Seqrite TRU uncovered a multi-stage campaign targeting Thailand’s healthcare sector with spear-phishing RAR archives, obfuscated batch loaders, GitHub-hosted payloads, and a Python stealer that attempts Telegram-based exfiltration. The operation used healthcare-themed lures, Startup-folder persistence, and browser credential harvesting to sustain access and steal data, with indicators tied to Health_Ministry_Approved_Equipment_2026, WindowSecuryt.bat, u-t2.bat, and sim.py. #Health_Ministry_Approved_Equipment_2026 #WindowSecuryt.bat #u-t2.bat #sim.py #SeqriteTRU
Keypoints
- Seqrite TRU identified an active malware campaign targeting Thailand’s healthcare sector, including Ministry of Health personnel and affiliated organizations.
- The attackers used healthcare-themed spear-phishing lures delivered through malicious RAR archives.
- The infection chain followed a multi-stage pattern: RAR archive, obfuscated BAT loader, Rouki-obfuscated payload loader, Startup persistence script, secondary batch payload, and a Python stealer.
- Initial samples were observed from April 7, 2026 to June 3, 2026, indicating an active campaign window of roughly ten weeks.
- Several samples were uploaded from Thailand, suggesting local staging infrastructure or compromised local systems.
- The final payload, sim.py, harvested browser data, credentials, and session information, then attempted exfiltration through Telegram Bot API infrastructure.
- The campaign relied on layered obfuscation, GitHub-hosted payloads, cleanup actions, and Startup-folder persistence to evade detection and enable repeatable delivery.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566.001] Spearphishing Attachment – The campaign began with malicious RAR archives delivered as healthcare-themed attachments (‘malicious RAR archives containing obfuscated batch scripts and executable payloads’).
- [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – The victim had to open the lure archive/document to trigger the infection chain (‘lures distributed through malicious RAR archives’).
- [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – Multiple stages used obfuscation and junk code to hide malicious logic (‘obfuscated batch scripts’, ‘junk data and obfuscation logic’).
- [T1036] Masquerading – Payloads were disguised as legitimate files such as PNGs, TXT files, and healthcare documents (‘masquerading as a PNG image’, ‘spoofed medical records’).
- [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – Batch scripts and cmd commands were used to execute the malware chain (‘cmd /c “curl … && call …”’).
- [T1059.001] PowerShell – PowerShell downloaded, decoded, and executed payloads (‘PowerShell to decode the embedded content’, ‘powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -Command’).
- [T1070.004] File Deletion – Temporary artifacts and downloaded archives were deleted after use (‘temporary artifacts are removed’, ‘del C:UsersPublicDesktops.zip’).
- [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – Persistence was established by placing WindowSecuryt.bat in the Windows Startup folder (‘Placement within the Startup directory ensures automatic execution’).
- [T1548] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism – The secondary payload attempted to relaunch with elevated privileges (‘attempts to relaunch itself with elevated privileges’).
- [T1033] System Owner/User Discovery – The exfiltration metadata included usernames and system identifiers (‘System identifiers’, ‘Username information’).
- [T1555] Credentials from Password Stores – The stealer targeted stored credentials and session artifacts (‘Harvests stored credentials and session information’).
- [T1555.003] Credentials from Web Browsers – The malware specifically terminated browsers to access browser databases and cookies (‘Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave’).
- [T1560] Archive Collected Data – Harvested data was compressed into ZIP archives before exfiltration (‘Compresses harvested data into ZIP archives’).
- [T1005] Data from Local System – The stealer collected local browser data and staged files on disk (‘Collects browser-related data’, ‘Stages collected data within temporary directories’).
- [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – Additional payloads were downloaded from GitHub-hosted infrastructure (‘DownloadFile’, ‘curl … from a GitHub-hosted repository’).
- [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – The malware used HTTPS/Web requests for retrieval and transmission (‘https://github.com/…’, ‘api.telegram.org’).
- [T1102] Web Service – The attackers relied on GitHub as a legitimate service for hosting payloads (‘GitHub-hosted payload delivery’).
- [T1567] Exfiltration Over Web Service – Stolen data was sent out through Telegram Bot API requests (‘attempted to transmit stolen data to attacker-controlled Telegram channels’).
- [T1567.002] Exfiltration to Cloud Storage/Web Service – The campaign used Telegram channels as a cloud/web service exfiltration path (‘Telegram Bot API’).
Indicators of Compromise
- [File names] Malicious archive and staged batch/payload files – Health_Ministry_Approved_Equipment_2026.rar, Health_Ministry_Approved_Equipment_2026.bat, WindowSecuryt.bat, u-t2.bat, sim.py
- [SHA256 hashes] Known sample hashes for archive, loaders, and stealer – E5F6D9D405819E6B05B5D8268A2E973294859AD65237EDE36AB612B536D0AC2B, 74BB6AD7E1310F30A3E24FD3CBBFFA2C0C41C64E89E5D0DD1D6900E96B914183, and 3 more hashes
- [URLs] GitHub-hosted payload retrieval and raw content locations – https://github.com/ud-7-te/ud-vtn/raw/main/up-t2.png, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ud-7-te/ud-vtn/main/ud-t2.txt, and https://github.com/d7-te/vtn/raw/main/T2.zip
- [Domain] Telegram exfiltration endpoint – api.telegram.org
- [Dropped files] Staged archive and extracted payloads on disk – C:UsersPublicDesktops.zip, C:UsersPublicDesktopsLibsim.py
- [Startup path] Persistence location used for autorun – C:UsersadminAppDataRoamingMicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartupWindowSecuryt.bat