PureLogs: Delivery via PawsRunner Steganography

PureLogs: Delivery via PawsRunner Steganography
FortiGuard Labs uncovered a phishing campaign that delivers a TXZ archive, uses environment variables and a steganography loader named PawsRunner, and ultimately deploys the .NET infostealer PureLogs. The attack hides encrypted payloads inside PNG images, including cat photos, while PureLogs steals browser, wallet, and communication-app data before exfiltrating it over HTTPS. #PawsRunner #PureLogs #FortiGuardLabs #MicrosoftWindows

Keypoints

  • FortiGuard Labs identified a phishing campaign targeting Microsoft Windows users with a TXZ archive attachment disguised as an invoice.
  • The JavaScript inside the archive hides malicious commands in environment variables and launches hidden PowerShell and conhost.exe processes.
  • PawsRunner acts as a steganography loader, using PNG images and hidden iTXt/IEND chunk data to retrieve the next-stage payload.
  • The final payload is PureLogs, a .NET infostealer protected with .NET Reactor and configured through Protobuf serialization.
  • PureLogs contacts its C2 server over HTTPS, checks connectivity, then downloads and loads the core DLL after AES decryption and gzip decompression.
  • The malware steals data from a wide range of browsers, crypto wallets, browser extensions, Discord, Telegram, VPN tools, and file transfer applications.
  • Fortinet notes detections, IPS coverage for PureLogs communications, and the ability to block the unusual TXZ attachment format.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – The campaign starts with a phishing email carrying a TXZ archive attachment used as the lure (‘The attack campaign begins with a phishing email containing an TXZ archive…as an attachment’).
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – The JavaScript includes irrelevant multilingual comments and garbled environment variables to obscure intent (‘contains several functions, each preceded by irrelevant comments’ and ‘declare a large number of Process environment variables containing garbled text’).
  • [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – PowerShell is used to execute the hidden command and stage subsequent payload decoding (‘invoked PowerShell also uses the -w hidden flag’).
  • [T1564.003] Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window – The malware hides execution by launching conhost.exe headless and PowerShell with a hidden window (‘launches conhost.exe in headless mode’ and ‘uses the -w hidden flag to hide the PowerShell window’).
  • [T1027.003] Steganography – The loader extracts encrypted data hidden in PNG images using steganographic markers (‘uses steganography to conceal data within the picture’ and ‘uses “iTXt” and “IEND” chunks as markers’).
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – The payload is AES-decrypted, Gzip-decompressed, and Base64-decoded in multiple stages (‘decodes and decrypts its payload using the AES algorithm’ and ‘decompresses it using the Gzip method’).
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The loader downloads next-stage content from remote URLs and replaces the original link if needed (‘retrieve data’, ‘downloaded data’, and ‘fallback URLs’).
  • [T1129] Shared Modules – The malware loads native libraries and resolves API functions dynamically (‘loads native libraries and resolves addresses for necessary API functions’).
  • [T1055] Process Injection – The .NET assembly is loaded and executed dynamically in a fileless manner via reflection (‘loaded and executed dynamically via reflection in a fileless manner’).
  • [T1497.001] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks – The loader bypasses ETW and Windows 11 (24H2) security features before execution (‘After bypassing ETW and Windows 11 (24H2) security features’).
  • [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 and data theft occur via HTTP/HTTPS requests to multiple endpoints (‘uses HTTP requests’ and ‘uses HTTPS for its Command and Control (C2) communications’).
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Harvested data is sent back to the C2 server through HTTP requests (‘exfiltrates it to the C2 server via HTTP requests’).
  • [T1518.001] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery – The malware checks or bypasses ETW and Windows 11 security features, indicating awareness of defensive tooling (‘bypassing ETW and Windows 11 (24H2) security features’).
  • [T1018] Remote System Discovery – PureLogs profiles the victim system using WMI to gather system information (‘leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to profile the victim’s system environment’).
  • [T1119] Automated Collection – The malware runs asynchronous tasks to gather browser, app, and file-search data (‘CreateDemoBrowserDataAsync’, ‘CreateDemoDiscordAsync’, and ‘CreateDemoFileSearchAsync’).
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – It harvests local browser data, wallet data, communication apps, and files from the victim machine (‘The following is a list of harvested items’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP address] C2 server used by the campaign – 5[.]101[.]84[.]202
  • [URL] PNG payload hosted as steganographic carrier – hxxps://everycarebd[.]com/imagelkjh0987[.]png
  • [SHA256 hash] malware sample hash – 8d0bcde739929fe41a6bcaaa62f7cba802af90b2ba8dea6ed1a4821236cdd5886910d27b9e1dc2229a8c280f5d0cea85146d50274c56a4d9a5b8d1793505b1b993724f1a9ad3a28c171927fc449ac34dc6ca890f915f00210e8b305577388c6e0fcb86ae384e9975933314ac2a231f0ff46c0208556bf4a16f096a642d3f505e1b730de72f921458b6b162b105a9521a931f07e19d3cac53207c7a8efbc412f9e2308749f6b7b7573009d0cac6616a6aa83cecb1f2933e868776400d122c86ec


Read more: https://feeds.fortinet.com/~/956103044/0/fortinet/blog/threat-research~PureLogs-Delivery-via-PawsRunner-Steganography