Fake Bahrain Government Android App Steals Personal Data for Financial Fraud

There is a counterfeit Bahrain government Android app that masquerades as LMRA services and steals personal data for financial fraud. McAfee Mobile Research found the Android “InfoStealer” app distributing via Facebook and SMS phishing, loading phishing URLs dynamically from Firebase, and exfiltrating data to a C2 server.

McAfee researchers uncovered an Android malware named InfoStealer that pretends to be the Bahrain LMRA government service and targets personal data for financial fraud. The campaign uses Facebook and SMS phishing, with Firebase-backed dynamic phishing URLs and data exfiltration to a C2 server, collecting CPR numbers, phone numbers, and other personal details from victims. #LMRA #InfoStealer

Keypoints

  • Researchers found an InfoStealer Android malware disguised as a Bahrain government service (LMRA) app.
  • The fake app promises multiple services to lure users, exceeding typical single-service LMRA apps.
  • Distribution relies on fake Facebook pages and SMS messages linking to phishing sites to download the apps.
  • The app collects sensitive data (CPR number, phone, full name, date of birth, email) and sends it to a C2 server.
  • Phishing URLs are dynamically loaded via Firebase Firestore, allowing rapid site updates to evade blocks.
  • About 62 Bahraini users have used the app; guidance emphasizes using official stores and security software.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing – The adversary used phishing to distribute the fake apps. Phishing pages were created on Facebook and linked to phishing sites. “The adversary used phishing to distribute the fake apps. Phishing pages were created on Facebook and linked to phishing sites.”
  • [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – The fake apps communicate with a C2 server using web protocols; user data is transmitted to the attacker’s server via HTTP/HTTPS. “The fake apps communicate with a Command and Control (C2) server using web protocols. User data entered into the app is transmitted to the attacker’s server via HTTP or HTTPS requests.”
  • [T1056.001] Input Capture: Keylogging – The malware captures input data (CPR numbers, phone numbers) entered by users and sends it to the C2. “The malware captures input data, including personal information like CPR numbers and phone numbers, which are entered by users in the fake app interfaces.”
  • [T1059.007] Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript – The fake app uses JavaScript within its webview to load phishing URLs from Firebase. “The fake app uses JavaScript within its webview to dynamically load phishing URLs from Firebase.”
  • [T1110.003] Brute Force: Credential Stuffing – The app requests sensitive information (CPR numbers, phone numbers) which can be used in credential stuffing attacks. “The fake app requests sensitive information such as CPR numbers and phone numbers, which can be used in credential stuffing attacks to access various user accounts and financial information.”
  • [T1071.004] Application Layer Protocol: DNS – The malware may use DNS to resolve C2 domain names, enabling communication with attacker infrastructure. “The malware may use DNS to resolve the domain names of its C2 servers, allowing it to communicate with the attacker’s infrastructure.”
  • [T1112] Modify Registry – The malware could modify device registry/configuration to maintain persistence after reboot. “The malware could potentially modify the registry or configuration settings on the infected device to maintain persistence and ensure the app continues running after a reboot.”
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – The app may obfuscate code and use legitimate services like Firebase to hide malicious activity. “The app may use obfuscation techniques to hide its malicious code and evade detection by security software. This includes using legitimate services like Firebase to obscure the malicious activity.”
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – The malware collects data from the device (including SMS) for exfiltration. “The malware collects data from the infected device, including SMS messages and other personal information, which is then exfiltrated to the attacker’s server.”
  • [T1052.001] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Stolen data is exfiltrated via the same channel used to interact with the UI. “The stolen data is exfiltrated to the attacker’s C2 server using the same communication channel that the app uses to interact with the user interface.”
  • [T1070.001] Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs – The malware may clear logs to avoid detection. “The malware may attempt to clear logs or other indicators on the infected device to cover its tracks and avoid detection by the user or security software.”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA256] context – 6f6d86e60814ad7c86949b7b5c212b83ab0c4da65f0a105693c48d9b5798136, 5574c98c9df202ec7799c3feb87c374310fa49a99838e68eb43f5c08ca08392d, and 6 more hashes
  • [Package Name] context – com.ariashirazi.instabrowser, com.npra.bahrain.five, and 6 more packages
  • [App Name] context – LMRA, LMRA Bahrain, and 3 more
  • [Domains] context – lmraa.com, lmjbfv.site, and 3 more domains
  • [Firebase URLs] context – npra-5.firebaseio.com, lmra9-38b17.firebaseio.com, and 1 more

Read more: https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/?p=192917