LockBit Ransomware Gang Attacks an MSP and Two Manufacturers Using…

eSentire intercepted three LockBit affiliate ransomware attacks aimed at an MSP and two manufacturers, halting them before widespread impact. The report highlights how attackers used RMM tools and remote-access software—and even brought their own tools—to propagate ransomware, often leveraging Living-off-the-Land techniques to fly under detection.
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Keypoints

  • eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) stopped three LockBit affiliate ransomware attacks between February 2022 and June 2023, targeting an MSP and two manufacturers.
  • Attackers reused legitimate IT tools (RMM and remote access software) to spread ransomware and, in some cases, brought their own tools to the environment (Living-off-the-Land).
  • Initial access came from multiple methods, including browser-based attacks and valid credentials, complicating detection.
  • Key operations included use of PsExec, AnyDesk, Atera, and ConnectWise ScreenConnect to move laterally or persist, with attempts to deploy ransomware to downstream customers.
  • Technical details reveal PowerShell-based loaders, in-memory DLL loading, API hashing (ROR13), XOR obfuscation, AMSI and UAC bypasses, and anti-forensics like shadow-copy deletion.
  • Recommendations emphasize securing RMM/remote-access tools (2FA, ACLs, VPNs, certificate-based access), continuous MDR, patching, phishing awareness, and proactive threat intel.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1078] Valid Accounts – LockBit affiliates gained initial access via valid credentials among other methods. ‘LockBit affiliates tend to get initial access via numerous methods, including browser-based attacks like SocGholish, exploitation of vulnerable servers exposed to the Internet, and valid credentials.’
  • [T1021.001] Remote Services – Attackers used legitimate remote-access software (AnyDesk, Atera, ConnectWise ScreenConnect) and even brought their own copies to spread ransomware. ‘using legitimate RMM tools and remote access software to deploy their ransomware, including Advanced IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera and ConnectWise ScreenConnect™.’
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – A PowerShell loader and obfuscated layers were used to load the ransomware in memory. ‘The third deobfuscated layer reveals the PowerShell loader that contains the LockBit ransomware binary. The deobfuscated script is responsible for reflectively loading the DLL that is base64-encoded and GZIP-compressed into the current process in memory, resulting in the ransomware execution.’
  • [T1055] Process Injection – In-memory loading of the DLL within the current process to execute the ransomware. ‘reflectively loading the DLL that is base64-encoded and GZIP-compressed into the current process in memory, resulting in the ransomware execution.’
  • [T1562.001] Impair Defenses – AMSI bypass by manipulating AMSI state to avoid scanning. ‘Before executing the decoded data, the script attempts to disable the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) by assigning amsiInitFailed to “True”‘
  • [T1548.002] Bypass User Account Control – UAC bypass via COM Elevation Moniker to elevate privileges. ‘The COM Elevation Moniker with “Elevation:Administrator!new:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}”‘
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – OS version detection via PEB data. ‘LockBit determines the version of the Windows operating system currently running on the system from the PEB data structure.’
  • [T1490] Inhibit System Recovery – Shadow copies deletion to hinder recovery. ‘delete shadow volume copies of the manufacturer’s files’
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – String decryption and XOR-based decryption. ‘The ransomware decrypts the strings using bitwise XOR operations’ and ‘decrypt the strings using bitwise XOR operations’
  • [T1562.004] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Security Tools (generalized) – TrustedInstaller technique to stop Defender and other security measures. ‘locks to stop services such as Microsoft Defender Antivirus; it queries for the TrustedInstaller service, starts the service and duplicates the token for the TrustedInstaler.exe process.’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Name] context – LBG64.exe, LBG32.exe
  • [Hash] context – 38c813d99d54de6639a80148ff1cfc6acec08066b0912c49576604ed67e9cfaf, 8793537b1422beb7d314c65761135b38c63fbdefac6092e93c80191a2e22de91

Read more: https://www.esentire.com/blog/russia-linked-lockbit-ransomware-gang-attacks-an-msp-and-two-manufacturers-using-the-targets-rmm-tools-to-infect-downstream-customers-and-employees-with-ransomware