Ongoing Social Engineering Campaign Tied to Black Basta Ransomware Operators

Rapid7 identifies an ongoing social engineering campaign targeting MDR customers, where actors flood users with spam and then call them to offer remote-access help, enabling credential theft and persistence. While no ransomware was observed in these cases, some indicators align with the Black Basta operators based on OSINT and prior investigations. #BlackBasta #AnyDesk #QuickAssist

Keypoints

  • The campaign begins with a flood of spam emails—often newsletters from legitimate organizations—to overwhelm email protections.
  • Phone calls impersonating IT staff are used to socially engineer victims into granting remote access via AnyDesk or Quick Assist.
  • Once access is gained, the attackers download payloads and attempt to harvest credentials and establish persistence.
  • In at least one case, Cobalt Strike beacons were deployed to other assets, with no observed ransomware in Rapid7’s responses.
  • Initial access and persistence rely on batch scripts, SSH keys, and OpenSSH for Windows packaged as a renamed executable.
  • Forensic indicators include NetSupport and ScreenConnect tools, DLL side-loading, and indicators linked to the Black Basta operations.
  • Mitigations emphasize baselining RMM tools, application allowlisting, and user awareness of legitimate IT channels and social engineering attempts.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1498] Network Denial of Service – The threat actor overwhelms email protection solutions with spam. “The threat actor overwhelms email protection solutions with spam.”
  • [T1566.004] Phishing: Spearphishing Voice – The threat actor calls impacted users and pretends to be a member of their organization’s IT team to gain remote access. “the threat actor calls impacted users posing as a member of their organization’s IT team reaching out to offer support for their email issues.”
  • [T1059.003] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell – The threat actor executes batch script after establishing remote access to a user’s asset. “The threat actor executes batch script after establishing remote access to a user’s asset.”
  • [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – Batch scripts used by the threat actor execute certain commands via PowerShell. “Batch scripts used by the threat actor execute certain commands via PowerShell.”
  • [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Run Keys / Startup Folder – The threat actor creates a run key to execute a batch script via PowerShell, which then attempts to establish a reverse tunnel via SSH. “The threat actor creates a run key to execute a batch script via PowerShell, which then attempts to establish a reverse tunnel via SSH.”
  • [T1222.001] File and Directory Permissions Modification – The threat actor uses cacls.exe via batch script to modify file permissions. “The threat actor uses cacls.exe via batch script to modify file permissions.”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – The threat actor encrypted several zip archive payloads with the password “qaz123”. “The threat actor encrypted several zip archive payloads with the password “qaz123”.”
  • [T1056.001] Input Capture: Keylogging – The threat actor runs a batch script that records the user’s password via command line input. “The threat actor runs a batch script that records the user’s password via command line input.”
  • [T1033] System Owner/User Discovery – The threat actor uses whoami.exe to evaluate if the impacted user is an administrator or not. “The threat actor uses whoami.exe to evaluate if the impacted user is an administrator or not.”
  • [T1570] Lateral Tool Transfer – Impacket was used to move payloads between compromised systems. “Impacket was used to move payloads between compromised systems.”
  • [T1572] Protocol Tunneling – An SSH reverse tunnel is used to provide the threat actor with persistent remote access. “An SSH reverse tunnel is used to provide the threat actor with persistent remote access.”
  • [T1574.002] DLL Side-loading – The DLL was altered to XOR-decrypt the Cobalt Strike beacon and then execute it; side-loading via 7zG.exe to load 7z.DLL. “The DLL was altered to include a function whose purpose was to XOR-decrypt the Cobalt Strike beacon using a hard-coded key and then execute the beacon.”
  • [T1041] Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Credentials are immediately exfiltrated to the threat actor’s server via SCP. “credentials are immediately exfiltrated to the threat actor’s server via a Secure Copy command (SCP).”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Network Based Indicators (NBIs)] Domain/IPv4 Addresses and Domains – upd7[.]com, greekpool[.]com, and 12 more items
  • [Host-based indicators (HBIs)] Files and Keys – s.zip (SHA256: C18E7709866F8B1A271A54407973152BE1036AD3B57423101D7C3DA98664D108), id_rsa (SHA256: 59F1C5FE47C1733B84360A72E419A07315FBAE895DD23C1E32F1392E67313859), and 5 more items

Read more: https://blog.rapid7.com/2024/05/10/ongoing-social-engineering-campaign-linked-to-black-basta-ransomware-operators/