HTML Smuggling Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware

Two-stage HTML smuggling campaign delivered a password-protected ZIP containing an ISO that dropped IcedID, leading to Cobalt Strike beacons and Nokoyawa ransomware across a domain. The operation involved TA551 as distributor and Storm-0390 as hands-on keyboard actor, exhibiting persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and extensive network discovery before encryption. #TA551 #Storm-0390 #Nokoyawa #IcedID #CobaltStrike #HTMLSmuggling #RDP #PsExec #AdFind #SessionGopher

Keypoints

  • Attack chain starts with HTML smuggling delivering a password-protected ZIP that hides an ISO payload.
  • Inside the ZIP/ISO, IcedID loader drops a DLL and establishes Cobalt Strike beacons for post-exploitation.
  • Initial access appears to be delivered via email with thread hijacking and a fake Adobe lure to download the ZIP.
  • Persistence is achieved via scheduled tasks and later, ransomware is deployed across the network using PsExec and WMIC.
  • Extensive discovery (AD, domain, network, and OS info) precedes ransomware deployment, including AdFind, nltest, and nslookup.
  • Ransomware (Nokoyawa) encrypts systems, loads hidden drives, and deletes volume shadow copies using k.exe and p.bat.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1027.006] HTML Smuggling – Used to deliver a password-protected ZIP and ISO payload via an HTML file labeled as an Adobe lure. [ ‘This HTML file was using a technique known as HTML smuggling.’ ]
  • [T1036] Masquerading – The LNK file masqueraded as a document to trick the user into execution. [ ‘The only visible file to the user was a LNK file masquerading as a document.’ ]
  • [T1218.011] Rundll32 – The initial loader renamed rundll32.exe to entails.exe and used rundll32 to load the IcedID DLL. [ ‘the initial access package used the Windows xcopy utility to rename rundll32.exe to entails.exe.’ ]
  • [T1055] Process Injection – IcedID DLL loaded via entails.exe and injected into cmd.exe; later, beacon.dll injected into cmd.exe. [ ‘entails.exe, which loaded the IcedID DLL, was then observed injecting into a cmd.exe process’ ]
  • [T1003.001] LSASS Memory – Cobalt Strike accessed LSASS memory to extract credentials. [ ‘accesses LSASS, likely to access credentials.’ ]
  • [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol – RDP session used to move laterally to a domain controller. [ ‘initiated an RDP session to move laterally to a domain controller.’ ]
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – IcedID persistence established via a scheduled task running hourly. [ ‘persistence was established via a scheduled task on the beachhead host. This task was set to run the IcedID malware every hour on the host.’ ]
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – Discovery commands included net, ipconfig, systeminfo, nltest. [ ‘standard utilities like net, ipconfig, systeminfo, and nltest.’ ]
  • [T1069.002] Active Directory Discovery – AdFind used for discovery on a domain controller. [ ‘AdFind was used for discovery on a domain controller via a batch script named adfind.bat.’ ]
  • [T1560.001] Archive Collected Data – Discovery results archived with 7-Zip. [ ‘the results of the discovery commands were archived using 7-Zip.’ ]
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – SessionGopher encoded PowerShell command used to find/decrypt session data for remote access tools. [ ‘an encoded PowerShell command which was SessionGopher.’ ]
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – Extensive use of cmd.exe for discovery and execution. [ ‘cmd.exe /c chcp >&2 ipconfig /all systeminfo net config workstation nltest /domain_trusts’ ]
  • [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – WMI used to enumerate antivirus products. [ ‘WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:rootSecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get * /Format:List’ ]
  • [T1018] Remote System Discovery – Net/nslookup/dns lookups for network-wide reconnaissance. [ ‘nslookup’ and other network lookup commands were used across hosts.’ ]
  • [T1218] Rundll32 – Rundll32-based execution of IcedID via renamed loader. [ ‘rundll32.exe … –oyxo=”EdgeDecreaselicense.dat”‘ ]
  • [T1560] Archive Collected Data – Archive of discovery results with 7-Zip. [ ‘archived using 7-Zip.’ ]
  • [T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact – Nokoyawa ransomware encrypts the network and endpoints. [ ‘encryption of the network’ and ‘ransomware binary’ executed.’ ]
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts – Domain-privilege escalation and use of domain administrator accounts during discovery and movement. [ ‘Domain Admins’ and ‘valid accounts’ context implied.]
  • [T1021.002] SMB/Windows Admin Shares – PsExec/WMIC lateral movement across network hosts. [ ‘PsExec and WMIC were used to move files across systems in the network.’ ]
  • [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol – RDP-based lateral movement to domain controllers. [ ‘RDP session to move laterally to a domain controller.’ ]
  • [T1036.005] Masquerading – LNK/file disguises and batch scripts used to disguise malicious components. [ ‘masquerading as a document’ ]
  • [T1040] Network Service Scanning – Netscan and nslookup used to enumerate network and DNS before attack. [ ‘netscan’ and ‘nslookup’ usage described.]

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP] – 5.8.18.242:443 (Cobalt Strike C2) – 5.8.18.242 observed connecting to C2 servers. 159.89.12.125:80 (HTTP endpoint for IcedID/Stage).
  • [IP] – 78.128.113.154 (hosted on 4vendeta.com in Bulgaria) – 78.128.113[.]154
  • [Domain] – trentonkaizerfak[.]com – C2 domain for IcedID/Nokoyawa activity.
  • [Domain] – pikchayola[.]pics – C2 domain for IcedID activity.
  • [Domain] – questdisar[.]com – C2 domain for IcedID activity.
  • [JA3/JA3s] – a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1, ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc – TLS fingerprints for Cobalt Strike/IcedID traffic.
  • [Hash] – 9740f2b8aeacc180d32fc79c46333178, 40c9dc2897b6b348da88b23deb0d3952 – DLLs/executables dropped during infection (1.dll, k.exe).
  • [File name] – documents-9771.lnk, k.exe – LNK masquerade file and ransomware component name.
  • [File name] – pimpliest_kufic.png, templates544.png – disguised files within ISO/ZIP used for loading IcedID.
  • [Hostname] – WIN-5J00ETD85P5 – host used during RDP/Mimikatz-like activity.
  • [URL] – http://127.0.0.1:8897/ – command to fetch SessionGopher payload from the C2 server.
  • [SSL Certificate] – Certificate Subject: O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd,ST=Some-State,C=AU,CN=localhost (used in observed TLS traffic to C2).

Read more: https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/