names before awaiting commands.’
  • [T1083] File and Directory Discovery – “Look up directory”.
    Quoted: ‘Look up directory’
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – “download a payload” and “downloads a payload to execute in memory”.
    Quoted: ‘download a payload and executes it inside the memory.’
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – “Upload files” during operation.
    Quoted: ‘Upload files’
  • [T1090] Proxy – “Socks Proxy” capability used for relaying traffic.
    Quoted: ‘Socks Proxy’
  • [T1573.001] TLS – “uses the SSL protocol to communicate with the C&C server”.
    Quoted: ‘uses the SSL protocol to communicate with the C&C server.’
  • [T1003.001] Credential Dumping – “Mimikatz and ProcDump … dumped memory of the LSASS process”.
    Quoted: ‘dumped the memory of the LSASS process using the ProcDump tool to hijack the infected system’s credentials.’
  • [T1555.003] Credentials in Web Browsers – “NirSoft’s WebBrowserPassView and browser credential theft”.
    Quoted: ‘the memory of NirSoft’s WebBrowserPassView and web browser was also discovered…’
  • [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol – “MultiRDP patches the memory of the currently running remote desktop service … with RDP”.
    Quoted: ‘patches the memory of the currently running remote desktop service so that multiple users can connect with remote desktop protocol (RDP).’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP] context – 104.168.145.83:993, 38.110.1.69:993, and other IPs listed with Meterpreter/Kimsuky activity
  • [Domain] context – www.yah00.o-r.kr:53, www.aslark.kro.kr:1433, www.aslark1.kro.kr:1433, www.lazor.kro.kr:443, and other KR domains
  • [Domain] SmallTiger C2 – www.navver.o-r.kr:53, w3.navver.o-r.kr:53, www.kepir.p-e.kr:53, www.kepir.p-e.kr:1521
  • [MD5] – 48d53985cefb9029feb349bcd514c444, d6a38ffdbac241d69674fb142a420740, 232046aff635f1a5d81e415ef64649b7
  • [MD5] – e582bd909800e87952eb1f206a279e47, 2a60348bd0fb2b5fadeb2a691c921370, 5e7acd7bf25dd7ef69bd76cbf7e96819
  • [File] – j******n.exe (SmallTiger downloader/dropper), printsys.dll, mNyKQBP3vV4uX (ADS payload)
  • [File] – DurianBeacon dropper (m.dat), DurianBeacon loader (mozillasvcone.dll), DurianBeacon loader (c0FcEpj86LSNmZ5.dll)
  • [URLs] – hxxp://my.shoping.kro[.]kr/setting.dat, hxxp://my.shoping.kro[.]kr/m.dat, hxxp://my.shoping.kro[.]kr/ng.db
  • [ADS/Path] – C:/Users/Public/printsys.dll:mdata (payload location in ADS)

Read more: https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/66546/