Operation TaxShadow : Multi-Region Tax Phishing & In-Memory Malware Campaign – CYFIRMA

Operation TaxShadow : Multi-Region Tax Phishing & In-Memory Malware Campaign – CYFIRMA
This report details an Indian tax-themed phishing campaign that used government impersonation, a fake tax portal, and a malicious ZIP archive to deliver a multi-stage malware framework. The malware relied on DLL Search Order Hijacking, token manipulation, reflective PE loading, and WebSocket-based C2, with artifacts and infrastructure linked to #करविवरण.exe #SbieDll.dll #SbieDll.bin #43.128.54.184.

Keypoints

  • The campaign began with a fraudulent tax notification email impersonating an Indian government tax authority.
  • Victims were redirected to a fake tax-themed phishing website that encouraged downloading a malicious ZIP archive.
  • The ZIP archive contained three staged components: कर विवरण.exe, SbieDll.dll, and SbieDll.bin.
  • The malware used DLL Search Order Hijacking to force loading of the malicious SbieDll.dll.
  • Advanced defense-evasion methods included API hooking, token manipulation, COM callback execution, mutated RC4, and LLVM-based Control Flow Flattening.
  • The final payload executed in memory using reflective PE loading and communicated over persistent WebSocket-based C2 traffic.
  • Analysis found Chinese-language artifacts and reused infrastructure, but attribution remained at moderate confidence.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.002 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – Victims were lured through a tax-themed email containing a malicious link to phishing infrastructure (‘malicious link redirecting victims to a phishing website’).
  • [T1189 ] Drive-by Compromise – The phishing page delivered the malicious ZIP package after redirecting users to the fake portal (‘delivered a ZIP package containing staged malware payloads’).
  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Execution depended on the user downloading, extracting, and launching the file (‘execution required user interaction through extraction and execution of कर विवरण.exe’).
  • [T1574.001 ] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking – The malware forced Windows to load malicious SbieDll.dll instead of the legitimate library (‘abuses DLL Search Order Hijacking to force loading of the malicious SbieDll.dll’).
  • [T1620 ] Reflective Code Loading – The final payload was manually reconstructed and run directly in memory (‘execute PE components entirely in memory without using LoadLibrary()’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Control Flow Flattening, mutated RC4, and dynamic execution logic concealed the malware’s behavior (‘Control Flow Flattening, mutated RC4, and dynamic execution logic to conceal behaviour’).
  • [T1140 ] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Encrypted shellcode in SbieDll.bin was decrypted at runtime (‘Encrypted payloads within SbieDll.bin were decrypted during runtime before execution’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – The executable used deceptive localized naming to appear legitimate (‘used deceptive naming and impersonation techniques to appear legitimate’).
  • [T1055 ] Process Injection – Memory-based execution and reflective loading were used to inject and execute payloads (‘reflective loading and memory-based execution mechanisms to inject and execute payloads’).
  • [T1134 ] Access Token Manipulation – Hooks on SetThreadToken() and GetTokenInformation() altered security tokens and impersonation contexts (‘manipulated security tokens and impersonation contexts’).
  • [T1553 ] Subvert Trust Controls – The malware abused trusted Sandboxie-related components and legitimate mechanisms for concealment (‘abused trusted Sandboxes DLL mechanisms and legitimate components’).
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – The loader checked the operating system and environment before continuing (‘performing operating system version checks and environment validation’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 traffic used HTTP/WebSocket protocols (‘established C2 communication through HTTP/WebSocket protocols’).
  • [T1573 ] Encrypted Channel – WebSocket sessions were used as protected communication channels (‘Communication channels were protected using encrypted WebSocket-based sessions’).
  • [T1090 ] Proxy – HTTP CONNECT support indicated proxy-aware communication (‘support for proxy-aware communication through enterprise environments’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Additional components were transferred and loaded between stages (‘Additional payload components were dynamically loaded and transferred between execution stages’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain ] Phishing and infrastructure domains observed in the campaign – guhxmg.com, naiqja.icu, and other 8 domains
  • [Subdomain ] Hosted tax-themed impersonation content and related infrastructure – d.pc-weide.com, taxations.cn-web-okooo.com, and other 2 subdomains
  • [SHA-256 ] Malware and related sample hashes for detection/blocking – 185b7a487316454da04e9cc0fe6eb370bb2955cf6096fe3e8c02c46f8989ba37, 4c9061a07d667bf7dd6f597a43a8552af2f4277b7be06d6ea138abdb668d6a49, and other 3 hashes
  • [IP Address ] External command-and-control or remote communication endpoint – 43.128.54.184
  • [File Names ] Staged payload components delivered in the ZIP archive – कर विवरण.exe, SbieDll.dll, and SbieDll.bin


Read more: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/operation-taxshadow-multi-region-tax-phishing-in-memory-malware-campaign/