Acronis TRU uncovered a multi-stage espionage campaign delivering the PATCHCORD backdoor, SHEETCORD, and HACKERAI C2 Agent against Afghan telecom, Indian government, defense, energy, and critical infrastructure targets. The operators used impersonation lures, browser shortcut hijacking, Google Sheets, and GitHub Gists for command-and-control, and the activity is assessed to overlap with APT36 (Transparent Tribe). #PATCHCORD #SHEETCORD #HACKERAI #APT36 #TransparentTribe #AFTEL #NIC #CGDA #SuperShell
Keypoints
- PATCHCORD is a previously undocumented custom C/C++ backdoor delivered through fake installers impersonating Afghan Telecom and telecom tools.
- The malware uses browser shortcut hijacking and a Run key for persistence, then communicates with a hardcoded C2 domain, appstoore[.]solutions.
- SHEETCORD is a Go-based implant that extends PATCHCORDâs ideas and abuses Google Sheets for command-and-control.
- HACKERAI C2 Agent is an earlier implant in the same cluster that uses GitHub Gists for C2 and shows signs of AI-assisted development.
- Infrastructure pivoting found a shared C2 server at 46.30.188.13 and multiple impersonation domains tied to Afghan and Indian targets.
- An exposed staging server revealed additional tooling, including SuperShell, Metasploit artifacts, browser credential theft tools, and exploit tooling for CVE-2024-6387.
- TRU assesses with moderate confidence that the campaign overlaps with APT36 (Transparent Tribe) based on targeting, tooling, infrastructure, and tradecraft.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1036 ] Masquerading â The operators disguised payloads and domains as legitimate telecom and government assets, including fake installers and impersonation domains [âfake VPN installers impersonating Afghan Telecom (AFTEL)â and âa domain impersonating Indiaâs National Informatics Centre (NIC)â]
- [T1547.009 ] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification â PATCHCORD and SHEETCORD persisted by rewriting browser shortcuts to launch the malware first [âhijacking browser shortcutsâ and ârewrites the shortcut⌠to the implantâs own executableâ]
- [T1547.001 ] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder â PATCHCORD wrote to a Run key and SHEETCORD used both a Run key and a Startup-folder VBS file for persistence [âwrites its own executable path to this keyâ and âdrops a VBScript file named SystemHelper.vbs into the Windows Startup folderâ]
- [T1057 ] Process Discovery â PATCHCORD enumerated running processes and returned names, PIDs, and executable paths [âEnumerates all running processes on the victimâs systemâ]
- [T1106 ] Native API â The implants used Windows APIs such as CreateThread, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, ShellExecuteW, and CreateProcessA to execute actions [âallocated into executable memory via VirtualAllocâ and âexecuted as a new thread via CreateThreadâ]
- [T1059.003 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell â PATCHCORD executed remote commands via cmd.exe /c [âExecutes arbitrary commands via cmd.exe /câ]
- [T1059.001 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell â SHEETCORD executed commands using PowerShell [âit executes commands through powershell -Command with script block wrappingâ]
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The malware downloaded and executed payloads delivered by the operator through C2 tasking and staged installers [âdelivering a previously undocumented custom backdoorâ and âreceives an encoded payload as part of the tasking responseâ]
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â The cluster used Base64 encoding, custom alphabets, HTML comment wrappers, and encrypted shellcode to conceal data [âencoded using the custom Base64 alphabetâ and âwrapped in HTML comment markersâ]
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Command output and host data were sent back to C2 servers over HTTP or cloud services [âcaptured output⌠and sent back to the C2 serverâ and âGoogle Sheets API v4â]
- [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols â C2 traffic used HTTP, Google Sheets, and GitHub Gists as application-layer channels [âcommunicates with the hardcoded C2 domainâ and âabuses Google Sheets for command-and-controlâ]
- [T1567.002 ] Exfiltration to Cloud Storage â SHEETCORD used Google Sheets as a bidirectional cloud C2 channel [âcreates per-victim tabs in the operatorâs spreadsheet for bidirectional communicationâ]
Indicators of Compromise
- [SHA256 ] Installer and dropper samples â TMS_AfghanTelecom.exe (cf7184c0dfe882dc6e3016f16e4ede32b75d7648f83d6f4f87eb6a703be7b8d6), MDEB_Update_Setup.exe (378484112b4e837d3850b5b0802fc509202c232bb124d6944a59fe66525ba668), and other listed hashes
- [SHA256 ] PATCHCORD binaries â tms_launcher.exe (d46ee94d6a27ff9f02cff6fb57780acac2833ce48c95e63042a6274e24a040bb), node_service.exe (50fc220347f9e281037e831c3755dc70a8ba7f663025aea35b301226918b016b), and agent.exe (0f4073d3c866bc3daf55b25f71250b96ec120db94a4f9cc8fe85b7c9f9d346b3)
- [SHA256 ] SHEETCORD and HACKERAI binaries â system-agent.exe (959bbb09cd86ce3930406bf1cf32776ca477dfefe3fd63e90bf0017fccd90587), Agent.exe (74d347785dc47f8cda3876826cdd3fb3935ac55dc8e9e0c0f96d5ef4e00089a2), and 2 more hashes
- [Domains ] C2 and lure domains â appstoore[.]solutions, afghantelecom[.]site, nic-support[.]site, and other listed domains such as caprispine[.]health and afghanistanupdates[.]site
- [IP address ] C2 server infrastructure â 46.30.188.13 (AS199959, Gwy IT Pty Ltd, Netherlands), also associated with other resolved domains in the cluster
- [Registry paths ] Persistence locations â HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunBeaconBrowserHijack and HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunSystemHelper
- [File names ] Droppers and supporting files â TMS_AfghanTelecom.exe, AFTEL_VPN_Setup.exe, MDEB_Update_Setup.exe, SystemHelper.vbs, and MCIT.pdf
- [File paths ] Startup persistence â %APPDATA%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartupSystemHelper.vbs and the browser shortcut locations targeted for hijacking
- [User-Agent ] C2 beacon identifier â Beacon/1.0.0