Threat Research | Weekly Recap [23 Nov 2025]

Threat Research | Weekly Recap [23 Nov 2025]

Cybersecurity Threat Research ‘Weekly’ Recap highlights a broad spectrum of activity, from APT and state-backed espionage campaigns to email, banking malware, ransomware, phishing, and supply-chain abuse, along with updates on detection and defensive tooling. Key actors and families mentioned include APT35, APT24, ToddyCat, MuddyWater, UNC1549, Curly COMrades, Kimsuky, NotDoor, WaterSaci, Astaroth, Eternidade, Sarcoma, Lynx, Akira, The Gentlemen, Tycoon2FA, Tsundere, PlushDaemon, NKNShell, TamperedChef, and related C2 and advancement trends.
#APT35 #APT24 #ToddyCat #MuddyWater #UNC1549 #CurlyCOMrades #Kimsuky #NotDoor #WaterSaci #Astaroth #Eternidade #Sarcoma #Lynx #Akira #TheGentlemen #Tycoon2FA #Tsundere #PlushDaemon #NKNShell #TamperedChef

APTs & state-backed espionage

  • Leaked APT35 corpus shows quota-driven IRGC operations exploiting Exchange (ProxyShell/Autodiscover/EWS), mailbox monitoring, KPI-driven ops. – APT35 leak
  • GTIG details APT24’s multi-vector espionage using obfuscated BADAUDIO downloader, web/supply‑chain compromises, and Cobalt Strike payloads. – APT24 / BADAUDIO
  • ToddyCat expanded toolset to exfiltrate browser creds, DPAPI keys, Outlook OSTs and M365 tokens via SMB collection and memory dumps. – ToddyCat email theft
  • Group‑IB exposes a refreshed MuddyWater toolkit enabling international espionage with new implants and TTPs. – MuddyWater toolkit
  • UNC1549 targeted aerospace/defense with spear-phishing, supplier compromise and custom backdoors (TWOSTROKE, DEEPROOT, etc.) using Azure/SSH tunnels. – UNC1549 analysis
  • Curly COMrades abused Hyper‑V to host hidden Alpine VMs running custom implants (CurlyShell, CurlCat) for covert persistence and proxying. – Curly COMrades
  • Contagious Interview: DPRK fake‑job platform lures AI/crypto talent into clipboard‑hijack workflows that deliver staged VBScript loaders and multi‑stage malware. – Contagious Interview
  • Kimsuky campaign using wedding‑photo lures to deliver malware via social engineering (regional/actor attribution reporting). – Kimsuky wedding‑photo lure

Email, Outlook, and mailbox-focused threats

  • NotDoor Outlook VBA backdoor (APT28) uses OneDrive DLL sideloading, encoded PowerShell, registry persistence and email‑triggered C2 detection artifacts. – NotDoor (Outlook)
  • Exchange/Outlook‑centric campaigns and tools (mailbox monitoring, OST/Token theft) persistent in multiple APT operations. – Email‑centric theft (ToddyCat)

Messaging-borne banking malware (WhatsApp & worms)

  • Water‑Saci campaign abused WhatsApp Web via Python/Selenium to propagate banking trojans and in‑memory payloads targeting Brazil. – Water‑Saci / WhatsApp
  • STAC3150 WhatsApp campaign delivered downloaders that harvest WhatsApp session data and ultimately install Astaroth banking trojan via Selenium/WPPConnect. – Astaroth via WhatsApp
  • Trustwave SpiderLabs found Eternidade stealer distributed through a WhatsApp‑propagating worm with MSI droppers and localized Brazilian targeting. – Eternidade / WhatsApp
  • Maverick/Coyote banking trojans continue spreading via WhatsApp downloads and obfuscated loaders targeting Brazilian banks. – Maverick / Coyote

WSUS & software‑update exploitation

  • Actors exploited WSUS RCE (CVE‑2025‑59287) to deploy Velociraptor from S3 and configure malicious update C2 endpoints for persistent C2. – WSUS → Velociraptor
  • Separate findings show ShadowPad delivered via the same WSUS RCE chain using certutil/curl and ETDApix.dll sideloading; mitigation: patch WSUS and restrict access. – ShadowPad via WSUS

Ransomware & extortion trends

  • October 2025 ransomware trends: Inc_Ransom dominance and new Qilin activity (notable attacks vs. Japanese firms) with DLS stats and detection signals. – Oct 2025 ransomware trends
  • CISA/FBI update on Akira RaaS: documented TTPs include credential dumping, lateral movement, ChaCha20/RSA‑4096 encryption and high ransom demands. – Akira advisory
  • Sarcoma profiled as a fast‑emerging double‑extortion RaaS targeting Windows/Linux/ESXi across US, Italy and Canada. – Sarcoma profile
  • Lynx intrusion used valid RDP creds, rapid lateral movement, data exfiltration to temp.sh and backup deletion before encryption. – Lynx incident
  • Analysis of The Gentlemen ransomware family, TTPs and observed campaigns. – The Gentlemen

Phishing, MFA bypass & social engineering

  • Tycoon 2FA PhaaS uses real‑time Adversary‑in‑the‑Middle pages to capture credentials, session tokens and bypass legacy MFA with dynamic obfuscation. – Tycoon 2FA
  • Phishing trends (Oct 2025): attachments dominated by Trojans (47%), heavy use of OLE downloaders and compressed JS droppers—regional focus on Korean campaigns. – Oct 2025 phishing trends
  • Threat actor campaign delivering signed MSI/EXE installers via holiday/party invite lures to install persistent RMM tools (ScreenConnect, LogMeIn Resolve, Naverisk). – RMM via phishing lures
  • Abuse of URL shorteners (t.ly, tinyurl, rebrand.ly, is.gd, goo.su, qrco.de) to scale credential phishing and malware delivery across multiple families. – URL shorteners abused

Malware ecosystems, supply‑chain & signed/packaged abuse

  • “TamperedChef” global malvertising/SEO campaign uses acquired code‑signing certificates to distribute signed fake installers and obfuscated JS backdoors. – TamperedChef signed installers
  • npm‑based campaign (dino_reborn) used Adspect cloaking to fingerprint and serve fake CAPTCHAs that redirect to malicious crypto‑phishing sites. – npm + Adspect cloaking
  • Tsundere Node.js botnet installs via MSI/PowerShell, uses npm libs and stores WebSocket C2 addresses in an Ethereum smart contract. – Tsundere / blockchain C2

Infostealers, commodity malware & novel obfuscation

  • AhnLab’s infostealer report: SEO‑poisoned crack/keygen distribution, DLL sideloading, and top families (Rhadamanthys, ACRStealer, LummaC2) with C2 patterns. – Infostealer trend report
  • Masked‑in‑Memory Python sample unpacks a marshalled .pyc, injects into cvtres.exe and loads a .NET component for encrypted C2. – Hidden .pyc memory loader
  • DarkComet RAT variant hidden inside fake Bitcoin tool RAR installs persistence, keylogging and beacons to hardcoded DDNS C2. – DarkComet Bitcoin lure
  • Netskope shows LLMs (GPT‑3.5/4 and early GPT‑5 tests) can generate malicious code—LLM‑powered malware feasible but often unreliable; guardrails affect capability. – LLM‑powered malware
  • “5 Ways Cybercrime Became a Subscription Business” highlights pay‑as‑you‑go services (phishing, OTP bots, access rentals) lowering attacker barriers. – Crime as subscription
  • LOLBin abuses explained with interactive sandbox examples to reveal living‑off‑the‑land misuse and detection pointers. – LOLBin attacks guide
  • macOS AppleScript droppers (.scpt) used as social‑engineered droppers for MacSync/Odyssey stealers, bypassing Gatekeeper via user interaction. – macOS AppleScript droppers

Network implants, update‑hijacking & C2 innovation

  • ESET documents PlushDaemon using MIPS EdgeStepper implants to forward DNS, hijack updates and deploy SlowStepper backdoors via update‑hijacking chain. – PlushDaemon / EdgeStepper
  • Larva‑24010 distributed trojanized VPN installer that deploys MeshAgent, gs‑netcat and new NKNShell using NKN/MQTT for C2; persistence via PowerShell downloaders. – NKNShell via VPN site

Detection, threat intelligence & defensive tooling

  • Recorded Future showcases automated threat intelligence for machine‑speed detection, ML risk scoring and SIEM/SOAR/EDR integrations. – Threat intel automation
  • Recorded Future’s Threat Intelligence Maturity Model (Reactive→Autonomous) and operationalization guidance for CTI teams. – Operational CTI model
  • SentinelOne released a Validin + Synapse power‑up for time‑aware, cross‑source infra discovery and campaign expansion pivots. – Threat Hunting Power Up
  • Datadog highlighted as a 2025 cloud security leader for linking code, observability and runtime security to reduce investigation complexity. – Datadog cloud security
  • AttackIQ published Sandworm emulation content detailing webshells, living‑off‑the‑land TTPs and sample artifacts for red/blue teams. – Sandworm emulation

Threat Research | Weekly Recap – hendryadrian.com