Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage Activity Targeting Semiconductor Industry in East Asia

EclecticIQ identifies a Chinese state-sponsored cyber-espionage campaign targeting East Asia’s semiconductor sector, using HyperBro loader with DLL-side loading, a Cobra DocGuard-hosted downloader, and a GO-based backdoor named ChargeWeapon to exfiltrate data and maintain persistence. The operation shows strong overlaps with PRC-backed threat activity and employs signed binaries, Cobalt Strike, and social engineering lures aimed at Mandarin-speaking regions around Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
#HyperBro #ChargeWeapon #CobraDocGuard #RedHotel #AP27 #Budworm #CobaltStrike #TSMC

Keypoints

  • Campaign targets Mandarin-speaking East Asia semiconductor interests (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) using a TSMC-themed lure.
  • HyperBro loader runs Cobalt Strike beacon in memory via DLL-side loading using a signed CyberArk binary (vfhost.exe).
  • A second-stage downloader on Cobra DocGuard server fetches Cobalt Strike payloads and loads them via DLL side-loading.
  • The Cobra DocGuard server hosts ChargeWeapon, a GO-based backdoor that collects host data and reports to a C2 server.
  • Decoy PDF lures in Mandarin aim to minimize user suspicion while malware executes in the background.
  • Attribution links to PRC-backed groups (e.g., RedHotel/APT27/Budworm) and shared infrastructure with Hong Kong targets.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1574.002] DLL Side-Loading – DLL side-loading attacks use the DLL search order mechanism in Windows to plant and invoke a legitimate application that executes a malicious DLL payload. Quote: β€œβ€¦DLL side-loading attacks use the DLL search order mechanism in Windows to plant and invoke a legitimate application that executes a malicious DLL payload…”
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The BitsTransfer module in PowerShell is used to fetch malicious binaries from a Cobra DocGuard server. Quote: β€œThis downloader utilizes the BitsTransfer module in PowerShell to fetch malicious binaries from a very likely compromised Cobra DocGuard server.”
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – PowerShell-based download and execution workflow observed, including the Start-BitsTransfer usage. Quote: β€œThe PowerShell command line execution after the successful infection of the Cobalt Strike downloader: Start-BitsTransfer -Source …”
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – The Cobalt Strike beacon uses a C2 profile and disguises traffic (Malleable C2) to resemble normal web traffic. Quote: β€œA Malleable C2 profile specifies how the beacon will transform and store data in a transaction to its C2 server. This technique is used for evasion of traditional firewall defenses.”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – The XOR-encrypted payload is decrypted with a one-byte length key (0x01). Quote: β€œThe shellcode decryption routine uses a one-byte length key (0x01) to decrypt the XOR-encrypted Cobalt Strike payload.”
  • [T1036.005] Masquerading – The threat actor masquerades components as legitimate binaries (e.g., securityhealthservice.exe, vfhost.exe). Quote: β€œMasqueraded names included securityhealthservice.exe, secu.exe, vfhost.exe, vxhost.exe, vx.exe, and v.exe.”
  • [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – WMI-based execution is used for lateral movement or execution. Quote: β€œWindows Management Instrumentation (WMI) execution.”
  • [T1566.001] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – A decoy PDF themed around Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing is used to lure victims. Quote: β€œThe threat actor used a TSMC-themed PDF as a decoy, displayed after the execution of the HyperBro loader.”
  • [T1036.005] Masquerading – Reiterated for the tactic of disguising as legitimate software in distributed components. Quote: β€œMasquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location – T1036.005”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Reiterated in the appendix for the XOR-based decryption of shellcode. Quote: β€œThe decryption routine uses a one-byte length key (0x01) to decrypt the XOR-encrypted Cobalt Strike payload.”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Hash] 12e1f50d7c9cf546c90545588bc369fa90e03f2370883e7befd87e4d50ebf0df – HyperBro loader variant artifact
  • [Hash] 7229bb62acc6feca55d05b82d2221be1ab0656431953012ebad7226adc63643b – secondary loader/downloader artifact
  • [Hash] df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348 – downloader/artifact component
  • [Hash] 45e7ce7b539bfb4f780c33faa1dff523463907ec793ff5d1e94204a8a6a00ab5 – Cobalt Strike shellcode artifact
  • [Hash] 56f94f1df0338d254d0421e7baf17527817607a60c6f9c71108e60a12d7d6dcf – additional loader/downloader artifact
  • [IP] 38.54.119.239 – C2 IP for HyperBro/Cobalt Strike beacon
  • [IP] 45.77.37.145 – C2 IP for ChargeWeapon GO backdoor
  • [IP] 45.32.33.17 – Additional C2-related host IP
  • [IP] 23.224.61.12 – Secondary C2-related host IP
  • [IP] 154.93.7.99 – Cobra DocGuard server hosting downloader components
  • [URL] http://38.54.119.239:443/jquery-3.3.1.min.js – Malleable C2 disguise payload
  • [URL] hxxp://154.93.7.99:8090/CDGServer3/images/zh/mcvsocfg.dll – Cobra DocGuard downloader component
  • [URL] hxxp://154.93.7.99:8090/CDGServer3/images/zh/mcods.exe – Cobra DocGuard downloader component
  • [URL] hxxp://154.93.7.99:8090/CDGServer3/images/zh/bin.config – Cobalt Strike shellcode config

Read more: https://blog.eclecticiq.com/chinese-state-sponsored-cyber-espionage-activity-targeting-semiconductor-industry-in-east-asia