Backdoor.Mistic: New Backdoor May be Linked to Ransomware Access Broker

Backdoor.Mistic: New Backdoor May be Linked to Ransomware Access Broker
Backdoor.Mistic is a stealthy new backdoor used in cybercrime intrusions since April 2026, and it has appeared alongside ModeloRAT in activity linked to Woodgnat. The campaign relies on DLL sideloading, in-memory execution, and opportunistic targeting across sectors such as insurance, education, IT, and professional services. #BackdoorMistic #ModeloRAT #Woodgnat #Qilin

Keypoints

  • Backdoor.Mistic has been observed in multiple intrusions since April 2026 and was first documented publicly by Zscaler as MLTBackdoor.
  • The backdoor was deployed through DLL sideloading using legitimate-looking files such as MpExtMs.exe and EndpointDlp.dll.
  • Mistic runs payloads directly in memory, supports file and system manipulation, and includes a kill switch for self-deletion.
  • The activity appears opportunistic and has affected organizations in insurance, education, IT, and professional services.
  • Mistic was seen near ModeloRAT, a Python-based RAT associated with Woodgnat, which has also been linked to Qilin ransomware deployment.
  • Woodgnat operates as an initial access broker and is publicly linked to multiple ransomware groups, including Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta.
  • The broader tradecraft includes ClickFix, FileFix, CrashFix, PowerShell chains, RC4-encrypted C2, persistence mechanisms, and extensive reconnaissance.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1574.002 ] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading – Used when MpExtMs.exe loaded the malicious EndpointDlp.dll through sideloading (‘MpExtMs.exe… was used to sideload malicious DLLs’).
  • [T1055 ] Process Injection – The backdoor executes payloads in memory without writing files to disk, consistent with in-memory execution (‘runs payloads in memory with no file written to disk’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Attackers used tools like curl and PowerShell to download payloads and components (‘download payloads’).
  • [T1059.001 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – PowerShell was used to run commands, download payloads, traverse networks, and execute attacker-supplied commands (‘run commands, download payloads’).
  • [T1083 ] File and Directory Discovery – The operators enumerated files and staged data while using Windows tooling for host assessment (‘gathering host and service inventories’).
  • [T1087.002 ] Account Discovery: Domain Account – The attackers enumerated domain users and groups with net.exe (‘enumerating domain users, groups, computers and sessions’).
  • [T1018 ] Remote System Discovery – They used Windows tools to enumerate computers and sessions across the environment (‘computers and sessions’).
  • [T1021.002 ] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares – The campaign used Windows administrative tools and remote execution capabilities to move through compromised networks (‘execute commands on remote computers’).
  • [T1135 ] Network Share Discovery – The operators gathered network resource information using net.exe (‘manage network resources’).
  • [T1112 ] Modify Registry – Persistence and configuration changes were made through Run-key entries and registry edits (‘using names such as AnyDesk, Splashtop and Comms’).
  • [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – Persistence included scheduled tasks (‘scheduled tasks’).
  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Victims were tricked into pasting and running attacker-supplied commands via ClickFix, FileFix, and Teams lures (‘paste-and-run’).
  • [T1566.001 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – Social-engineering lures and Microsoft Teams pretexts were used to deliver commands (‘helpdesk and IT-support pretexts delivered through external Microsoft Teams chats’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – Data was staged and exfiltrated over HTTP (‘exfiltrated over HTTP using curl.exe’).
  • [T1106 ] Native API – The loader hooked GetModuleFileNameW and LoadLibraryW to control execution flow (‘hooks GetModuleFileNameW and LoadLibraryW’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – The group used obfuscation, layered encryption, and domain-generation algorithms (‘more heavily obfuscated variant’).
  • [T1218 ] System Binary Proxy Execution – Legitimate signed binaries such as pythonw.exe, node.exe, and certutil were abused to run attacker code (‘abused as the carrier and runtime’).
  • [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – A file associated with likely privilege escalation was present (‘Likely privilege escalation – n.dll’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File hashes ] Backdoor.Mistic / loader components – 1e41c7bfaa6aa3b93b6cc024274a10e33f3e12fe7c98c1db387ef8927f9d1984, 59e3c4cb06331b4f2d78a9a0592f3747e573bd01c5a7650c26361d1e25520712, and 2 more hashes
  • [File names ] malicious DLLs, loader, and fake lock screen – endpointdlp.dll, version.dll, and other named files including f.dll and aeff97fe.msi
  • [IP addresses ] command-and-control or related infrastructure – 142.93.242.144, 144.31.53.78, and 2 more IPs
  • [Domains ] lure, update, and C2-related infrastructure – authorized-logins.net, updater-worelos.com, and other 14 more domains
  • [URLs ] downloader or lure paths – hxxp://thomphon.com/update.msi, and related update or login URLs


Read more: https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/new-mistic-backdoor-modelorat