Joint FBI/CISA/MS-ISAC advisory details Vice Society’s ransomware operations, highlighting their methods, IOCs, and recommended mitigations for education-sector defenders. It notes that Vice Society uses variants such as Hello Kitty/Five Hands and Zeppelin and urges entities to apply proven mitigations and report incidents. #ViceSociety #Zeppelin
Keypoints
- Vice Society is an intrusion, exfiltration, and extortion group active since 2021, deploying variants like Hello Kitty/Five Hands and Zeppelin ransomware.
- Initial access commonly comes from compromised credentials via internet-facing applications (T1190) or valid accounts (T1078).
- Execution leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for living-off-the-land activity (T1047) and uses scheduled tasks (T1053) for persistence and execution.
- Persistence tactics include Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder (T1547.001) and DLL side-loading (T1574.002); abuse of services and autostart mechanisms is observed.
- Defense evasion includes masquerading as legitimate files (T1036) and process injection (T1055); some samples use sandbox evasion techniques (T1497).
- Lateral movement involves tainting shared content (T1080) to deliver payloads across network shares.
- Exfiltration is associated with double extortion—threatening to release stolen data unless a ransom is paid (TA0010); data encryption (T1486) is used to disrupt availability, and password changes can remove access (T1531).
MITRE Techniques
- [T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application – “Vice Society actors exploit vulnerabilities in an internet-facing systems to gain access to victims’ networks.”
- [T1078] Valid Accounts – “Vice Society actors obtain initial network access through compromised valid accounts.”
- [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) – “Vice Society actors leverage WMI as a means of “living off the land” to execute malicious commands.”
- [T1053] Scheduled Task/Job – “Vice Society have used malicious files that create component task schedule objects, which are often mean to register a specific task to autostart on system boot.”
- [T1543.003] Modify System Process – “Vice Society actors encrypt Windows Operating functions to preserve compromised system functions.”
- [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – “Vice Society actors have employed malicious files that create an undocumented autostart Registry key to maintain persistence after boot/reboot.”
- [T1574.002] DLL Side-Loading – “Vice Society actors may directly side-load their payloads by planting their own DLL then invoking a legitimate application that executes the payload within that DLL.”
- [T1068] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – “Vice Society actors have been observed exploiting PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527) to escalate privileges.”
- [T1036] Masquerading – “Vice Society actors may attempt to manipulate features of the files they drop in a victim’s environment to mask the files or make the files appear legitimate.”
- [T1055] Process Injection – “Vice Society artifacts have been analyzed to reveal the ability to inject code into legitimate processes…”
- [T1497] Sandbox Evasion – “Vice Society actors may have included sleep techniques in their files to hinder common reverse engineering or dynamic analysis.”
- [T1080] Taint Shared Content – “Vice Society actors may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations such as network drives.”
- [TA0010] Exfiltration – “Vice Society actors are known for double extortion, which is a second attempt to force a victim to pay by threatening to expose sensitive information if the victim does not pay a ransom.”
- [T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact – “Vice Society actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.”
- [T1531] Account Access Removal – “Vice Society actors run a script to change passwords of victims’ email accounts.”
Indicators of Compromise
- [Email Addresses] – v-society.official@onionmail[.]org, ViceSociety@onionmail[.]org, and OnionMail accounts in the format of [First Name][Last Name]@onionmail[.]org
- [TOR Address] – http://vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyad[.]onion
- [IP Addresses for C2] – 5.255.99[.]59 (High Confidence), 5.161.136[.]176 (Medium Confidence), and 2 more IPs
- [MD5] – fb91e471cfa246beb9618e1689f1ae1d
- [SHA1] – a0ee0761602470e24bcea5f403e8d1e8bfa29832
Read more: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-249a