Mandiant reported a 2026 intrusion against Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN infrastructure that began with rogue peering, SSH access, and password manipulation before the attacker exploited CVE-2026-20245 to gain root-level access. The actor then created a troot account, stole SD-WAN configurations, and used extensive anti-forensic cleanup to delete traces of the compromise. #CiscoCatalystSDWAN #CVE-2026-20245 #troot
Keypoints
- Mandiant observed a threat actor targeting a service providerâs Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN environment in early 2026.
- Initial access was linked to unauthorized rogue peering connections that enabled SSH access on SD-WAN Manager devices.
- The attacker used the vmanage-admin and admin accounts to change passwords and access the web application.
- The attacker exploited CVE-2026-20245 through a malicious CSV upload named evil_tenant.csv to obtain root-level access.
- The intrusion created a new privileged user account named troot and used su to switch into it from admin.
- The actor exfiltrated SD-WAN fabric configuration data and then restored or deleted files to reduce forensic visibility.
- Mandiant noted heavy anti-forensic behavior, including file deletion, configuration rollback, and validation scripts to confirm cleanup.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1133 ] External Remote Services â The attacker gained access through unauthorized peering connections that facilitated remote SSH access (âunauthorized peering connections to facilitate SSH accessâ).
- [T1078 ] Valid Accounts â The actor authenticated using legitimate default accounts vmanage-admin and admin to access the SD-WAN Manager (âsuccessfully authenticated to the SD-WAN Manager device via SSH using the vmanage-admin accountâ and âauthenticated directly ⌠using the admin accountâ).
- [T1098 ] Account Manipulation â The attacker changed the admin password and later reverted it to hide activity (âexecute commands to change the password of the default admin accountâ and âchange the password ⌠back to its original stateâ).
- [T1106 ] Native API â The actor used SD-WAN web and CLI interfaces to issue administrative requests and retrieve configuration data (âPOST /j_security_checkâ and âGET /dataservice/âŚâ).
- [T1059.004 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell â The attacker executed shell commands to modify files, create backups, and add the troot account (âgrepâ, âcp -aâ, âecho ⌠>> /etc/passwdâ).
- [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation â CVE-2026-20245 was exploited to escalate from a compromised administrative account to root (âallow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands as rootâ).
- [T1110 ] Brute Force â No brute force is described; not included.
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools â The attacker used anti-forensic cleanup to delete files, restore configurations, and run validation checks to reduce detection (âdeleted all files they createdâ and ârestored any system configurations they modifiedâ).
- [T1070.004 ] Indicator Removal: File Deletion â The actor deleted evil_tenant.csv and other temporary or backup files (âdeleted all files they createdâ).
- [T1070.009 ] Indicator Removal: Clear Persistence â The actor removed malicious persistence-related artifacts by restoring configuration and account-related changes (ârestored any system configurations they modifiedâ).
- [T1036 ] Masquerading â The account name troot was created to resemble a root-level identity (âCreated a user account named troot with full root privilegesâ).
- [T1005 ] Data from Local System â The attacker exfiltrated configuration data from the SD-WAN fabric (âexfiltrated configurations of the SD-WAN fabricâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP addresses] rogue device connections and exploit activity â 126.51.108[.]152, 76.92.245[.]217, and 6 more IPs
- [File paths] recovered or removed files involved in the intrusion â /home/admin/evil_tenant.csv, /home/admin/.orig_passwd, and other 3 items
- [File hash SHA256] malicious CSV payload remnant â b82936f37648518425c7d3cf9e09eaffa41d7cdb3840f6a40287e3a108880f7b
- [Command / script names] malicious upload and validation activity â /usr/bin/vconfd_script_upload_tenant_list.sh, request tenant-upload tenant-list /home/admin/evil_tenant.csv vpn 0
- [Log / config artifacts] authentication and rollback evidence â /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/scripts.log, and /var/confd/rollback/