GitHub advisory GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj (CVE-2026-44338) disclosed that PraisonAI’s legacy api_server.py shipped with authentication disabled by default, exposing GET /agents and POST /chat to unauthenticated callers. Within 3 hours and 44 minutes of publication, a scanner using the User-Agent CVE-Detector/1.0 had already probed the vulnerable endpoint on internet-exposed systems, showing how quickly new CVEs are being targeted. #PraisonAI #CVE-2026-44338 #CVE-Detector/1.0 #SysdigTRT
Keypoints
- PraisonAI’s legacy api_server.py had authentication disabled by default, creating an unauthenticated access issue.
- The vulnerable endpoints were GET /agents and POST /chat, both exposed without authorization checks.
- GitHub published advisory GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj and assigned CVE-2026-44338 on May 11, 2026.
- Sysdig TRT observed the first targeted probe only 3 hours, 44 minutes, and 39 seconds after disclosure.
- The scanning activity came from 146.190.133.49 and used the User-Agent CVE-Detector/1.0, indicating automated exploitation attempts.
- The bypass can trigger the configured PraisonAI workflow, which may burn model API quota, execute tools, or disclose configuration details.
- The recommended fix is to upgrade to PraisonAI 4.6.34 or later and avoid exposing the legacy API server to the internet.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1595 ] Active Scanning – The attacker/scanner probed internet-exposed hosts for vulnerable PraisonAI endpoints and other fingerprints, including generic and AI-specific paths (‘The first contact was generic recon… The second pass narrowed to AI-agent surfaces’).
- [T1595.001 ] Scanning IP Blocks – The activity targeted exposed instances across the internet and validated hosts for exploitation readiness (‘probing the exact vulnerable endpoint on internet-exposed instances’).
- [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application – The scanner used GET /agents without authorization to confirm the auth bypass on the exposed application (‘GET /agents from 146.190.133.49, User-Agent CVE-Detector/1.0’).
- [T1078 ] Valid Accounts – The vulnerability description centers on authentication being disabled by default, allowing access without valid credentials (‘GET /agents returns … confirming the bypass was successful’).
- [T1059 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter – The article notes that /chat can trigger configured workflows that may invoke shell or Python-based tooling inside the agent graph (‘grant agents access to a code_interpreter, file I/O, web fetch, shell, or HTTP request tools’).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – The workflows may fetch external content or interact with remote resources as part of their execution (‘web fetch, shell, or HTTP request tools’).
- [T1005 ] Data from Local System – The configured agent workflow may access local files and internal datasets during execution (‘can write files, exfiltrate from internal datasets’).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – The article mentions possible exfiltration and outbound communication from the agent process during post-exploitation activity (‘network egress from the agent process’).
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP Address ] Scanner source observed probing PraisonAI endpoints – 146.190.133.49, and 1 more IP context item (not listed)
- [User-Agent ] Automated CVE-targeting scanner identifier used during probing – CVE-Detector/1.0, and other 0 items
- [URL Paths ] Vulnerable and fingerprinting endpoints targeted during enumeration – /agents, /chat, and other paths such as /docs, /openapi.json, /praisonai/version.txt
- [File Names ] PraisonAI configuration and package fingerprint files referenced during reconnaissance – agents.yaml, pyproject.toml, and other files such as poetry.lock and requirements.txt
- [GitHub Advisory / CVE ] Public disclosure identifiers tied to the issue – GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, CVE-2026-44338