Socket detected a coordinated typosquatting npm campaign dubbed “StegaBin” that published 26 malicious packages which use Pastebin-based character-level steganography to hide Vercel C2 infrastructure and deliver a multi-stage installer that ultimately deploys a RAT and a nine-module infostealer targeting developer artifacts. The activity is consistent with the North Korean-aligned cluster tracked as FAMOUS CHOLLIMA / Contagious Interview and includes a shared loader (vendor/scrypt-js/version.js, SHA256: da1775d0…) and live C2 at 103[.]106[.]67[.]63:1244. #StegaBin #FAMOUS_CHOLLIMA
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Daily Recap, North Korea actors published 26 steganographic npm packages (StegaBin) that pull Vercel-hosted C2s from Pastebin to deploy credential stealers and a RAT, while APT37 expanded tooling with LNKs and implants (Restleaf, ThumbSBD, VirusTask, FootWine) to bridge air-gapped systems via USB and Zoho WorkDrive C2s. CISA warns RESURGE remains dormant on Ivanti Connect Secure devices (CVE-2025-0282) with ECC encryption, forged TLS certs, SSH tunnels and traffic fingerprinting for covert persistence — a malicious campaign delivers a RAT via trojanized gaming utilities (Xeno.exe, RobloxPlayerBeta.exe) connecting to C2 79.110.49.15 for data theft and follow-up payloads, and ClawJacked fixes tighten WebSocket checks to block localhost brute-force abuse. #StegaBin #APT37 #RESURGE #IvantiConnectSecure #CVE20250282 #XenoExe #RobloxPlayerBetaExe #ClawJacked #OpenClaw #VAL4K
Researchers disclosed a new iteration of the Contagious Interview campaign — tracked as StegaBin and attributed to the North Korean Famous Chollima cluster — that published 26 malicious npm packages masquerading as developer tools to deliver a developer-targeted credential stealer and remote access trojan. The packages use install.js to run a…
Cybersecurity Threat Research ‘Weekly’ Recap highlights burgeoning risks from agentic AI in SOCs, OpenClaw backdoors, and AI‑augmented malware experiments, spanning supply‑chain abuse, developer‑targeting campaigns, phishing, and OT/edge security implications. It catalogs notable actors and families—OpenClaw, SURXRAT, Moonrise, Winos 4.0, Lazarus/Medusa, APT36, APT37, GRIDTIDE, UNC2814, MuddyWater—and techniques from StegaBin steganography to Go module backdoors and AI‑assisted detection engineering. #OpenClaw #AMOS #SURXRAT #Moonrise #Winos4.0 #Lazarus #Medusa #APT36 #APT37 #GRIDTIDE #MuddyWater #StegaBin #XWorm #DcRAT