CloudSEK found an exposed directory belonging to a Chinese-speaking operator who used AI coding agents, Telegram, and a self-hosted LLM proxy to run autonomous intrusions against WordPress sites, crypto/DeFi targets, and wallet-bearing phishing databases. The operator also built a blockchain-based DeadDropC2 concept and deployed a disguised Monero miner, while leaving behind over 12,000 WordPress backdoors, harvested credentials, and large sets of wallet keys and seed phrases. #WordPress #DeadDropC2 #Monero #Telegram #ClaudeCode #Codex #Hermes #pi #ZhipuGLM
Keypoints
- The investigation began with an open directory on IP 80[.]96[.]109[.]64:18080 that exposed the operatorâs full working home folder.
- The operator ran multiple AI coding agents in full-auto mode, with approvals disabled, and controlled them through Telegram.
- A reusable Chinese âauthorized pentestâ prompt was used as a jailbreak wrapper to make the agents carry out offensive tasks.
- The mass exploitation pipeline produced 12,048 WordPress compromise records across 8,996 unique sites, plus 66 harvested database admin credential sets.
- The operator also held hundreds of cryptocurrency wallet private keys and seed phrases, much of it scraped from a misconfigured phishing clone database.
- Evidence showed targeted theft against crypto and DeFi services, including validated API keys, admin tokens, and real wallet data.
- The operator was developing DeadDropC2, an EtherHiding-style blockchain command-and-control system, and separately deployed a disguised Monero miner.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1595 ] Active Scanning â Used FOFA, ProjectDiscovery tools, and broad internet sweeps to enumerate targets and exposure (âPhase 1: Asset mapping via FOFAâ and âProjectDiscovery-style reconnaissance suiteâ).
- [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application â Used WordPress-to-webshell exploitation and fastjson2 deserialization RCE against exposed services (âWordPress-to-webshell mass exploitationâ and âfastjson2 deserialization RCE kitâ).
- [T1110 ] Brute Force â The prompt instructed agents to try default credentials and weak passwords during automated testing (âtry default credentialsâ and âweak passwordsâ).
- [T1552 ] Unsecured Credentials â Harvested admin creds, API keys, SSH keys, wallet keys, seed phrases, and tokens from exposed directories, databases, and bundles (âcredentials, cloud AK/SK, payment keysâ and âlive API keys and admin tokensâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â Dropped and pushed miner binaries and other tooling to worker hosts and compromised systems (âpushing binaries to worker hostsâ and âstaged through a public file-sharing serviceâ).
- [T1021 ] Remote Services â Reused a recovered SSH key and accessed systems via SSH-based workflows (âSingle recovered SSH key reused for root on multiple cloud hostsâ and âover SSHâ).
- [T1074 ] Data Staged â Consolidated stolen wallet keys, seed phrases, credentials, and evidence files into working datasets (âloot consolidationâ and âcombined datasetsâ).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Sent results and stolen data back through Telegram-controlled agent bridges and operator workflows (âtasking and monitoring them entirely over Telegramâ).
- [T1059 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter â Used shell commands, automation scripts, and agent-directed command execution during offensive operations (âshell executionâ and shell history evidence).
- [T1505 ] Server Software Component: Web Shell â Generated a large inventory of WordPress backdoors and unique attacker-created admin accounts (â12,048 real compromise recordsâ and âbackdoor admin accountâ).
- [T1587 ] Develop Capabilities â Built DeadDropC2, a custom blockchain-based C2 kit, and a Monero miner workflow (âThe operator was developing an EtherHiding-style command-and-control systemâ and miner setup).
- [T1090 ] Proxy â Used a self-hosted Zhipu GLM proxy via LiteLLM/llmio and rotating infrastructure to broker requests (âself-hosted Zhipu GLM proxy via LiteLLM/llmioâ).
- [T1496 ] Resource Hijacking â Deployed a disguised Monero miner onto compromised hosts for illicit revenue (âdeploys a disguised Monero miner onto compromised hostsâ).
- [T1611 ] Escape to Host â Disabled AI-agent safety approvals and full-auto controls to run tasks unattended (âall safety approval disabledâ and âall actions default to allowâ).
- [T1106 ] Native API â Queried Firestore REST APIs, GraphQL endpoints, and blockchain RPC interfaces directly to retrieve data (âpublic Firestore REST API with zero authenticationâ and âGraphQL indexerâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP address ] exposed staging and pivot infrastructure â 80[.]96[.]109[.]64:18080, 103[.]236[.]54[.]207, and other worker-host IPs mentioned in the article.
- [File names ] tooling, evidence, and C2 artifacts â recovered_key.txt, DeadDropC2.sol, DeadDropC2.bin, and other project files referenced in the dump.
- [Domains ] blockchain RPC and service endpoints â bsc-testnet-rpc.publicnode.com, bsc-testnet.drpc.org, and bsc-testnet.bnbchain.org.
- [Wallet addresses ] blockchain test and operator addresses â 0x399EâŚbCE7c and 0x5eA7âŚed2B80, both described as having zero mainnet activity.
- [API/service names ] exposed cloud and platform targets â Firestore, LiteLLM/llmio, Zhipu GLM, and Telegram bot infrastructure.
- [Hashes/credentials ] redacted but explicitly present â ED25519 SSH host key, live bot token, FOFA API keys, and 2 Monero payout wallet addresses.