Zero-Day Exploitation of Vulnerability (CVE-2026-20245) in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager

Zero-Day Exploitation of Vulnerability (CVE-2026-20245) in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager
Mandiant reported a 2026 intrusion against Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN infrastructure that began with rogue peering, SSH access, and password manipulation before the attacker exploited CVE-2026-20245 to gain root-level access. The actor then created a troot account, stole SD-WAN configurations, and used extensive anti-forensic cleanup to delete traces of the compromise. #CiscoCatalystSDWAN #CVE-2026-20245 #troot

Keypoints

  • Mandiant observed a threat actor targeting a service provider’s Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN environment in early 2026.
  • Initial access was linked to unauthorized rogue peering connections that enabled SSH access on SD-WAN Manager devices.
  • The attacker used the vmanage-admin and admin accounts to change passwords and access the web application.
  • The attacker exploited CVE-2026-20245 through a malicious CSV upload named evil_tenant.csv to obtain root-level access.
  • The intrusion created a new privileged user account named troot and used su to switch into it from admin.
  • The actor exfiltrated SD-WAN fabric configuration data and then restored or deleted files to reduce forensic visibility.
  • Mandiant noted heavy anti-forensic behavior, including file deletion, configuration rollback, and validation scripts to confirm cleanup.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1133 ] External Remote Services – The attacker gained access through unauthorized peering connections that facilitated remote SSH access (‘unauthorized peering connections to facilitate SSH access’).
  • [T1078 ] Valid Accounts – The actor authenticated using legitimate default accounts vmanage-admin and admin to access the SD-WAN Manager (‘successfully authenticated to the SD-WAN Manager device via SSH using the vmanage-admin account’ and ‘authenticated directly … using the admin account’).
  • [T1098 ] Account Manipulation – The attacker changed the admin password and later reverted it to hide activity (‘execute commands to change the password of the default admin account’ and ‘change the password … back to its original state’).
  • [T1106 ] Native API – The actor used SD-WAN web and CLI interfaces to issue administrative requests and retrieve configuration data (‘POST /j_security_check’ and ‘GET /dataservice/…’).
  • [T1059.004 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell – The attacker executed shell commands to modify files, create backups, and add the troot account (‘grep’, ‘cp -a’, ‘echo … >> /etc/passwd’).
  • [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – CVE-2026-20245 was exploited to escalate from a compromised administrative account to root (‘allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root’).
  • [T1110 ] Brute Force – No brute force is described; not included.
  • [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – The attacker used anti-forensic cleanup to delete files, restore configurations, and run validation checks to reduce detection (‘deleted all files they created’ and ‘restored any system configurations they modified’).
  • [T1070.004 ] Indicator Removal: File Deletion – The actor deleted evil_tenant.csv and other temporary or backup files (‘deleted all files they created’).
  • [T1070.009 ] Indicator Removal: Clear Persistence – The actor removed malicious persistence-related artifacts by restoring configuration and account-related changes (‘restored any system configurations they modified’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – The account name troot was created to resemble a root-level identity (‘Created a user account named troot with full root privileges’).
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – The attacker exfiltrated configuration data from the SD-WAN fabric (‘exfiltrated configurations of the SD-WAN fabric’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP addresses] rogue device connections and exploit activity – 126.51.108[.]152, 76.92.245[.]217, and 6 more IPs
  • [File paths] recovered or removed files involved in the intrusion – /home/admin/evil_tenant.csv, /home/admin/.orig_passwd, and other 3 items
  • [File hash SHA256] malicious CSV payload remnant – b82936f37648518425c7d3cf9e09eaffa41d7cdb3840f6a40287e3a108880f7b
  • [Command / script names] malicious upload and validation activity – /usr/bin/vconfd_script_upload_tenant_list.sh, request tenant-upload tenant-list /home/admin/evil_tenant.csv vpn 0
  • [Log / config artifacts] authentication and rollback evidence – /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/scripts.log, and /var/confd/rollback/


Read more: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/zero-day-exploitation-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager/