Gootkit Loader Actively Targets Australian Healthcare Industry

Trend Micro analyzes Gootkit loader’s infection routine targeting Australian healthcare, showing SEO poisoning for initial access and abuse of VLC Media Player for DLL sideloading and Cobalt Strike usage. The campaign features obfuscated JavaScript, fake WordPress pages hosting contaminated content, and a multi-stage infection with delayed C2 communication. #GootkitLoader #Gootloader #VLCMediaPlayer #CobaltStrike #ACSC #AustralianHealthcare

Keypoints

  • Gootkit loader leverages SEO poisoning to target Australian healthcare organizations.
  • Abuse of VLC Media Player via DLL side-loading (msdtc.exe and libvlc.dll) to load Cobalt Strike components.
  • Infection starts with a malicious ZIP/JS delivered through contaminated search results and a counterfeit forum page.
  • First stage uses a scheduled task for persistence; second stage loads Cobalt Strike after a waiting period and C2 activity.
  • Legitimate tools (e.g., wabmig.exe, dllhost.exe) are abused to perform process injection and evade defense.
  • Discovery tools (PSHound.ps1, soo.ps1) and AD-recon activities are used to map networks before broader movement.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1189] Drive-by Compromise – Drive-by compromise via SEO poisoning to obtain initial access. ‘Known for using search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning for its initial access’.
  • [T1574.002] DLL Side-Loading – Abuse of legitimate VLC components by loading a malicious DLL; ‘msdtc.exe (renamed “VLC Media Player” and a legitimate file)’ and ‘libvlc.dll’ (malicious).
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – Execution chain includes PowerShell; ‘Scheduled task → wscript.exe → cscript.exe → PowerShell’.
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – Persistence via scheduled task creation; ‘The goal of the first stage of infection is to set a scheduled task for persistence’.
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – C2 communication over web protocols; ‘C&C access is performed from the PowerShell’ and multiple URL endpoints.
  • [T1021.002] SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral movement to internal machines via SMB with outbound connections to ports 389, 445, and 3268. ‘Multiple outbound connections to internal machines toward ports 389, 445, and 3268’.
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – Heavy obfuscation in large JavaScript payloads; ‘the second anonymous function uses numbers, lowercase letters (from a to z), and uppercase letters (from A to Z) for obfuscation….’
  • [T1055] Process Injection – Malicious code execution via process injection using wabmig.exe and dllhost.exe; ‘process injection and then became a beacon for Cobalt Strike’.
  • [T1003] OS Credential Dumping – Kerberos hashes observed in memory; ‘krb.txt was created by one of the injected processes that contains Kerberos hashes’.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA256] – libvlc.dll – 7c2ea97f8fff301a03f36fb6b87d08dc81e948440c87c2805b9e4622eb4e1991 – Detection: Trojan.Win64.COBEACON.SWG
  • [SHA256] – Object Relations.js – 6d549cd0b623f5623bb80cc344f6b73962d76b70a7cbd40ca8f1d96df7cce047 – Detection: Trojan.JS.DOWNLOADER.AC
  • [SHA256] – PSHound.ps1 – a9d2a52e418f5cc9f6943db00a350a5588c11943898d3d6d275e1b636b3cd7c8 – Detection: HackTool.PS1.BloodHound.C
  • [SHA256] – soo.ps1 – 57af5c9f715d5c516e1137b6d336bff7656e1b85695fff4c83fc5a78c11fdec6 – Detection: Trojan.PS1.POWLOAD.TIAOENO

Connections (examples)

  • 193.106.191.187
  • http://bip.podkowalesna.pl/xmlrpc.php
  • http://blog.ddlab.net/xmlrpc.php
  • http://bodilbruun.dk/xmlrpc.php

Files and artifacts (examples)

  • libvlc.dll
  • Object Relations.js
  • PSHound.ps1
  • soo.ps1

Read more: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/gootkit-loader-actively-targets-the-australian-healthcare-indust.html